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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that from the end of the First World War in November 1918 to the 
signing of the Locarno Pact in December 1925, Eyre Crowe's perception of 
Germany, as articulated in the 1907 Memorandum and held consistently afterwards, 
was that of British governments and the Foreign Office during those years. It also 
asserts that between the end of the First World War and the signing of the Locarno 
Treaty, the Crowe Memorandum was not used by the Foreign Office as an inflexible 
dogma, but rather as a framework within which policies towards Germany could be 
formulated and business conducted. Moreover, it will be emphasised that the 
treatment of Germany in the period 1918 to 1925 cannot be fully understood 
without regular reference to the work of Foreign Office diplomats, especially, Crowe. 
The thesis will reveal that during key diplomatic events of the period, most notably, 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the London Conference of 1924, at which the 
Dawes Report on German reparations was accepted by the wartime allies and 
Germany, Crowe's ideas on Germany were deeply influential on his political 
superiors, especially, the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George (1916-1922), 
and three Foreign Secretaries, Lord Curzon(1919-1924), Raonsay MacDonald (both 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1924) and Austen chamberlain (1924-1929) 
In particular, it will emphasise that although Lloyd George did not like the `experts' 
of the Foreign Office and tried to conduct foreign policy towards the German 
government almost without them, his attitudes to Germany mirrored those of Crowe. 
Both wanted Germany to be treated firmly, but fairly after the war, but were opposed 
to Germany being crushed. The thesis will also argue that, after the fall of Lloyd 
George in October 1922, Crowe was indispensable to the brilliant, but indecisive 
Curzon, and that it was Crowe's work that moved British policy forwards in the 
direction of an end to the Ruhr crisis. In 1924, when MacDonald formed the first 
Labour administration and assumed the onerous dual role, he was content to allow 
Crowe and Foreign Office officials to formulate policies, enabling him to make 
decisions rapidly. It was Crowe's work that was behind the great success of the 
London Conference of 1924, although, as in Paris before the Treaty of Versailles, 
Crowe himself was pushed to the background and MacDonald, a true politician, took 
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Chapter 1 
The Foreign Office and Review of Literature 
There has been an exhaustive literature on almost every aspect of the causes and 
consequences of the First World War. A great deal of this writing has concentrated on 
the failings of the Paris Pace settlement and the international crisis of the 1930s, 
which culminated in the outbreak of the Second World War. What has been far more 
neglected is the period following the peace conference, leading up to the signing of 
Locarno Treaty of 1925, which is the main focus of this thesis. Even within the extant 
literature, one figure (Eyre Crowe), who, it will be argued here, was deeply influential 
on British foreign policy in this period has been neglected: Indeed, very little is 
known about Crowe's important contribution to the course of British foreign policy, 
and especially his views towards Germany following the end of the First World War. 
To rectify this omission, this thesis will examine the influence of Sir Eyre Crowe 
(1864-1925) on the perceptions of Germany held within the Foreign Office between 
the end of the First World War and the signing of the Locarno Pact. He was generally 
considered to be the Foreign Office's foremost expert on Germany and he was the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State from November 1920, until his death in April 
1925. The thesis will provide evidence that such perceptions were, to a great extent, 
those of Crowe himself. The thesis will, therefore, require an analysis of Crowe's 
celebrated `Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and 
Germany, ' submitted on I January 19071. Although this document has particular 
I `Memorandum on the Present State of Relations with France and Germany, ' I 
January 1907, reproduced as `German Foreign Policy Before The War: The 1907 
relevance to the period before and during the First World War, this thesis will 
demonstrate that with regard to Foreign Office attitudes to Germany, it continued to 
have great resonance after 1918. The argument presented in this thesis, which will be 
fully elaborated in the chapters that follow can be summarised thus: This thesis argues 
that from the end of the First World War to the signing of the Locarno Pact in 
December 1925, Eyre Crowe's perception of Germany, as articulated in the 1907 
Memorandum, and held to consistently afterwards, was that of British governments 
and the Foreign Office during those years. It also asserts that the Crowe Memorandum 
was not used by the Foreign Office as an inflexible dogma, but rather as a framework 
within which policies towards Germany could be formulated and business conducted. 
Moreover, it will be emphasised that the treatment of Germany in the period 1918 to 
1925 cannot be fully understood without regular reference to the work of Foreign 
Office diplomats, especially, Crowe. The thesis will reveal that during key diplomatic 
events of the period, most notably, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the 
London Conference of 1924, at which the Dawes Report on German reparations was 
agreed, Crowe's ideas on Germany were deeply influential on his political superiors, 
especially, the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George (1916-1922), and three Foreign 
Secretaries, Lord Curzon (1919-1924), Ramsay MacDonald (both Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary in 1924) and Austen Chamberlain (1924-1929) In particular, it 
will be emphasised that although Lloyd George did not like the `experts' of the 
Foreign Office and tried to conduct foreign policy towards the German government 
almost without reference to them at important times, his attitudes to Germany 
mirrored those of Crowe. Both wanted Germany to be treated firmly, but fairly after 
the war, but were opposed to Germany being crushed. The thesis will also argue that, 
Memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, with a foreword by Hilaire Belloc in A Friends of 
Europe Publications, London, 1934, pp. 1-30. See also Chapter 2, pp. 58-59. 
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after the fall of Lloyd George in October 1922, Crowe was indispensable to the 
brilliant, but indecisive Curzon, and that it was Crowe's work that moved British 
policy forwards in the direction of an end to the Ruhr crisis. In 1924, when 
MacDonald formed the first Labour administration and assumed the onerous dual 
role, he was content to allow Crowe and Foreign Office officials to formulate policies, 
enabling himself to make decisions rapidly. It was Crowe's work that was behind the 
great success of the London Conference of 1924, although, as in Paris before the 
Treaty of Versailles, Crowe himself was pushed to the background and MacDonald 
took the credit. When the new Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin came to 
power, the new Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, was overwhelmed by the 
question of European security, including how to improve relations with France and 
Germany. It was Crowe and the Foreign Office that provided a solution that 
ultimately ended in the signing of the Locarno Treaty in December 1925. In fact, 
Crowe, had always hoped for a peaceful Germany and it is probable that, had Crowe 
lived, he would have advocated an `eastern Locarno' that dealt with Germany's 
eastern frontiers, but the Foreign Office was, for a few years, a ship without a rudder. 
The thesis is structured in the following way. The opening chapter 
outlines the nature of the research, the sources consulted, and provides a wide-ranging 
analysis of the historiography relevant to the study of this period. Chapter 2 examines 
the life and career of Sir Eyre Crowe up to the end of the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, but will pay special attention to the role of himself and other Foreign Office 
delegates prior to the 'signing of the `German Treaty, '- the Treaty of Versailles on 28 
June 1919. The third chapter will analyse the three years of so-called `Conference 
Diplomacy' from January 1920 to January 1923. Until October 1922, Lloyd George 
conducted the British government's foreign policy towards Germany largely without 
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utilising the expertise of Foreign Office officials such as Crowe. Yet, it will show that 
whilst Lloyd George and the Foreign Of lice differed greatly over policies towards 
France and Russia, their views on Germany were very similar, despite holding widely 
divergent opinions about diplomatic styles and methods. It will be also be 
demonstrated that the views of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and the Foreign 
Office on Germany also had much in common with those of Crowe, as well as how 
much Curzon depended on Crowe's advice and support. The fourth chapter analyses 
the Ruhr crisis of 1923, an event of great significance in inter-war diplomatic history. 
Evidence will be provided that elucidates the considerable role of Sir Eyre Crowe and 
his influence on British government policies in the year from January 1923 to January 
1924. The part played by Crowe and the Foreign Office in the fall of Ramsay 
MacDonald's first Labour government of 1924 has sometimes been misrepresented 
and the fifth chapter will show that, in fact, MacDonald (who acted as his own 
Foreign Secretary) and the leading Foreign Office officials had a very positive 
relationship and there was much mutual respect between himself and his Permanent 
Under-Secretary. There were differences over the Geneva Protocol and Bolshevik 
Russia, but it will be shown that Crowe and his fellow mandarins were influential in 
the successful acceptance by the major powers, including Germany, of the Dawes 
Report on German reparations, despite Crowe's complaints about his own inactivity at 
the London Conference of August 1924. The penultimate chapter will examine the 
crucial role that Crowe played in the early discussions about a western European 
security pact that resulted, six months after his death, in the signing of the Locarno 
Pact. The conclusion will re-emphasise the influence of Crowe on British foreign 
policy and on attitudes within the Foreign Office towards Germany. 
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The thesis made extensive use of a number of private papers, including, 
Hardinge, Vansittart, Lloyd George, Curzon, Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, 
MacDonald, Tyrell and John Strachey. Also consulted extensively were Foreign 
Office archives, private papers, letters, Parliamentary debates, newspaper extracts and 
articles from journals and books. The availability to historians of the collected 
editions entitled Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,2 has been 
extremely valuable and the first of the series covers the period of the study almost 
exactly. The first volume of the next series covers the year 1925, including the 
Locarno Treaty. 
But, the most important collection proved to be the Crowe papers, which, 
as the thesis will demonstrate, have been neglected in many previous studies. Crowe 
did not live long enough to write his memoirs and so it is through the Documents on 
British Foreign Policy that historians can discover the depth of his insight and 
directness of his views in his daily work from 1920 to 1925. But the private papers 
and letters not only reveal the private family man and that his marriage was an 
intellectual partnership (he did not show any sign of condescension in his reports of 
diplomatic affairs to his wife Clema), but also Crowe's very strong opinions on his 
political masters and the great events in which he participated. This is particularly true 
of the events of 1919 and 1924. It is astonishing that many large-scale works of the 
period have apparently not used the Crowe Papers, for example, Margaret 
MacMillan's The Peacemakers, or indeed the private papers of other senior 
diplomats. Even Sibyl Eyre Crowe and Edward Corp did not use them fully, for 
example, neglecting to discover what Crowe and the Foreign Office actually did in 
` Sir L. Woodward et al (eds. ) Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter 
DBIFP), Series 1, Volumes I-XXVII, 1919-1925, London, 1947-1985, and Series IA, 
Volume 1, London, 1986. 
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Paris in May and June of 1919.3 They seemed to be so determined to assert the 
importance of Crowe and to counter Alan Sharp's view that the Foreign Office was 
`in eclipse'4 that they failed to confront the considerable evidence that ran contrary to 
their opinion and to persuade historians that they were still right. 
There is one large single volume biography of Sir Eyre Crowe5 written 
in English, and co-written by his daughter, Sibyl Eyre Crowe and Edward Corp. It is 
invaluable for this study, was well researched and is particularly useful up to the final 
five years of Crowe's life when he was the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office. It does have a number of weaknesses, in particular its hagiographic 
nature and a tendency to criticise all whose ideas and actions conflicted with Crowe, 
especially his predecessor as Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Hardinge. It is also 
critical of Lloyd George and Curzon. Yet the book contains a chapter on the work of 
Crowe and the Foreign Office in Paris in 1919, and focuses on his highly important 
work as Ambassador Plenipotentiary after Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George had 
gone home. It contains very little about the largely secretarial role of Crowe and his 
fellow delegates in the first six months of 1919, prior to the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles - the `German Treaty. ' It will be one of the purposes of this thesis, to some 
extent, to fill in this gap, using the private papers of Crowe himself. The biography 
also does not give sufficient space to the four and a half years when Crowe was the 
Permanent Under-Secretary. From the standpoint of this study, too much attention 
was given to Crowe's early life. 
3 See Chapter 2, pp. 72-76. 
4 See Chapter 1, p. 15. 
S S. E. Crowe and E. Corp, Our Ablest Public Servant- Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925, 
Braunton, Devon, 1993. 
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Crowe and Corp aimed to raise the profile of their subject, claiming that 
his place in the history of the period had been undervalued and, more often than not, 
ignored. Yet, Eyre Crowe was not unknown to scholars. Harold Nicolson, one of his 
juniors in the Foreign Office, describes his chief almost in terms of hero-worship. 6 
Nicolson said that, in Paris in 1919, Crowe had stood up so successfully to the 
bullying tactics of the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau and that even 
`The Tiger' was forced to admire him. Gordon Craig, who knew many of the 
diplomats who served in the Foreign Office in the 1930s, praised Crowe in his work.? 
Three of Crowe's successors as Permanent Under-Secretary, Robert Vansittart, 
William Strang and Ivone Kirkpatrick all lauded Crowe in their memoirs. 8 John 
Connell believed that Crowe's views influenced the Foreign Office until the 1950s, 
with the disastrous exception of the two peacetime years of Neville Chamberlain as 
prime minister and the years of World War Two .9 This view was supported 
by a 
more recent historian who stated that "it has been argued correctly that the `Crowe 
doctrine' became the litmus by which all policy discussed within the Foreign Office 
was measured until the early 1950's... "'° According to Erik Goldstein, Crowe was 
6 H. Nicolson, Peacemaking, London, 1933, p. 211. In a recent biography of 
Nicolson, his `hero-worship' of Crowe is repeatedly extolled. Rose contrasts Crowe 
with his successor, Sir William Tyrrell: "As one high official put it plainly: 'Where 
Crowe would fearlessly confront a situation, Tyrrell would take avoiding action and 
let the thing blow itself out. ' " N. Rose, Harold Nicolson, London, 2005, p. 33. 
G. A. Craig, `The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain' in G. A. 
Craig and F. Gilbert (eds), The Diplomats, Princeton, 1953, pp. 26-29. 8 Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession, London, 1958, pp. 62-63; Lord Strang, Home 
and Abroad, London, 1956, pp. 271-273. The Inner Circle: The Memoirs of Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, London, 1959, p. 12. Strang said that "I would place him first amongst 
all those who have occupied this seat in his time and ours. " Crowe and Corp, Ablest 
Public Servant, p. 403. 
9 J. Connell, The 'Office. A Study of British Foreign Policy and its Makers, 1919- 
1951, London, 1958. 
10 B. McKercher, 'Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 
1919-1939, ' in M. Dockrill and B. McKercher (eds. ), Diplomacy and World Power: 
Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950, Cambridge, 1996, p. 85. 
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"one of the outstanding diplomatists in British history... " who made a very positive 
contribution to post-war Europe. I1 
Perhaps the greatest praise of all came from John Gregory, in a book 
written after his premature departure from the Foreign Office in 1928.12 
How rarely it must happen to any institution to have been led by a man who is 
so wedded to it, so identified with it, that you might almost say that he was 
that institution, that he was of its very substance, as it was of his! Crowe and 
the Foreign Office were one and indivisible. He was its life; and his life was 
the Foreign Office and nothing but the Foreign Office. 13 
Historians, though, have not always been complimentary about Crowe. In 
her seminal work on the Foreign Office before the First World War, Zara Steiner was 
less enthusiastic about the Crowe Memorandum, believing it to be a negative account 
of recent German history. 14 After becoming Prime Minister in December 1916, Lloyd 
George frequently expressed an unfavourable attitude to the diplomats of the Foreign 
Office. is It is perhaps inevitable that supporters of Lloyd George, such as his 
compatriot, Kenneth Morgan, were also critical of the Foreign Office and tended to 
view its personnel in the same light as he did. 16 In Germany between the wars, one 
historian called him "der böse Geist" (the evil spirit) of the Foreign Office. '7 
11 E. Goldstein, Winning The Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning 
and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920, Oxford, 1991, p. 118. 
12 J. D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy: Rambles and Reflections, 1902-1928, 
London, 1928. Gregory, an Assistant Under-Secretary, was dismissed following the 
`Francs Case' in 1928. See R. S. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment 
to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-1929, London, 1997, pp. 22-23. 
13 Ibid, p. 255.1 
14 Z. S. Steiner, The J, qreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, Cambridge, 
1969. See also Chapter' 2, p. 63. This book greatly increased the awareness of scholars 
of modern diplomatic history of the personalities and work of men such as Crowe, 
Hardinge and Tyrrell. 
's See Chapter 1, pp. 13-14. 
16 K. O. Morgan, Consensus and Diversity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 
1918-1922, London, 1979, p. 139. Morgan repeats Lloyd George's criticism of the 
inadequacy of Crowe and Foreign Office experts in dealing with political matters, 
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Steiner's book stimulated the production of a number of articles that 
discussed Crowe's career. Keith Wilson showed that Crowe's opinions on Germany 
were not, at first, accepted by some of his superiors before the 1907 Memorandum 
was submitted. 18 Richard Cosgrove refuted what he believed was the traditional 
portrayal of Crowe as the British equivalent of the devious, poisonous and disloyal 
Holstein of the German Foreign Office, prior to the war. He described Crowe's family 
background and said that he did not have the advantages of Aristocratic lineage or 
connections. Furthermore, he was born and educated in Germany (not an English 
public school and Oxbridge), and had married into a minor German aristocratic 
family. "Crowe achieved success by virtue of his superior gifts, but he was never 
fully integrated into the Foreign Office hierarchy. His German origins set him apart at 
once. " Yet, Cosgrove named eighteen former Foreign Office officials, including Sir 
Edward Grey, who paid special tributes to Crowe in their memoirs. Cosgrove 
concluded that Crowe's criticisms of Germany "were indistinguishable from those of 
Haardinge, Nicolson and Bertie, " but it was his ability to v rbalize those fears and 
formulate policy clearly and logically that made him remar able. By stating policy 
choices in unequivocal language, Crowe fostered the impression that he led opinion 
within the Foreign Office. He declared plainly, however, only what other colleagues 
believed but expressed in muted form. Crowe crystallized ideas which had already 
gained currency among other diplomats; his logic did not convert them but they 
assented to conclusions already accepted. " It is a highly plausible argument, but it 
particularly over the affair in December 1919 (see Chapter 2, pp. 81-82). Crowe and 
Corp accused Lloyd George of lying. See Ablest Public Servant, p. 369. " H. Lutz, Eyre Crowe I)er Bose Geist des Foreign Office, Stuttgart and Berlin, 
1931. 
18 K. M. Wilson, `Sir Eyre Crowe on the Origin of the Crowe Memorandum of I 
January 1907, ' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, Volume 56, Number 
134 (1987), pp. 240-242. 
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only tells part of the story. What set Crowe above his contemporaries, as Cosgrove 
elsewhere explains, were his industry, superior subject knowledge and directness. 19 
In an article written shortly after Crowe and Corp's biography, Sir Alan Campbell 
attempted a more balanced assessment. 20 In Campbell's view, 
Crowe was the arch professional and despised what he called `meddlesome 
busy bodies' such as journalists or members of parliament. He does not seem 
to have been aware of the dangers to his own profession of being thought to be 
isolated from public and parliamentary opinion. His insistence on high 
professional standards even led to his opposition to several overdue reforms in 
the recruitment and structure of the Foreign Service. 21 
It would not be correct to infer that Crowe was simply expressing the 
foreign policy of the Conservative Party, before, during and after the war. Inbal Rose, 
though, was right to identify some areas of mutual agreement between it and Foreign 
Office mandarins such as Crowe after 1918, for example, regarding Germany's 
ambitions towards Russia22 and the threat posed by Bolshevism to the British 
Empire. 23 "An acquaintance with present and, perhaps more significantly, past 
opinions of some of the members of the Foreign Office encouraged the belief that 
they shared a similar, traditional conservative view of policy. "24 In a work that is 
essential for diplomatic historians of the period before the First World War, Paul 
Kennedy supported the notion that there was a Foreign Office mind on Germany. 25 
19 R. A. Cosgrove, `The Career of Sir Eyre Crowe: A Reassessment, ' Albion, Volume 
4, Number 4 (1972), pp. 193-205. 
20 Sir A. Campbell, `Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925,1'CO Historical Branch, 
Occasional Papers, Number 8, August 1994, pp. 31-45. 
21 Campbell, `Sir Eyre Crowe', p. 43. 
22 I. Rose, Conservatism and Foreign Policy during the Lloyd George Coalition, 
1918-1922, London, 1999, pp. 213-215. 
23 Ibid, p. 206. 
24 Ibid, p. 26. 
25 P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1880-1914, London, 
1980. 
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The Foreign Office is still an institution with an air of mystery to many 
British people. Yet, there are a number of accounts of its history, some of which come 
from the Foreign Office History Department. 6 There are a number of articles relevant 
to this study in a collection edited by Roger Bullen. 27 Nor is it true to say that the 
Foreign Office mandarins kept their work secret forever, judging from the 
autobiographies of some of the mandarins. They provide fascinating and very 
readable accounts of their careers, although they are not always completely reliable, 
as they are as prone to selective memory and self-justification as any other 
autobiographies. 28 However, they did not usually provide historians with the amount 
of detail that they required in order to cross-reference evidence. It would not be until 
the availability of substantial, hitherto unseen archive material in the 1960s that a 
greater academic awareness of the role of Foreign Office mandarins before, during 
and immediately after the First World War was facilitated. 
Zara Steiner's book on the Foreign Office is vitally important. 29 Using the 
newly available archives, she analysed the organisation of the `Office' and showed 
that it was not living in the past, but had undergone considerable reform in 1905 and 
1906, of which Crowe himself was the prime mover. 30 Her work altered many 
perceptions of the `old' Foreign Office. "The nineteenth century Foreign Office (had) 
26 Library of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO Historical Branch, 
Occasional Papers. See Bibliography. 
27 R. Bullen (ed), The Foreign Office, 1782-1982, Frederick, Maryland, 1984. For 
example, A. Sharp, `Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office', pp. 66-84. 
28 The memoirs of Lord Hardinge are a good example. See Lord Hardinge of 
Penshurst, Old Diplomacy, London, 1947. 
29 Steiner, Foreign Office. 
30 "The decisive role played by Crowe in the introduction of the reforms increased 
his reputation for brilliance ...... E. Maisel, The Foreign 
Office and Foreign Policy, 
1919-1926, Brighton, 1994, p. 46. 
long been regarded as the epitome of `old diplomacy'. ' 31 It was criticised for being 
old-fashioned in its methods, 32 but actually had been repeatedly reformed and in 1914 
was in "modern sociological parlance... a knowledge-based organisation with 
efficient information management procedures geared towards informed policy- 
making. " ti In 1920, it was reformed again when the Foreign Office and the 
Diplomatic Service were amalgamated, although Christina Larner argued that this was 
"less complete and less effective than has hitherto been thought... s34 
Steiner also supplied invaluable biographical detail about men such as 
Hardinge, Tyrrell and Crowe (including her critical view of his 1907 memorandum), 
elucidated the confused days before Britain's declaration of war on Germany in 
August 1914 and discussed the declining influence of the Foreign Office. In July 
1914, Crowe quarrelled with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Crowe wanted 
a clear government statement to Germany that Britain would support Belgium if it 
were to be invaded, but Grey prevaricated. 35 
Historians have since developed some of the themes outlined in her study. 
Roberta Warman analysed the question of the erosion of Foreign Office power during 
the war. Beginning with Hardinge's return to the Foreign Off ice as Permanent Under- 
31 A. J. P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign policy, 1792-1939, 
London, 1957, pp. 167-200 cited in T. G. Otte, `Old Diplomacy : Reflections on the 
Foreign Office before 1914, ' Contemporary British History, Volume 18, Number 3 
(2004), p. 31. 
32 Steiner, Foreign Office, pp. 10-15. 
33 Otte, `Old Diplomacy', p. 31. 
34 C. Larner, `The Amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office, ' 
Journal of contemporary History, Volume 7, (1972), p. 107. 
35 In his memoirs, Lloyd George also blamed Grey who, he said, could have united 
the Cabinet over Belgian neutrality, but had merely demanded an international 
conference. See G. W. Egerton, `The Lloyd George War Memoirs: a study in the 
Politics of Memory, ' Journal of Modern History, Volume 60,1-2 (1988), pp. 74-75. 
Another view is that during the crisis of July 1914, Crowe "pushed too hard for an 
early British commitment to go to war with Germany... Grey admonished him and [in 
1916] blocked his certain promotion to succeed Nicolson as Permanent Under- 
Secretary. " See McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 88. 
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Secretary in 1916 (he had been Permanent Under-Secretary from 1910 to 1913 and 
then Viceroy of India from 1913 to 1916), she showed how the war, and consequent 
internal events, had greatly weakened the status of the institution. 36 After the outbreak 
of war, the relationships between the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign 
Office altered because the Foreign Secretary, previously largely independent, now had 
decisions taken at Cabinet level. The Foreign Office was relegated in importance 
below the War Office and the Admiralty. Warman believed that the decision to move 
Eyre Crowe (then Assistant Under-Secretary and Head of the War Department) to the 
Contraband Department (in 1915) deprived the political departments of his abilities 
until the end of the war. 37 
Warman discussed the role of the War Cabinet of Lloyd George and, in 
particular, the position of A. J. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, who she argues was 
excluded from the inner circle of five men, but was "not isolated" because he was 
often required to attend meetings. 38 The performance of Balfour has come in for much 
criticism. Gaynor Johnson stated that he had an "excessively compliant attitude to 
Lloyd George. ' 39 For Warman (and many contemporaries), the main obstacle that the 
Foreign Office faced between 1916 and 1918 was the Prime Minister, who, she said, 
"had little respect for traditional institutions (and) was prepared to ignore the Foreign 
Office when it suited him to do so. "40 "Diplomats, " said Lloyd George, "were 
36 R. W. Warman, ` he Erosion of Foreign Office Influence In The Making of 
Foreign Policy, 1916 1918, ' Historical Journal, Volume 15, Number 1, (1972), pp. 
133-159. 
37 Ibid, p. 134. 
38 Ibid, p. 135. 39 G. Johnson, `Preparing for Office: Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary, 
January - October 1919, ' Contemporary British History, 18,3 (2004), p. 55. 40 Warman, `Erosion of Foreign Office Influence', p. 136. 
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invented simply to waste time. s41 He even questioned their right to represent the 
government. "It is simply a waste of time to let (important issues) be discussed by 
men who are not authorised to speak for their countries. ' 42 The massive increase in 
the size of the parliamentary electorate in 1918, including the vote for women over 
thirty, made Britain arguably a truly democratic country for perhaps the first time. 
After December 1918, it begged questions as to how Britain should be governed, how 
best should Britain be represented abroad and who should decide policy, especially 
the matter of taking the country or not taking the country to. war. Warman's article 
showed that Lloyd George believed that Britain needed a `new diplomacy ' even 
before it became a `new democracy. ' Supporting his view, Arno J. Mayer argued that 
the allied leaders in Paris in 1919 "were not as ignorant of international politics as 
legend would have it... " and that a political rather than a diplomatic background was 
really an advantage to them in their peacemaking task. "Party politics and power 
politics are not antithetical. Quite the contrary, experience in the domestic politics of 
modernized societies... is an excellent school for aspiring practitioners of 
international politics. " It was not a prerequisite for their a pointment to have detailed 
knowledge. What really mattered was for the leaders of major powers to have "an 
overall view of and an insight into the processes of international politics rather than a 
thorough knowledge of a few select geographical areas. ' 43 
41 A. Sharp, `The Foreign Office in Eclipse, 1919-1922, ' History, Volume 61 (1976), 
198. 
42 Warman, `Erosion of Foreign Office Influence' p. 142. 
43 A. J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and 
Counterreaction at Versailles, 1918-1919, New York, 1967, p. 358. This book is 
otherwise of little value to this thesis as it does not mention Eyre Crowe at all and 
Lord Hardinge only once. Too many other books on post-war diplomacy do not 
analyse the work of the diplomats sufficiently. For example, Margaret MacMillan, 
The Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference and its Attempt To End War, London, 
2001. 
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Roberta Warman was particularly useful on the creation of the Cabinet 
Secretariat and on the `Garden Suburb' ( Lloyd George's coterie of assistants who 
replaced the Foreign Office experts as advisers, policy-makers and even, on occasion, 
diplomatic envoys). This included Maurice Hankey (the Cabinet secretary from 1917 
to 1941), Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary and Leopold Amery, the latter 
two being disciples of the arch-imperialist Lord Milner. Kerr said that the Foreign 
Office had "no conception of policy in its wider sense. "44 The Cabinet Secretariat 
was to act, Hankey believed, as "a kind of informal `brains trust, ' to be `Ideas Men. ' 
Men such as Eric Drummond were sent on special missions abroad and then had to 
report back to the Cabinet Secretariat, not the Foreign Office. 45 In 1917, there were a 
number of `extra-diplomatic' missions such as that - Kerr to Switzerland, Milner to 
Petrograd, Northcliffe to the U. S. A. and Arthur Henderson to Russia. The Foreign 
Office was furious. ` It was also upset by Amery's `Appreciations, 'a weekly 
summary of world events sent to the Cabinet and the prime ministers of all the 
Dominions, the setting up of Beaverbrook's Ministry of Information in February 
1918 (a possible rival to the Foreign Office) and particularly the interference in the 
appointment and dismissal of ambassadors without consulting the Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State. 47 
Alan Sharp took Warman's research further and argued that the Foreign 
Office, for most of Lloyd George's premiership, was in a state of 'eclipse. '48 This 
as Warman, `Erosion of Foreign Office Influence, ' p. 138. 
as Ibid, p. 139. 
46 Ibid, p. 144. 
47 In 1918, two outstanding ambassadors were removed from their posts to make way 
for political appointments of Lloyd George. Lord Derby and Auckland Geddes 
replaced Francis, Lord Bertie and Sir Cecil Spring-Rice in Paris and Washington 
respectively. 
48 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse. ' Sharp's view was supported by, among others, 
Maisel, The Foreign Office, Brighton, 1994. It is an interpretation that does not 
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position was, unsurprisingly, vehemently opposed by Crowe and Corp, 49 but has more 
recently been questioned by historians of Lord Curzon's period in office as Foreign 
Secretary (1919-1924), such as Harry Bennett5° and Gaynor Johnson. 51 Their 
argument is only partially convincing as they focus on the questions that interested 
Curzon most, particularly the Near East. Indeed, after discussing Curzon and the 
Foreign Office and then Western European security in the first two chapters, 
Bennett's book is mainly about Curzon, Russia and the East. On German matters, 
especially reparations, Curzon was largely redundant, as were the Foreign Office 
mandarins, judging by the figures supplied by Sharp of the attendance records of 
Curzon and his experts at the post-war reparations conferences. 52 This thesis 
-reinforces Sharp's argument and adds that, despite the `eclipse, ' the perceptions of 
Eyre Crowe on Germany still remained extremely influential within both the Foreign 
Office and the government itself. 
This was true even during the Paris Peace Conference and the framing of 
the Treaty of Versailles. Michael Dockrill and Zara Steiner 53 were highly critical of 
the Foreign Office in Paris, especially the performance of Lord Hardinge. They 
explained how Lloyd George chose Maurice Hankey, rather than Hardinge, to be the 
head of the British secretariat, despite the latter's greater experience of foreign affairs, 
conflict with the memories of former senior Foreign Office officials such as Harold 
Nicolson, Peacemaking-J919, London, 1933; Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters, 
London, 1944; Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, or Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession, 
London, 1958. 
49 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 402. 
so G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy During The Curzon Period, Basingstoke, 
1995, pp. 1-11. See also G. H. Bennett, `Lloyd George, Curzon and the Control of 
British Foreign Policy, 1919-1922, ' The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
Volume 45, Number 4 (1999), pp. 467-482. 
sl G. Johnson, `Curzon, Lloyd George and the Control of British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1922: A Reassessment, ' Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11,3 (2000), pp. 49-71. 
52 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse', pp. 202-203,212. 
53 M. Dockrill and Z. S. Steiner, ` The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919, ' International History Review, Volume 11 (1980), pp. 55-86. 
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and how Crowe emerged as the leading Foreign Office personality in Paris. Dockrill 
and Steiner defended Crowe over his clash with the Prime Minister in December 1919 
in connection with the French note. 54 The article is also very useful to historians on 
the role of the Political Intelligence Department 33 in playing "a crucial role" in 
shaping post-war policies towards the Central PowerS56 and on Curzon's negative 
opinions of his Foreign Secretary as well as his Prime Minister, his methods and the 
`Garden Suburb. '" To Curzon, Lloyd George, "Hankey and Kerr were a little 
Camarilla who ruled the country and managed or sought to manage the Foreign 
Affairs of the Continent. "S8 He regarded Balfour "as the worst and most dangerous 
of Foreign Ministers with whom I have been brought into contact in my public 
life. s59 Dockrill and Steiner were far more sympathetic, believing that Balfour, 
despite his failings, "when given the opportunity... proved to be an able co-ordinator 
and his many minutes suggest that he was not lacking in astuteness or awareness. s60 
They question the extent of his alleged marginalisation by Lloyd George in Paris, 
pointing out that he had a flat above the prime minister at 23 rue Nitot and met him 
daily to discuss the business of the peace conference. Balfour himself did say though 
that, both in peace and wartime, the Cabinet continued to give "a free hand for the 
54 Ibid, pp. 81-82. See Chapter 2, p. 81-82. ss One of the members of the P. I. D. was James Headlam-Morley, who had been 
appointed as the first historian of the Foreign Office. See Alan Sharp, `James 
Headlam-Morley: Creating International History, ' Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 
9, Number 3 (1998), pp. 266-283. 
56 Dockrill and Steiner, `Foreign Office at Paris', pp. 55-56. On this subject see also 
Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p. 118 and in Chapter 2, p. 80. 
57 See also A. Sharp, `Holding up the flag of Britain.. . with 
Sustained Vigour or 
"Sowing the seeds of European disaster"? Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris 
Peace Conference' in M. Dockrill and J. Fisher (eds. ), The Paris Peace Conference, 
1919: Peace Without Victory, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 35-50. 
sx Dockrill and Steiner, `Foreign Office at Paris', p. 84. 
59 Ibid, p. 84. 
60 Ibid. 
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little man. ' v61 In response to accusations that, in Paris, Balfour was lethargic, 
Egremont said that this was unfair and stated that he was still capable of 
"constructive, if intermittent activity. ' s62 
The descriptions of the work done by Foreign Office experts in Paris by 
those of them who were there are of great interest and are essential sources, but must 
be used with varying degrees of scepticism. As is often the case, they also reveal as 
much about the author's character flaws as they do about events and other people. For 
many years, Harold Nicolson's views were quoted by critics of the Treaty of 
Versailles as evidence of the failures of the political leaders in Paris. He was 
particularly critical of the choice of the venue - "that shell-shocked capital:.. s63 and 
of President Woodrow Wilson. "Why did he come? " he asked. 64 He believed that 
Wilson was an idealist who was incapable of coping with the wily British and French 
leaders. 65 On the other hand, Nicolson praised Lloyd George and eulogised the work 
and character of his hero, Eyre Crowe. Lord Hardinge's autobiography presents a 
different, highly subjective perspective on Lloyd George. Writing some years later 
than Nicolson, Hardinge plunged his literary knife into the former prime minister. 
"Lloyd George was quite the most dangerous representative it was possible to have" 
and that "... responsibility for the Treaty rests principally" with him. 66 Lloyd George 
61 A. Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 7. 
62 M. Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur James Balfour, London, 1980, p. 305. 
63 H. Nicolson, Peacemaking-1919, London, 1964 edition, p. 76. 64 Ibid, p. 69. Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing agreed (ibid, p. 69), as did 
Lord Derby (Liverpool Record Office, Derby Papers, 920 DER (17) 28/1/1, diary 
entry, 16 December 1918) among others. 
65 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 69. 
66 Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 242. 
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even told Hardinge, allegedly, that "if I had to go to Paris again I would conclude a 
different treaty. 2967 
The memoirs of Lord Vansittart unfortunately ended before he could give 
his version of his period of service under Neville Chamberlain, 68 but it did include his 
opinions on the period of this thesis. Vansittart, like Nicolson, was a promising junior 
official in 1919, and his book is a highly readable, but often flawed account, of his life 
and career, written in an idiosyncratic style, full of epigrammatic wit about the great 
figures that he had known . 
69 Even so, it does contain some important insights 
concerning British policy towards Germany in the immediate post-war years. 
Vansittart was certainly negative towards German policy and cynical about the peace 
process in Paris. "Our contingent was eighteen strong -'picked men' Hardinge called 
us to make us look better, but without avail. ' v70 However, Vansittart, like Crowe, and 
unlike Hardinge, defended the Treaty of Versailles71 and, in particular, criticised the 
work of Maynard Keynes and blamed him personally for the decision of the U. S. 
Congress to vote against the Treaty. 72 
67 Ibid, p. 238. Hardinge recalled that these words were spoken to him when he was 
sat next to Lloyd George at a dinner in 1923 and after the recently retired diplomat 
had, according to his account, launched a scathing attack on the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 and his dinner companion. 
68 Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 
1938, when he was `promoted' by Neville Chamberlain to the newly created post of 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser. He retired in 1941. 
69 Vansittart, Mist Procession. 
'o Ibica p. 201. 
71 Vansittart was though prone to self-revisionism, in the opinion of one biographer. 
"His views on Versailles were never as clear-cut and uncompromising as in later life 
he would have us believe. Although in public he championed the treaty in all its 
clauses, in private he was much more critical. " N. Rose, Vansittart - Study of a 
Diplomat, London, 1978, p. 47. 
72 Keynes was "... a tyro in a tantrum. " Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 180. See pp. 
23-24 on the arguments of Keynes and Mantoux. For Crowe's opinion of Keynes, see 
Chapter 2, p. 79. 
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There is undoubtedly need for more research to be produced on the role of 
the Foreign Office in Paris in 1919, and it is to be hoped that this thesis might make a 
small contribution, but there is certainly already a substantial amount of excellent 
source material on the role of Lloyd George, the Paris Peace Conference and the 
Treaty of Versailles in general. Books by Michael Dockrill and Douglas Goold73, 
Alan Sharp74, Ruth Henig75, Anthony Lentin76 and Erik Goldstein77 have all 
contributed to academic debates on 1919. Among their many criticisms of the `peace 
without promise, ' Dockrill and Goold felt that perhaps given the sympathies of some 
Foreign Office officials, including Crowe, it might have been a good thing that the 
Foreign Office had so little influence in Paris. 78 This thesis rejects the view that the 
attitude to Germany of Crowe was unhelpful to the British delegation. Elspeth 
O'Riordan held a different point of view to Dockrill and Goold, as, in her opinion, 
Versailles "was a treaty of promise. Had the victor powers worked together, it had the 
potential to be either implemented or revised to lead to a peaceful, secure Europe. , 79 
This happened, she said, during the Locarno honeymoon. "The tragedy... was that it 
took the Ruhr crisis ... 
before the policies of the major powers ... were co-ordinated 
and in particular the dichotomy between the American and French positions 
removed. s80 Sharp81 analysed the peace conference and the Treaty of Versailles and 
emphasised the immensity of the tasks facing the peacemakers and concluded that 
73 M. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace 
Conferences, 1919-23, London, 1981. 
74 A. Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919, Basingstoke, 
1991. 
75 R. Henig, Versailles and After, 1919-1933, London, 1995. 
76 A. Lentin, Guilt at Versailles - Lloyd George and the Pre-History of Appeasement, 
London, 1984. See also Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace. 
77 Goldstein, Winning the Peace. 
78 Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p. 350. 
79 E. O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 182. 
so Ibid. 
x' Sharp, Versailles Settlement, p. 196. 
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there was still a `German problem' after 1919. Ruth Henig believed that the treaty 
itself could not be blamed for the failure to secure a lasting European peace. The First 
World War produced serious, deep-seated economic and political problems, including 
severe economic dislocation. The peacemakers had to grapple with the forces of 
nationalism and militarism also unleashed by the war. 82 Vansittart wrote that the 
Second World War happened because the treaty was broken, not because it was too 
severe. Sharp stated that this view was now more acceptable to historians, 83 but as 
Anthony Lentin said, "the legend of Versailles as a doomed settlement dies hard. 1,84 
Lentin, a barrister, believed that, as a lawyer, the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
should have known that imposing an indemnity was against international law. 85 Then, 
in his later book, he quotes Lord Riddell's recollections of the speed with which key 
decisions were made in Paris. 86 Lentin is therefore very incisive when discussing 
Lloyd George and German war-guilt. In 1919, Lloyd George believed that the war 
was a crime against humanity, that the Kaiser was primarily responsible for it, that he 
should be put on trial and executed. 87 Agreeing with Harold Nicolson, Lentiü believed 
that the war-guilt clause was for British public opinion and that "Lloyd George of all 
men should have been the first to grasp the unwisdom of article 231. s88 Then, for the 
next seven years Lloyd George argued that the Treaty as a whole was based on 
German war-guilt and would collapse if it were abandoned. As Lentin rightly pointed 
82 Henig, Versailles and After, p. 48. 
83 Sharp, `Holding up the flag of Britain', p. 48. Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 220. 
84 A. Lentin, `Appeasement at the Paris Peace Conference' in Dockrill and Fisher, 
Paris Peace Conference, p. 51. 
85 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, pp. 12-13. 
86 Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, p. 3. According to Riddell, at the end of 
31 March 1919, a day when a number of huge decisions were made, including the 
war-guilt clause, the remarkably energetic Lloyd George was "full of fun. " See Lord 
Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923, London, 1933, 
263. 
Ibid, p. 12. 
88 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
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out, Lloyd George therefore played, unwittingly into the hands of the German treaty 
revisionists as this was exactly their position. 89 Yet even Keynes accepted that 
Germany bore "a special and peculiar responsibility for the war itself, for its 
universal and devastating character, and for its final development into a combat 
without quarter for mastery or defeat. s90 
In an introduction to a recent series of articles, Alan Sharp and Conan 
Fischer argued that the studies challenged the `new consensus' that the major problem 
with the peace settlement was its enforcement 91 The studies indicated "that the 
practicalities of compliance and execution were far more problematic than has 
hitherto been realised. s92 
The literature on the performances of the various political leaders in Paris 
is vast. 93 The versions of history written by some of them, notably Lloyd George94 
and Andre Tardieu, 95 should not be ignored, even though their accounts must be read 
with caution. The indefatigable former Prime Minister, in the twilight of his career, 
was determined to correct many of the falsehoods and misunderstandings about the 
post-war peace conferences and treaties. He called the Versailles Treaty, "this much 
89 Ibid, p. 18. 
90 J. M. Keynes, `The Economic Consequences of the Peace -A British View, ' in No 
J. Lederer (ed), The Versailles Settlement - Was it Foredoomed to Failure? Boston, 
1960, pp. 40-41. 
91 A. Sharp and C. Fischer, `Introduction', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 16, 
Number 3 (2005), p. 420. 
92 Ibid. 
93 David Newhall and J. A. Thompson provide very helpful bibliographies of 
Clemenceau and Wilson respectively. See D. S. Newhall, Clemenceau: A Life at War, 
Lampeter, 1991, pp. 569-631 and J. A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, London, 2002, 
pp. 253-260. As `Wilsonianism' challenged Crowe's belief in the `Balance of Power, ' 
the most useful books are those that focus on diplomacy. 
94 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Volume 1, London, 1938; Lloyd George, 
Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume 1, New Haven, 1939. Also of particular 
relevance to this study are The Truth About Reparations and War Debts, London, 
1932 and The Truth About The Peace Treaties, London, 1938. 
95 Andre Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty, Preface by Georges Clemenceau, 
Paris, 1921. 
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abused and little perused document... s96 Egerton97 explained how and when the 
books came to be written and the valuable assistance that he was given by his 
secretaries. 98 Maurice Hankey checked the memoirs with the government and Basil 
Liddell Hart checked military facts. 99 Lloyd George was still Hankey's hero. '°° In his 
article, Egerton focused on two things - "the coming of war and the failure of Grey's 
diplomacy and then the struggle with Haig and the generals for the control of war 
strategy ... "'ol 
Probably the most famous book to have been written following the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles was by John Maynard Keynes, who had been a 
member of the Treasury team in Paris. Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, 
had urged Keynes "as soon as possible to set about writing a clear, connected account 
of what the financial and reparation clauses of the Treaty actually are and mean. i102 
In December 1919, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, was first published. '03 
In it, Keynes made a strong personal attack on the `Big Three' - Wilson, Clemenceau 
and Lloyd George - and said that the treaty was unjust. Germany was unable to pay 
more than £2bn. in reparations at the outside. 104 It was a `Carthaginian Peace' that 
would lead to the economic and political collapse of Europe. 105 Its impact was 
enormous in Britain, but was utterly devastating in the United States (sections of it 
were read aloud in Congress) where it destroyed the post-war diplomatic aims of 
96 Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations and War Debts, p. 23. 
97 Egerton, `Lloyd George War Memoirs', pp. 55-94. 
98 Ibid, pp. 62-63. 
99 Ibid, p. 67. 
loo Ibid, p. 86. 101 Ibid, p. 73. Grey had died in 1930 and Haig in 1928. 
102 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, p. 137. 
103 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, London, 1920. 
104 Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations and War Debts, p. 18. 
105 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, p. 137. 
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President Wilson. 106 The Congress rejected the Versailles Treaty and American 
participation in the League of Nations. The U. S. A. returned to international isolation 
with disastrous consequences for the post-war peace settlement. Lentin said that 
"whatever may have been the economic consequences of the peace, the political 
consequences of Maynard Keynes were wholly monstrous. 9007 
However, the Second World War made many people question the inter- 
war sympathy shown towards Germany and the views of Keynes in particular. A 
critique of Keynes's book by a brilliant young French economist, Etienne Mantoux, 
was published posthumously. 108 Keynes had stated that Germany would never be able 
to pay the reparations that the allies demanded and, for some, the collapse of the 
German economy into hyperinflation in 1923 verified Keynes's argument. But, 
Mantoux said that 
reparations were not paid because Germany, as was quite natural, did not want 
to pay them, and - which was perhaps not quite so natural - the Allies showed 
themselves incapable or unwilling to take jointly the necessary measures 
which could have made Germany pay. The whole question, therefore, boiled 
down to political expediency. 109 
Zara Steiner believed that the treaty "was not a `Carthaginian peace. ' 
Germany was not destroyed. " Keynes's pamphlet was "pernicious but brilliant... and 
still the argument found underpinning too many current textbooks. "' 10 Margaret 
MacMillan said that Jan Smuts was "the most eloquent critic of all. s111 But, she 
pointed out that it was Smuts who wanted to add pensions for widows and orphans of 
1 
106 Ibid, pp. 137-14;. 
107 Ibid, p. 140. 
108 E. Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or The Economic Consequences of Mr 
Keynes, New York, 1952. 
109 Lederer, Versailles Settlement, p. 63. 
110 Z. S. Steiner, The Lights That Failed, Oxford, 2005, p. 67. 
111 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 479. 
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Allied soldiers, thus inflating the reparation figures. 112 More research needs to be 
done on the attitude of the Foreign Office to the treaty, especially as it was the 
ministry that had to work for its fulfilment by Germany. This thesis will attempt to 
add to knowledge about the Foreign Office, its work at the Paris Peace Conference 
and the attitudes of leading officials to Germany up to the Locarno Treaty of 1925. 
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles was the subject 
of great controversy in 1919 and have remained so ever since. The approach of the 
750' and 80th anniversaries of the Paris Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty 
saw a surfeit of articles on aspects of the events of 1919. A number of historians 
discussed the post-war German economy. Sally Marks insisted that reparations were a 
political question, which explained "why Britain's best efforts at treaty revision never 
satisfied Germany" 113 and why the reparations question blighted relations between 
France and Germany until 1932. Marks also pointed out that the war and the ensuing 
peace treaty did not economically cripple Germany. "Despite the loss of Saar coal 
and Lorraine iron ore, Germany remained Europe's `industrial power-house, ' able, in 
a remarkably short time, to dominate the trade of the central and eastern European 
states. s114 Gerald Feldman in his articles and book has consistently rejected this view. 
"Apparently, the only people who really believed that the Germans could fulfil their 
reparations obligations... are some historians. "las Elisabeth Glaser pointed out that 
others, for example, Hoover, Lansing and Headlam-Morley shared Keynes's views, 
but his views "appeared more excessive than the others only in that he opted to make 
112 Ibid. 
113 S. Marks, `Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galerie des 
Glaces' in M. Boemeke, G. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: A 
Reassessment After 75 Years, Cambridge, 1998, p. 370. 
114 Ihid, p. 360. 
115 Feldman, `A Comment' in ibid, pp. 441-450. 
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them public. s16 Niall Ferguson's chapter is particularly interesting for its analysis of 
the `German Offer' to pay a reparations figure of 100 billion gold marks (£5 billion) 
in May 1919. "7 William R. Keylor implied that Keynes post-war polemic "reflected 
his sense of guilt at having worked in the Treasury during the war while his pacifist 
chums in Bloomsbury, such as Lytton Strachey and his former lover, Duncan Grant, 
chose conscientious objection and let him know of their disapproval. s18 
The atmosphere in Paris and the haste of the statesmen to complete their 
task and leave for home gave rise to a decision that had considerable repercussions. It 
was decided that the total German liability would not be fixed in Paris, but it, and the 
execution of the collection of German reparations, would be the work of the 
Reparation Commission, the body established by the treaty. 119 The Treaty of 
Versailles did insist though that Germany paid a first instalment of one billion gold 
marks (50 million pounds) by I May 1921. Lentin has argued that the Foreign Office 
should have pressed Lloyd George to settle the entire question there and then at the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and that this delay worsened the situation. 120 
In April 1921, the Reparation Commission decided that Germany must 
pay a total of 132,000,000,000 GM (£6,600,000,000) over forty-two years and a 
schedule of payments was formulated at the London Conference in May. Following 
the collapse of the German currency in 1923 and prior to the beginning of the Great 
116 E. Glaser, `The Making of the Economic Peace' in ibid, p. 381. 117 N. Ferguson, `The Balance of Payments Question: Versailles and After' in ibid, 
407-409. ýý 
W. R. Keylor, `Versailles and International Diplomacy' in ibid, pp. 469-506. 
119 This decision has proven to be highly controversial. Harold Nicolson supported 
the delay, but Henry Kissinger disagreed. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, London, 
1994, p. 257. Anthony Lentin said that "Lloyd George's refusal to consider a German 
counter-offer of £5 billion (May 1919) and his abandonment of a time limit for 
payment of reparations were demonstrably among the worst legacies of the 
Conference. " See Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, p. 17. 
120 Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, p. 17. 
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Depression in 1929, committees of international financial experts produced the Dawes 
and Young Plans that revised the earlier decisions on German reparations. In an 
article published in December 1969, Sally Marks reconsidered the reparation question 
and concluded that its impact on the German economy and society had been 
frequently exaggerated. 121 David Felix, another American historian, attacked her 
views and suggested that the opposite was true. The effects of reparations had been 
under-estimated. Her arguments were "not so much unacceptable as nonexistent. She 
has managed to investigate an economic question with almost no economic data. " 122 
Alan Sharp though has been highly critical of German governments after 1918. 
Germany received far more loans from the U. S. A. than it paid in reparations to the 
allies. 123 Stephen Schuker put it bluntly: "Not only did the Reich entirely avoid 
paying net reparations to its wartime opponents, it actually extracted the equivalent of 
reparations from the Allied powers, and principally the U. S. ... The gross capital 
inflow amounted to an astounding 5.3 per cent of German national income during the 
entire period from 1919 to 1931. The net capital inflow, after subtracting all 
reparations transferred and making generous allowance for the disguised return of 
German funds, still came to a maximum of 2.1 per cent of national income over the 
next thirteen years. ' s124 
Schuker denounced Keynes as a "defunct economist" 25 and criticised 
those such as George Kennan, a highly influential member of the United States State 
121 S. Marks, `Reparations Reconsidered, ' Journal of Central European History, 
Volume 2 (1969), pp. 356-365. 
122 D. Felix, `Reparations Reconsidered - With A Vengeance, ' Journal of Central 
European History, Volume 2 (1971), pp. 171-179. 
123 Sharp, `Holding up the flag of Britain', p. 44. 
124 S. A. Schuker, `American Reparations to Germany, 1919-1933: Implications For 
The Third World Debt Crisis, ' Princeton Studies in International Finance, Volume 61 
(July 1988), pp. 10-11; see also Sharp, `Holding up the flag of Britain'. 
125 Schuker, `American Reparations to Germany', p. 14. 
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Department after 1945, for linking German reparations to the economic problems of 
the 1920s, the rise of Hitler and World War Two. However, the past generation has 
seen a great change in the historiography of the period, provoking a very important 
debate. "While these propositions continue to form part of the international catechism 
and thus to command substantial assent among the wider educated public, specialized 
historians no longer view them as credible. " 126 Professional historians now speak of a 
"new international history of the 1920s, " 127 Schuker said. According to him, the total 
sum imposed by the Reparation Commission in May 1921 "demanded less than met 
the eye. s128 The burden laid down by the London Schedule of Payments totalled only 
50 milliard gold marks. "Significantly, the sum exceeded by just one-quarter what 
Keynes (1919, p. 261) had described as a feasible maximum. s129 
Schuker has generally supported Marks's stance that Germany had the 
actual capacity to pay reparations, had it had the political will to do so, a line opposed 
vigorously by Gerald Feldman130 and Barry Eichengreen. 13 1 The Australian historian, 
Bruce Kent, argued that the allied reparations policy was based on a financial illusion 
and that Great Britain and the United States were mainly to blame. He said that Lloyd 
George should have accepted the Treasury proposal that Britain solve the reparations 
question by writing off the debts of her former allies. 132 Marc Trachtenberg also 
126 Ibid. 1 
127 Ibid. See also J. Jacobson, `Is there a new international history of the 1920s? ' 
American Historical Review, 88,3 (1983), pp. 617-645. 
128 Schuker, `American Reparations to Germany', p. 16. 129 Ibid. 
130 G. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German 
Inflation, 1914-1924, Oxford, 1993. 
131 B. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 
1919-1939, Oxford, 1992. 
132 B. Kent, The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of 
Reparations, 1918-1932, Oxford, 1989, p. 9. 
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rejected the view that France's desire was to extract excessive reparations from 
Germany and thus destroy its old enemy economically and financially. 133 
Nor are German points of view unanimous. "Historians and economists 
have fought over reparations almost as fiercely as did the politicians of the 1920's. 
After World War Two some historians blamed reparations for the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic (for example Ludwig Zimmermann, `Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der 
Are der Weimarer Republik, ' Göttingen, 1958), but recently some have said that 
during this period, Germany generally successfully obstructed their payment. s134 
Detlev Peukert's conclusion was realistic: 
All told, reparations were far less of a burden on the German post-war 
economy than had been feared. Between 1919 and the introduction of the 
Dawes Plan in 1924 Germany remitted approximately 10 billion RM in 
reparations. Simultaneously, the inflation led to a devaluation of foreign 
capital investment in Germany amounting to about 15 billion RM. Under the 
Dawes and Young Plans annual reparations payments ranged from 0.6 to 2.1 
billion RM, giving a total of 11.3 billion RM between 1924 and 1932. During 
the same period, however, imported capital to the value of about 28 billion 
RM flowed into Germany, of which the Americans alone lost roughly 8 billion 
RM as a result of the world economic crisis. 
Reparations did not, in fact, bleed the German economy. Indeed, their net 
effect was to leave the economy in rather better shape. But the psychological 
effects of reparations were extremely serious, as was the strain that the vicious 
circle of credits and reparations placed on the international financial system. 135 
A number of other books deal with the cost of the war and the question of 
inter-allied war debts. 136 Robert Bunselmeyer's book is particularly useful on the 
1918 `Coupon Election' and the atmosphere in Britain in the months following the 
end of the war and the popular attitudes to Germany. It is of considerable relevance to 
1 
133 M. Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, 1916-1923, New York, 1980. 
134 M. Berg, `Germany and the United States: The Concept of World Economic 
Interdependence, ' in C. Fink, Axel Frohn and Jurgen Heideking (eds), Genoa, 
Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922, Cambridge, 1991, p. 77. 
135 D. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, London, 1993, p. 197. 
136 For example, R. E. Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War, 1914-1919: British 
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this study. The Foreign Office's attitude to Germany was based upon Crowe's 
memorandum of 1907. Bunselmeyer believed that "the Election of 1918 formed a 
link between the mentality of the war, especially economic war, and the making of 
peace. ' 137 He said that 
fear of Germany's economic and military strength, and hatred of her arrogance 
... were the origins of Reparation and war-guilt 
in Britain. Both emotions... 
were given a final impetus by the General Election and by the fiscal worries of 
Britain at the end of the war. They survived into the months of (sic) Peace 
Conference and saddled the Treaty of Versailles with its fatal mixture of 
economic penalty and moral censure. 
Arthur Turner pointed out that analyses of Anglo-French relations after 
i 
the war had tended to neglect the war-debt issue. 138 Turner argued that "it made its 
own special contribution to the prevailing mistrust that hampered co-operation 
between London and Paris during the 1920s. s139 He believed that British 
governments thought that war debt claims on the French would "provide a valuable 
bargaining counter" and also, mistakenly, "as a useful means of exercising control 
över French policy towards Germany. s140 
In Britain, much of the credit for the allied vict ry in November 1918 was 
given to David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister from December 1916 to October 
1922. There is a vast amount of literature on him, much of which is not directly 
relevant to this thesis, but the opposite is certainly true as well. A truly remarkable 
137 Ibid, p. 17. 
138 A. Turner, The Cost of War: British Policy on French War Debts, 1918-1932, 
Brighton, 1998. Turner did acknowledge recent scholarship, such as of Bruce Kent, 
that had not ignored the question. He made special mention of Denise Artaud's two- 
volume history of interallied debts. D. Artaud, La question des dettes interallees et la 
reconstruction de l'Europe, 1917-1929,2 volumes, Lille and Paris, 1977. 
139 Turner, Cost of War, pp. 1-2. 
140 Ibid, p. 271. 
JOHN M` O ES UN-1W UVERPOOL STY 
30 
politician, Lloyd George polarised opinions about him throughout his career141 and he 
continues to fascinate historians. His friends, unsurprisingly, tended to be positive, 
even hagiographic in their judgements. 142 Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary 
from 1917 to 1941, was aware of "his master's idiosyncratic methods... (and) often 
experienced his deviousness at first-hand... (but) he was sometimes perhaps dazzled, 
by the sheer brilliance of intellect and imagination, which almost daily flashed and 
scintillated before him like an Aurora Borealis. " 43 
Modern historians have recognised Lloyd George's remarkable talents, 
but have been highly critical of the ways in which he used them. In an important 
article, George W. Egerton144 discussed the former Prime Minister's war memoirs, 
written and published in the years following his resignation as Prime Minister. 
Egerton focused on two things - the coming of war and the failure of Grey's 
diplomacy, and then his struggle with Haig and the generals for the control of war 
strategy. 145 Of relevance to this thesis was Lloyd George's criticism of Sir Edward 
Grey in the summer of 1914. Grey' s hand, he said, "trembled in the policy of 
apprehension, unable to grip the levers and manipulate them with a firm and clear 
purpose. "146 In an article on Lloyd George's foreign policy, Alan Sharp listed the 
Prime Minister's immense range of talents. "And yet... the balance of contemporary 
141 Keynes said that he was beyond good and evil. Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost 
Peace, p. xvii. Stanley Baldwin believed that he was that "... very dangerous thing, a 
d1namic force". Ibid, p. 3. 
2 For example, Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace and the biography by his 
private secretary, Tom Jones, Lloyd George, Cambridge, MASS, 1951. Also useful 
are the writings of his mistress and later wife, F. Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary 
bFrances Stevenson, edited by A. J. P. Taylor, London, 1971. 
173 S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume II, London, 1972, p. 302. 144 Egerton, `Lloyd George War Memoirs', pp. 55-94. 
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and historical opinion lies against Lloyd George. ' 1147 Zara Steiner believed that Lloyd 
George "had no doubts about German guilt. " He favoured a peace that would teach 
Germany "an unforgettable lesson. s148 Anthony Lentin was highly critical of the 
Prime Minister's role in the 1919 treaty that guaranteed French security, but which 
was never implemented. 149 In another article, Alan Sharp discussed Curzon's 
criticisms of Lloyd George and Balfour and believed that a more serious charge 
against Lloyd George was not that he sowed the seeds of future discord in Paris, but 
that he "should have done more to preserve the wartime coalition and particularly the 
Anglo-French partnership which might have contributed to a happier outcome. " 50 
Margaret MacMillan did not mention Eyre Crowe or Lord Hardinge at all 
in her substantial book on the peace conference, but she describes Lloyd George's 
foreign policy towards Germany as follows: "Germany, he told a friend in the middle 
of the war, must be beaten, but not destroyed. That would not do either Europe or the 
British empire any good, and would leave the field clear for a strong Russia. He 
understood where Britain's interests lay: its trade and its empire, with naval 
dominance to protect them and a balance of power in Europe to prevent any power 
from challenging those interests. " 151 
Curzon, his acting Foreign Secretary in London, was highly critical and 
perhaps prescient. He said that in Paris "Lloyd George was supposed to be holding up 
the flag of Britain... with sustained vigour and brilliance... In reality (he) was sowing 
147 A. Sharp, `Lloyd George's Foreign Policy, 1918-1922: The "And Yet" Factor, ' in 
J. Joades (ed. ), The Life and Times of Lloyd George, Bangor, 1991, p. 129. 
148 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 29. 
149 A. Lentin, `Lloyd George, Clemenceau and the elusive Anglo-French guarantee 
treaty, 1919: A disastrous episode? ' in Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (eds. ), Anglo- 
French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, London and 
New York, 2000, pp. 104-119. 
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the seed of European disaster. " 52 This study will show that, in diplomatic terms 
during this period, one characteristic that Lloyd George, Ramsay MacDonald (two 
Prime Ministers) and Crowe all shared and that three Foreign Secretaries, Balfour, 
Curzon and Austen Chamberlain all did not possess, was their readiness to take 
decisions and decisive action rather than produce a brilliant analysis of a situation. 
The period immediately after the end of the Paris Peace Conference has 
perhaps not attracted the same amount of attention from historians. In a seminal 
article in 1976, Alan Sharp suggested that the Foreign Of lice, at this time, was "in 
eclipse. " 153 Lloyd George continued to keep control of foreign policy, particularly in 
matters pertaining to Germany. In doing this, he marginalised the Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Curzon and the officials of the Foreign Office, including Eyre Crowe. David 
Gilmour, '54 As previously stated, '" Harry Bennett' 56 and Gaynor Johnson 157 have 
challenged Sharp's view that the Foreign Office was `in eclipse' from 1919 to 1922, 
roughly coinciding with the first three years of Curzon's period in office as Foreign 
Secretary, but the criticism is only partly valid as it only relates to Curzon's favoured 
area - the Near East - and not relating to Germany and Western Europe. 
Lord Curzon was the Foreign Secretary from October 1919 (having been 
Acting Foreign Secretary from January1919 whilst Balfour was in Paris) to January 
1924. Earlier in his career, from 1898 to 1905, he had been the Viceroy of India'58 
152 Sharp, `Lloyd George and Foreign Policy, 1918-1922', p. 130. 153 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse', p. 198. 154 D. Gilmour, Curzon, London, 1994. 
iss See Chapter 1, p. 16. 
156 G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, London, 1995. 
157 G. Johnson, `Preparing for Office: Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary, 
January-October 1919, ' Contemporary British History, 18,3 (2004), pp. 53-73. 158 Lord Hardinge also held this `semi-divine' position from 1913 to 1916. The 
relationship between the two former Viceroys at the Foreign Office was sometimes 
difficult. See Vansittart, Mist Procession, pp. 232-233. 
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and much of the literature focuses on that period, including his private papers. 159 After 
his sudden death in March 1925, Harold Nicolson wrote an unauthorised and, at 
times, highly critical biography that has special relevance to this study. 160 Curzon's 
widow did authorise Lord Ronaldsay to produce a more favourable work in an 
attempt to save her husband's reputation. 161 Interest in Curzon's life was later revived 
by the publication of Grace, Marchioness Curzon's own memoirs that were notable 
for furthering awareness of the relationship between Curzon and Crowe during the 
Ruhr crisis in 1923.162 The large biography by David Gilmour, the son of the former 
Conservative Cabinet minister, Sir Ian Gilmour, written in the 1990s, did little to 
restore Curzon's reputation to that of the `great man' that the subject believed that he 
was. His colleague, the Earl of Crawford, the brother of the future Permanent Under- 
Secretary, Sir Ronald Lindsay, concluded that Curzon did not `cut ice. ' 163 John 
Gregory, who worked for Curzon at the Foreign Office, wrote a chapter about the 
experience and gave evidence of both his gifts and his indecisiveness. 164 
Historians have tended to be critical of Lloyd George's preference for 
`Conference Diplomacy' between January 1920 and January 1923 (Lloyd George was 
succeeded by Andrew Bonar Law in October 1922). Harold Nicolson was the son of a 
former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office who became a senior official 
in the Central Department. After resigning from the Foreign Office in the late 1920s, 
he wrote about his experiences at the Paris Peace Conference. Apart from his 
extremely valuable descriptions of Eyre Crowe and the events in Paris, Nicolson 
159 British Library, Ibdia Library, St. Pancras, London, Curzon Papers. 
160 H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, New York, 1925. 
161 Ronaldsay, Earl of, The Life of Lord Curzon, volumes 1,2 and 3, London, 1928. 
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wrote critically of the `new diplomacy' of Lloyd George. 165 Gordon Craig was 
certainly a supporter of the Foreign Office line: 
It can scarcely be argued ... that the twelve 
international conferences which 
were held on the reparations question made any progress toward achieving a 
reasonable solution of that troublesome problem. It would be more accurate to 
say that their principal result was a series of public clashes between British 
and French policy, awkwardly smoothed over by compromises which satisfied 
no one and which finally produced, in England, an unreasoning suspicion of 
France and, in France, a degree of co-operation which found its ultimate 
expression in the fateful occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. s 166 
The Foreign Office mandarins believed that they had specific expertise 
and greater knowledge of diplomatic affairs than politicians and that their ministry 
must have a controlling role in policy formulation. Curzon ägreed with them. 167 Arno 
J. Mayer gave an alternative point of view. 168 The politicians "were ill-informed not 
because they owed their jobs to petty graft or political patronage but because detailed 
knowledge about Teschen and Transylvania quite rightly is not a perquisite for their 
appointment. " 169 In a very large work, though, there is no mention of Eyre Crowe and 
only one reference to Lord Hardinge, thus emphasising the importance of Zara 
Steiner's pioneering work. 
Although this thesis focuses on Foreign Office perceptions of Germany, 
this matter is impossible to separate from Anglo-French relations, partly because it is 
a dimension of the Crowe Memorandum. Two articles are invaluable. Thomas Otte170 
165 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 207-209. 
166 G. A. Craig, `The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain' in 
Craig and Gilbert, Diplomats, p. 29. See also Sharp, `The `And Yet' Factor', pp. 140- 
142. 
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170 Thomas G. Otte, `The elusive balance: British foreign policy and the French 
entente before the First World War' in Sharp and Stone (eds. ), Anglo-French 
Relations, pp. 11-35. 
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analysed the period before the war and Alan Sharp'7' the period from 1919 to 1925. 
Together they connect attitudes of the two powers before and after the war. In 
February 1911, Eyre Crowe remarked that the entente was nothing but a "frame of 
mind" and warned that "for the purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to 
have no substance at all. ' 9172 Otte believed that the Agadir crisis of July 1911 "played 
a catalytic role in Anglo-French relations. " Lloyd George's Mansion House speech 
on 21 July had an electrifying effect as until then he had been regarded as a `pro- 
German. ' British public opinion was pro-French and Grey believed that it would force 
any British government to back France. 173 Otte concluded by saying that in July 1914, 
"France was still too weak in Europe and too dangerous overseas. Once again 
blundering German diplomacy had helped to cement the entente and transformed it 
into a formidable alliance. " 174 It will be shown that at times this was also true from 
1919 to 1925. 
Sharp argued that despite the fact that "British decision-makers did not 
feel a strong compulsion to assist France ... there was also an awareness that almost 
every important issue in post-war British diplomacy had a French aspect to it and that 
each state had the potential to frustrate the aims and objectives of the other unless 
they cooperated. " It was particularly important to secure French cooperation "over 
the execution of the Treaty of Versailles where each had very different perceptions of 
the future role and ambitions of Germany. " 75 
171 A. Sharp, `Anglo-French relations from Versailles to Locarno, 1919-1925: The 
quest for security' in Sharp and Stone (eds. ), Anglo-French Relations, pp. 120-138. 
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Therefore, part of the study must compare not just the perceptions of 
Germany of the Foreign Office with those of British political leaders, but also with 
those of France as well. In an article that analyses the Foreign Office perceptions of 
its relations in the 1920s with major nations such as France, Germany, the U. S. A. and 
the Soviet Union, Alan Sharp stated that "British policy towards Germany in the 
early post-war years veered between exasperation at its failure to execute the terms of 
the treaty and suspicions that some of the treaty clauses were impractical, if not 
actually wrong, and worse still, that Britain might be at fault... s176 Sharp cited the 
opinions of Sydney Waterlow, a senior official, in a very significant memorandum of 
28 April 1922, regarding reparations and security, and those of Lord D'Abernon, the 
British Ambassador in Berlin. 177 Anne Orde also pointed out that Waterlow admitted 
that Britain bore much responsibility for the reparations problem as it had wanted 
pensions included in the total bill "and her record over the lapse of the 1919 
guarantee was not good. P078 Waterlow soon modified his stance, 179 but D'Abernon 
remained generally a sympathiser with Germany, 180 but this thesis will show that his 
views were not held by the leading mandarins of the Foreign Office, who instead 
followed the principles of Sir Eyre Crowe. 
The attitudes of the key British participants to a treaty with France (of 
whatever kind) can reveal much about their attitudes to Germany. Those within the 
Foreign Office who favoured a treaty with France, including Crowe, Tyrrell and 
Lampson, tended to believe that a firm stance should be taken with Germany. Anne 
176 Sharp, `Adapting to a New World? ' p. 80. 
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Orde was a particularly useful source on Lloyd George's promise to France over 
security and particularly the Anglo-French `Guarantee' 81 
In April and May 1922, the Genoa Conference took place. Lloyd George, 
the `spiritual father' of Genoa, 182 wanted to consider the economic reconstruction of 
Europe, although the French Prime Minister, Poincare, did not want to discuss 
reparations. During the conference Germany and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of 
Rapallo and Genoa ended in failure. Its consequences were considerable, including, in 
January 1923, the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr. The book by Carole Fink on 
the Genoa Conference, as well as the collection of articles on Genoa edited by herself 
and two colleagues183 are essential sources on these subjects. Fink said that Crowe 
and Curzon did not like Lloyd George's Genoa plans, but were furious at Poincare'84 
for wrecking it. 185 In one of the chapters, Sally Marks again argued that Germany had 
the capacity to pay reparations, but was not showing the will to do so. 186 Two German 
historians analysed the foreign policies of politicians and diplomats of the Weimar 
Republic. Manfred Berg was particularly interested in Germany's economic relations 
with the United States. On 29 March 1922, Walter Rathenau told the Reichstag that 
"never before has a nation held the fate of a continent so inescapably in its hand as 
does America at this moment. s187 Throughout the 1920s, Gustav Stresemann sought 
world economic interdependence. Reparations were a secondary issue, but the 
181 Orde, Great Britain and International Security, p. 24 
182 C. Fink, `Introduction, ' in C. Fink, A. Frohn and J. Heideking (eds. ), Genoa, 
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preservation of the Reich's territorial integrity was vital, a stance that Stresemann 
advanced strongly during the Ruhr crisis. 188 Peter Krüger argued that von Maltzan, 
Head of the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Ministry (the Auswärtiges 
Amt or `Wilhelmstrasse') was the moving spirit behind Rapallo and that Rathenau 
was against it. 189 
Stephen Schuker argued that "the U. S. government considered the Genoa 
Conference a sideshow -a misconceived British conjuring trick to deal with the 
superficial features of trade depression on the Continent before agreement was 
reached on the political perquisites for European economic reconstruction along 
sound lines. 190 It was "a conference designed primarily to meet the exigencies of 
British domestic politics, and that failed to consider American political requirements 
at all, stood no chance of clearing away the obstacles to world economic revival. s19' 
The period following the Genoa Conference has been analysed in books by Anne 
Orde192 and Stephanie Salzmann. '93 
In August 1922, the British government attempted to solve the reparations 
problem by proposing a cancellation of all inter-allied war debts. The `Balfour Note' 
was received coldly by Poincare and with utter disdain by the United States. 194 it 
seems extraordinary that British governments continued to have faith in `The Balfour 
Note' almost until the end of reparations in 1932. Winston Churchill thought that the 
tss Ibid, p. 93. 189 P. Krüger, `A Rainy Day, April 16 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy 
Perspective for German Foreign Policy, ' in Fink, Frohn and Heideking, Genoa, 
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1922, ' in Fink, Frohfi and Heideking, Genoa, Rapallo, p. 95. 191 Ibid, p. 122. 
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`Note' forced the Americans "to search their consciences. "195 Modern historians 
have though generally and understandably castigated the `Balfour Note. 196 Anne 
Orde believed that it showed that the policies and motives of Lloyd George and his 
ministers to be utterly confused. s197 Stephen Schuker said that in 1922 the United 
States still wanted its debtors to pay up before they became officially involved in 
Europe. 198 President Calvin Coolidge famously said about America's former wartime 
allies: that "they hired the money, didn't they? " 199 
After the war ended, there was much discussioi about who would be the 
first post-war ambassador in Berlin. From January 1920, Lord Kilmarnock acted as 
Charge d'Affaires in Germany. In July 1920, a banker, Edgar Vincent, Viscount 
D'Abernon, took up the post. He served until 1926. Three volumes of his diary were 
later published under the title, `Ambassador of Peace. '200 Lord D'Abernon's diaries 
were not lacking self-praise and particularly self-justification. D'Abernon did not 
share the general Foreign Office perception of Germany and he was greatly criticised 
- in the memoirs of Foreign Office mandarins. Vansittart ws Private Secretary to the 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. Curzon asked him what 
he 
thought of the 
appointment. "I ... condemned 
it - wrongly in one respect, for D'Abernon was 
equipped with greater knowledge of currency and economics than anyone in the 
Foreign Service. I questioned the intrusion because the French had lost money when 
he was President of the Ottoman Bank... X201 Vansittart retained his animosity for the 
former ambassador for the rest of his life, describing him as the "heir in credulity to 
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Haldane and Keynes" who called `an armed attack by Germany on France within the 
next twenty-five years admittedly improbable' and laughed when `in France the old 
cries were repeated that no German agreement would be adhered to. s2°2 
However, Alan Sharp believes that historians have generally regarded 
Lord D'Abernon's career as Ambassador in Berlin sympathetically, 203 but, as he 
pointed out, recent analyses by, for example, Gaynor Johnson204 and Stephanie 
Salzmann205 have been more critical. It is difficult to agree though with Johnson's 
comment that scholars have depicted D'Abernon "as one of the heroes of interwar 
diplomacy - the man who, almost single-handedly, helped to prevent war for a decade 
by persuading Stresemann to meet Briand and Chamberlain to conclude the Treaty of 
Locarno. s206 Salzmann was critical, for example, of D'Abernon's failure to see the 
danger posed by the German Right. 207 D'Abernon received a more sympathetic tribute 
from a German historian who said that it was "difficult to see how the German 
government could have managed the reparations question without the active 
mediation of the British ambassador, Lord D'Abernon, sometimes referred to as the 
lord-protector of Germany. s208 
202 Ibid, p. 340. 
203 One exception was F. S. Northedge, who conceded that D'Abernon may have 
given German governments sound financial advice, but condemned his diplomatic 
advice as demonstrating "a far weaker grasp on reality. " See The Troubled Giant - 
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In a recent article, Robert Gerwarth examined "Weimar Germany's 
public controversy about the Republic's place in German history. "209 The Versailles 
Treaty had left Germany as a unified state able to remain one the great nations of 
Europe, but Sharp believed that "the Allies did little to foster the new democratic 
Germany which they hoped would ensure peace. ' 210 Great Britain's relations with 
post-war Germany were analysed in a very provocative book by Douglas Newton. 211 
A selection of mainly Foreign Office documents relating to the Weimar Republic 
were summarised by Carsten. 212 There are many books and articles on the Weimar 
Republic and its economic problems. Hermann Rupieper wrote about the government 
of Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno before and during the occupation of the Ruhr and 
emphasised the role of the leading German bankers in 1922 and 1923. He argued that 
German economic interest groups and the government itself prolonged the post-war 
inflation and prevented the fulfilment of the Treaty of Versailles and the introduction 
of much-needed social reforms. 213 In Detlev Peukert's excellent book on the Weimar 
Republic, his section on reparations and the economic crisis is particularly useful. 214 
The collapse of the German economy and the infamous hyperinflation of 
1923 have been explained frequently as having been the product of the allied 
reparation policies. In 1945, Allan Taylor though questioned the link between the war, 
the imposition of reparations and the hyperinflation that ruined the mark. 215 Maisel 
pointed out that some leading Foreign Office officials believed that "Germany 
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deliberately created the economic crisis in order to escape reparation payments. ' 216 
More recently, the German historian Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich supported this view. 217 
Niall Ferguson attached some of the blame for Germany's hyperinflation to the 
involvement of Keynes with German governments between 1919 and 1923. Keynes 
advised them on how best to achieve revision of the Versailles Treaty and Ferguson 
believed that his advice was harmful. The policies employed by German governments 
in 1923, including the excessive printing of paper notes, led to the deliberate 
destruction of the currency, thus enabling Germany to pay a sizeable proportion of its 
external debts, while still complaining of the burden of reparations. 219 Charles S. 
Maier showed Poincare's restraint and hesitation during the Ruhr crisis and that the 
foreign policies of France and Germany were, in part, reflections of the domestic 
conflict within each country. 219 In a huge book on the German inflation, Gerald 
Feldman criticised the British government for making a difficult situation worse by its 
confusing policy in 1923.220 
For half a century, British and American historians have been critical of 
French foreign policy after the First World War, especially over the decision to invade 
the Ruhr. 221 Recently, a revisionist school of interwar history began to reassess the 
216 Maisel, Foreign Office, p. 122. 
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edition, p. 284. James Joll said that Poincare's policy "totally misfired. Not only did 
it make French relations with Britain even worse, it also completely failed in its 
purpose, leading to an inflation in France caused by the financial burden of 
maintaining troops in the Ruhr, and to a severe weakening of France's international 
credit. The consequences for Germany were even worse. " 
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early 1920s. Stephen Schuker, 222 Walter McDougall, 223 Marc Trachtenberg, 224 Jon 
Jacobson'225 P. Guinn, 226 John Keiger, 227 Bruce Kent'228 Elspeth O'Riordan229 and 
Zara Steiner230 all concluded that Poincare's Ruhr policy was affected by the role 
played by Great Britain. An outstanding account of the subject, in French only, by 
Jacques Bariety, 231 contained a similar line of argument. 
Paul Guinn explained how this `new history' had transpired. In the 1970s, 
the French archives of the post-Great War period were opened up and were therefore 
available to historians. This led to the publication of research, mainly by French and 
American historians, the effect of which has been 
to transform almost out of recognition the older Anglo-American images of 
France the wrecker, insistent on the letter of the Versailles treaty even though 
the result was European ruin. The French now no longer appear so intractable, 
while their erstwhile suspicions of German policy seem to have some 
viability. 232 
Walter McDougall reassessed the post-war period and observed that there 
was no analysis of French policy towards Germany that covered the whole period of 
peacemaking up to the end of the Ruhr occupation, also that integrated politics, 
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economics and finance and that analysed policy from a French perspective. 233 Marc 
Trachtenberg, contradicting the view of many Anglo-American historians, argued that 
French reparation policy at the Paris Peace Conference was extremely moderate. 234 
However, in 1971, before all of these books were published, Frankreichs 
Ruhrpolitik by Ludwig Zimmerman was published posthumously. It had little impact 
at the time. 235 Anglo-Saxon historians though, have tended to remain hostile to 
Poincare. In Kieger's opinion, their view was that Poincare was "a bigoted, 
nationalist Germanophobe. s236 Kieger hoped "that his policies might now be 
regarded as a continuum of firm but open negotiation. 99237 
An excellent chapter by Denise Artaud considered French financial policy 
at the time, 238 as did a book by the American economic historian, Barry 
Eichengreen. 239 Artaud believed that the weakness of France's financial condition 
"was certainly the decisive factor undermining French foreign policy. i240 
Eichengreen was helpful on the financial figures of the British and French 
governments. The Foreign Office was as much aware oft e financial problems of the 
French government as it was of France's need for securit . This was particularly true 
in 1923 during the Ruhr crisis and the apparent attempt by the French government to 
create an independent Rhineland state. 
The Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the Rhineland was to be occupied 
by allied troops for fifteen years. Much has been written on France's attempts to 
233 McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, p. 12. 
234 Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics. 
235 Guinn, `On Throwing Ballast', p. 427. 
236 Kieger, Poincare, p. 342. 
237 Ibid. 
238 D. Artaud, `Reparations and War Debts: The restoration of French financial 
power, 1919-1929' in R. Boyce (ed. ), French Foreign and Defence policy, 1918- 
1940: The Decline and fall of a Great Power, ' London, 1998, pp. 89-106. 
239 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters. 
240 D. Artaud, 'Reparations and War Debts', p. 89. 
45 
create a separate Rhenish state during the Ruhr crisis. Walter MacDougall's book 
was, as has been stated already, one of the `revisionist school' that was more 
sympathetic to France's post-war position. 241 Keiger said that Poincare did not want 
the dismemberment of Germany, only the fulfilment of the treaty. 242 Detlev Peukert 
wrote of "the unstated aim" of the foreign policy of the French government. 43 
Schuker was also critical of Poincare. 244 In a recent article, Jeannesson believed that 
France "had an active policy s245 in the Rhineland territories that it had occupied in 
accordance with the Versailles treaty and the Rhineland Agreement. He said that the 
final halting of France's Rhineland policy, a consequence of the Ruhr invasion, 
"marked clearly the limits of French power in the post-war era, though it is not 
certain if all of France's rulers grasped this. ' 2` 6 
Anthony Adamthwaite's book is an excellent work on the French foreign 
policy of the period. 247 He was highly critical of the French decision-making process 
(between the president, prime minister and the foreign secretary) and the lack of 
coordination of strategy and diplomacy. 248 Adamthwaite said that the French 
economy recovered so rapidly that, in the early 1920s, the government "had the 
resources to pursue an independent foreign policy - even perhaps to the extent of 
improving her own reparations and debt settlement. , 249 In his book on Poincare, 
Stanislas Jeannesson stated that France's participation in the invasion of the Ruhr was 
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primarily due to Poincare himself. He took a long time to make the decision, but it 
was his decision and he made it "de toute connaissance de cause" - in full knowledge 
of the facts. 25° Jeannesson concluded that the legacy of the Ruhr crisis took longer to 
fade than that of Versailles. Despite the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Pact, "... the 
Republic was fatally wounded, a weakened body that would be overwhelmed by the 
Nazi virus. ' 251 Conan Fischer agreed, but said that "had Poincare responded 
positively to Germany's overtures during the late summer of 1923, Franco-German 
relations might have assumed dimensions comparable in important respects to those 
of the post-Hitler era. s252 
Until the advent of the `new history, ' the role of the British government in 
the Ruhr crisis, according to most British historians, was that of something akin to an 
innocent bystander. The French government was the guilty party. Older works have 
not been helpful to this study. A book by Royal J. Schmidt on Versailles and the Ruhr 
included very little on the role of the Foreign Office during the crisis, again 
emphasising the importance of the publication of the original archives in the 1960s. 253 
In a book and article focusing on the British role during the Ruhr crisis, 
Elspeth O'Riordan254 was particularly interested in the influences of France, Germany 
and the U. S. A. on Britain, as well as foreign policy-making processes within Britain's 
bureaucratic system, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury and 
its impact on European policy. O'Riordan argued that "on the eve of the crisis British 
policy lacked purpose and direction, but rather vacillated between procrastination 
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(regarding the proposed inter-allied conference at Brussels) and misjudgement 
epitomised by the provocative Paris plan. "255 During the crisis, she believed that 
British policy was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained than 
has previously been thought. 256 O'Riordan rightly emphasised Crowe's "crucial role" 
in the summer of 1923.257 Frank McDonough, though, concluded that "the whole 
sorry episode showed that France, acting without British support, could not hope to 
force Germany to pay reparations. "258 In a recent article, O'Riordan examined 
Britain's occupation of the Rhineland zone after the war and concluded that it had a 
notable impact on its policy-making process. The Foreign Office involved `the 
periphery' "much more proactively in decision-making, using officials in the 
Rhineland to help find solutions to problems both in the spring and autumn. All in all 
the policymaking relationship had become much more ... symbiotic. s259 Christopher 
Andrew's book260 is very informative on the intrigue against Curzon in the summer 
and autumn of 1923, in which the editor of the Morning Post, H. A. Gwynne, was a 
leading actor. 
The French Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay, is a subject requiring far 
more research from British historians, especially on the post-First World War period. 
Georges Bonnet's reputation has been tainted with the epithet `appeaser, ' as a result 
of his participation in foreign affairs for French governments in the 1930s, but it 
would be wrong to ignore completely his book on the Quai d'Orsay, partly because it 
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is the only one currently available in English. However, as with the books of the 
former mandarins of the Foreign Office, it contains many interesting anecdotes, but 
lacks a modern perspective and scholastic rigour. It therefore needs to be cross- 
checked with other sources. Bonnet, though, rightly asserted that French politicians 
and diplomats were occasionally frustrated with the "abrupt, confusing changes" in 
Britain's policy. 261 
The first Labour government of 1924 has been the subject of considerable 
scrutiny from historians. 262 Most of the literature has concentrated on its domestic 
policies, the intrigue within the Labour Party, 263 but particularly on the character of 
the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. MacDonald acted as his own Foreign 
Secretary and it is surprising that foreign affairs, in which he was intensely interested, 
has often received such little attention even from biographers. The most 
comprehensive biography of Ramsay MacDonald was that of David Marquand. 264 He 
did not accept that MacDonald was a political pygmy, as Mowat had complained. 265 
For example, Marquand cited MacDonald's interest in and great knowledge of foreign 
affairs, especially the politics of the United States. 266 Austen Morgan's biography267 
was part of a series entitled `Lives of the Left' and devoted little space to Labour's 
261 G. Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, Isle of Man, 1965, p. 62. 
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foreign policy. Eyre Crowe was not mentioned at all. Yet, when foreign policy was 
briefly examined, Morgan's work is of great value to this thesis. He showed that in his 
`Foreign Policy of the Labour Party' of 1923, MacDonald was extremely interested in 
coming to an agreement with America when Labour gained power. 26" In discussing 
the Zinoviev Letter, Morgan mentions John Gregory's speedy action in releasing the 
letter and protest note (Gregory's name was below the note)269 and MacDonald's 
rejection in 1925 of a Labour plan to reform the Foreign Office and replace its 
leadership with American-style political appointments. 270 
Philip Bell's book on Franco-British relations between the wars is very 
useful on Ramsay MacDonald and France 271 but Patrick Cohrs article on Anglo- 
American relations between 1923 and 1925 is essential for any analysis of 
MacDonald's foreign policy. 272 Cohrs argued that the Locarno Pact would not have 
occurred, but for the renewal of co-operation between Britain and the United States 
and in which MacDonald was a major player273 and asked whether the London 
-Protocol of 1924 and the Locarno Pact of 1925 were the fist real peace agreements 
after the war. 274 He said that MacDonaJd's greatest achiev ment, the London 
Conference, "altered overall relations between the Westenr powers and Germany"275 
and that the peace of the 1920s "stemmed from a formative, yet after 1925, 
unsustained, transformation of Euro-Atlantic politics. "276 What is important for this 
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thesis is that the role of Sir Eyre Crowe, MacDonald's main adviser on foreign affairs, 
should be emphasised, especially on matters relating to Germany. The most important 
event concerning Germany during MacDonald's first Ministry was the acceptance of 
the Dawes Plan on reparations. 
In April 1924, the expert committees produced their report. The 
conference held in London in July and August aimed to gain the acceptance of the 
major powers, especially France, Britain, Germany and the United States, for the 
Dawes Plan, as it came to be known. Germany was to be assisted by receiving 
substantial foreign loans, mainly from America. It would then be able to pay the 
readjusted reparation instalments. Historians have generally praised the Dawes Plan 
for ameliorating what have been perceived to be the worst effects of the imposition of 
reparations and for stimulating the economic recovery of Germany, albeit for only a 
few years. 27 However, Schuker pointed out that "... the net capital flow ran toward 
Germany during both the inflation and stabilization phases of the Weimar 
Republic. , 278 As a result, Germany's economy developed considerably in the next 
few years, to the great benefit of the German people. "The `reparations' to Germany 
allowed the maintenance of living standards in the Weimar Republic at a level 
appreciably higher than domestic productivity would have justified. s279 Furthermore, 
in his earlier book, Schuker had argued that Anglo-American financiers and 
politicians "in forcing the Dawes settlement on France, destroyed Europe's best hope 
for stability: France's bid to found security on a contained and fragmented 
Germany. s280 
277 For example, Maisel, Foreign Office, p. 144. 
278 Schuker, American Reparations to Germany, p. 10. 
279 Ibid, p. 11. 
280 Cohrs, `The first "Real" Peace Settlements', 12,1 (2003), p. 2. 
51 
There is a great deal of literature on the Locarno Treaty or Locarno Pact 
of 1925. The treaty claimed to have brought peace and security to Western Europe. 
Since the Second World War, the Locarno Treaty has been fiercely criticised. 
"Locarno had not so much pacified Europe as it defined the next battlefield. s281 But, 
Philip Bell argued that the policy might have succeeded, but for the economic disaster 
of 1929.282 Some of the literature has concentrated upon the parts played by the 
Foreign Secretaries of the major powers. Yet, so often the part played by Crowe and 
his colleagues has been ignored. 
Crowe's daughter, Sibyl, wrote an article283 that demonstrated her father's 
"key guiding role in the success of the Locarno Pact. "284 She felt that to ensure this 
was his "last great personal achievement. , 285 Yet, Sibyl Crowe showed that for 
many years the contribution of Crowe and the Foreign Office to the formation of the 
diplomatic strategy was largely ignored. Ms. Crowe argued that, perhaps 
inadvertently, Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary was partly responsible for 
this situation. A letter of 28 November 1925 to his sister Ivy "was by no means an 
entirely accurate account of what happened, ' 9286 as Middlemas and Barnes pointed out 
in their biography of Stanley Baldwin. Chamberlain's omission of any credit to 
Crowe was not due to any personal animosity. They suggested that it was simply "a 
clear case of faulty memory. "287 Crowe thought that whatever the reason, her father's 
role had been only partly documented, but the accessibility of the official archives of 
281 Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, 1994, p. 274. 
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1924 and 1925 since 1967 had made it possible to fill many gaps. 288 They have helped 
to "throw much light on the way in which Chamberlain's policy was formed in 
consultation with expert opinion in the foreign office... s289 
Ms. Crowe's argument that her father's role has been undervalued is 
beyond doubt. Alan Campbell, a diplomat, not a historian, as he admitted, wrote an 
overview of Crowe's career, 290 but with very little original insight and, on Locarno, 
mentioned only that Crowe and Chamberlain quickly established a close friendship 
and mutual affection in the short time that they worked together. 291 In a large 
biography of Austen Chamberlain, David Dutton292 made one reference to Crowe. 
Richard Grayson seemed to emphasise the original vision of Chamberlain, not that of 
the diplomats. 293 In the past decade though, one excellent article has supported Sibyl 
Crowe's argument about the valuable role played by her father in the history of the 
Locarno Pact. 
Erik Goldstein analysed the early months of the new Conservative 
government and argued that Crowe, working closely with the Foreign Secretary, 
Austen Chamberlain, played a highly significant role in the evolution of the 
diplomatic strategy for the Locarno Pact. Furthermore, he believed that the vital role 
of the Foreign Office in this success served to restore much of the influence lost by 
the ministry in recent years. 294 In his article on Anglo-American relations between 
1923 and 1925, Patrick Cohrs failed to discuss the contribution of Crowe or any 
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Foreign Office official, other than the Foreign Secretary, in the development of the 
Locarno strategy. 295 Austen Chamberlain saw himself and England as Europe's 
`honest broker, '296 reprising Bismarck's role at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. 
There has been no independent study of the attitudes and perceptions of 
Foreign Office officials about Germany during the period after the war, although 
various historians have drawn their own conclusions. Stephanie Salzmann suggested 
that there was a division of opinion inside the Foreign Office about Germany. She 
believed that the `old' high-ranking officials such as Crowe and Tyrrell had been 
prejudiced against Germany since before the war, whereas the younger ones 
(supported incidentally by Curzon), such as Wellesley and Gregory (assistant 
secretaries) and clerks such as Lampson and Harold Nicolson believed that the harsh 
terms of the Versailles Treaty had inflamed Germany and made it likely to ally with 
Moscow. 97 In fact, the officials that Salzmann named were all great admirers of Sir 
Eyre Crowe and sympathised with his views on Germany, as will be shown in 
Chapter 2, Salzmann even conceded that 
despite the diverging views on German policy within the Foreign Office there 
never was an open confrontation between the two groups. The prevailing view 
was that, for the moment, the treaty of Versailles was the basis of European 
relations. Moreover, until 1922 no long-term strategy for a policy towards 
298 Germany had been formulated. 
In a biography of her grandfather, Robert Hadow, Lindsay Michie said 
that when Sir Eyre Crowe died, with him died "the strong tradition of a policy of 
collective security in Europe. The death of Crowe seemed to represent the release of 
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the Foreign Office from a tighter control over policy and a clarity of direction ... s299 
Michie wrote of her grandfather's strongest critic, Sir Orme Sargent, then head of the 
Central Department (responsible for Germany), that he `advocated a `classical' policy 
for Britain in which she could not allow any one power to dominate Europe. Germany 
was therefore to be contained by alliances; preferably Franco-British... s300 
Very recently, a series of books on British foreign and colonial policy has 
begun to be published. Of some relevance to this thesis is one by Michael Hughes, 301 
but of even greater interest is one by Thomas Otte that will include a chapter on Eyre 
Crowe. It is expected to be published in August 2007.302 
It is beyond question that the works published on the seven years 
following the end of the First World War is only a fraction of those published on the 
ten years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. This is understandable as 
causes of wars are often of greater interest to historians and the public than the wars 
themselves or their aftermath. Yet this thesis argues that the seven years after 1918 
are also of great importance in understanding the evolution of the international crisis 
of the inter-war years and the role of Germany within that crisis. The thesis is an 
attempt to follow in the tradition of historians such as Zara Steiner, Alan Sharp, F. L. 
Carsten, Sibyl Eyre Crowe, Ephraim Maisel and Elspeth O'Riordan, all of whom have 
asserted that in order to understand British diplomatic history one needs to be aware 
of the work of the diplomats `behind the scenes. ' What did the Foreign Office 
contribute to the Paris Peace Conference, the Treaty of Versailles, the London 
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Conference of 1924 and the Locarno Treaty? How did it act during the Ruhr crisis of 
1923, the German hyper-inflation and the Munich Putsch? 
Throughout this thesis, it will be continually reinforced that the `Foreign 
Office mind' on Germany, including most of the junior staff, was that of Sir Eyre 
Crowe. His perceptions not only influenced the thinking of the Foreign Office itself, 
but also some of the leading ministers of the Crown. Even during periods of apparent 
`eclipse, ' Crowe himself, or aspects of the spirit of the 1907 Memorandum, 
influenced British government policy on Germany. Obviously, it is not possible to 
discover the views of every official employed by the Foreign Office on Britain's 
relations with Germany after the First World War, but through an examination of 
public and private documents it is possible to discover the perceptions of almost all 
the leading mandarins as well as some of the junior officials who later in their careers 
attained high rank, especially those who worked in the Central Department (the 
section that dealt with German affairs). It is also accepted that there was much 
negative feeling within the Foreign Office, and Britain as a whole, towards the 
defeated former enemy in the period following the end of thý war. But, emotions can 
change, as indeed, for many people, they did. It is also accepted that, at times, Crowe 
himself, and his Foreign Office colleagues, seemed to have been pushed to the 
background, as happened during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the London 
Conference of 1924. Yet, the principles for which Crowe stood remained potent. The 
study will demonstrate that Crowe's perceptions of Germany, as articulated in the 
1907 Memorandum, were not a dogma that Foreign Office officials of this period 
carried around with them to wave at opponents like a `Little Red Book, s303 Yet, they 
did provide a framework within which the foreign policy of the British government 
303 See Conclusion, p. 275. This seems to have happened, though, after the publication 
of the Memorandum following Crowe's death. 
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towards Germany between 1919 and 1925 could be formulated and business could be 
conducted. 
In the course of the research, all sources were critically evaluated for their 
usefulness to a historian of the period. None were completely disregarded, despite the 
questionable reliability of some of the authors. Errors were due, perhaps, to the time 
lag between events and their being committed to paper, but more probably to the 
needs of the authors for a positive verdict upon them by the judgement of history. 
This was certainly true of the memoirs of Lords Hardinge and Vansittart of the 
Foreign Office, and, of course, Lloyd George. It was a major constraint on the thesis 
that some of the secondary material was approximately fifty to eighty years old. Their 
inclusion was justified because it was not possible to interview anyone who had 
served in the Foreign Office during this period (or authors such as Connell and Craig) 
who knew some of them) and therefore memoirs of senior officials could not be 
ignored. Very few references to Foreign Office officials were discovered in either 
Hansard or The Times and therefore the importance of the Documents on British 
Foreign Policy series to the conducting of this study was considerable. 
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Chapter 2 
Sir Eyre Crowe, the Foreign Office at Versailles and the Post-War World 
This chapter will examine the work of the Foreign Office delegates at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919, concentrating on the events leading to the signing by the German 
delegation of the Treaty of Versailles. Evidence presented here will argue that on 28 
June 1919, Lloyd George signed a treaty that was very similar in spirit to the Crowe 
Memorandum. The chapter will analyse the apparent failure to impose their views in 
Paris of the Foreign Secretary, A. J. Balfour, and Lord Hardinge, the Permanent 
Under- Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. It will also discuss the ambitions of 
Balfour's successor, Lord Curzon. The reaction of Crowe and the Foreign Office to 
the famous work of John Maynard Keynes and its effects upon the policies of the 
United States must also be discussed. Above all, the chapter will highlight the hitherto 
neglected career and views of Sir Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office from 1920 to 1925, when, sadly, he died at the early age of sixty. It 
aims to show that for more than a decade before, during and after the war, Crowe's 
perceptions of Germany dominated the `official mind" of the Foreign Office. To this 
end, the chapter will analyse his famous `Memorandum' of I January 19072 which 
1 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 432-437. `The Foreign Office mind' 
essentially consisted of the views of the Foreign Office elite according to T. G. Otte, 
`Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914, ' Contemporary 
British History 18,3 (2004), pp. 31-52. 2 British Library, Memorandum on the Present State of Relations with France and 
Germany, 1 January 1907, partly published under the different title of `German 
Foreign Policy Before The War: The 1907 Memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe', Preface 
by Hilaire Belloc, reproduced in A Friends of Europe Publication, London, 1934, pp. 
1-30. For the whole memorandum, see British Documents on the Origins of the War, 
58 
argued that, following two decades of making concessions, Britain needed to take a 
firmer line towards Germany. 3 It will then examine, as briefly as possible, his life and 
career until the end of 1918,4 including the question of his `German roots. '5 It will 
demonstrate that his views even influenced politicians such as Lloyd George and 
Curzon who held widely differing opinions to Crowe on a number of key issues. As 
well as concentrating on Crowe's attitudes to Germany, it will discuss his vision of 
the post-war world and consider to what extent the `Edwardian' view of Europe6 
persisted during the Paris Peace Conference. It will show that despite the `eclipse' of 
the Foreign Office in terms of Lloyd George's desire to do without its participation in 
formulating policies towards Germany, the policies of the `Garden Suburb' (the small 
coterie of advisers and assistants favoured by the Prime Minister) shared many of the 
views outlined in the famous `Crowe Memorandum. ' 
The chapter will attempt to discover Sir Eyre Crowe's view of the 
international situation in 1918-1919, largely through his work at the Paris Peace 
Conference, 8 but, firstly, his earlier career must be analysed. In the aftermath of the 
1906 Algeciras Conference, when the Kaiser had tested the new `Entente Cordiale' 
over the question of Morocco, Eyre Crowe sent a forty-three-page document to his 
1898-1914, Volume 3, London, 1928, pp. 397-420. Originally the document in 
manuscript was forty-three pages long. 
3 This document, "perhaps for the first time, laid bare the true nature of the German 
threat to British interests. " See G. Craig, `The British Foreign Office from Grey to 
Chamberlain' in Craig and Gilbert (eds), 77, e Diplomats, p. 26. 
° Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 1-302. 
G. A. Craig, The Germans, London, 1982. 
6 Mc Kercher, `Old diplomacy and new'. 
7 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse'. 
8 Bodleian Library, Oxford. Crowe Papers and Letters. MS Eng, e. 3022, and MS 
Eng, e. 3025 (hereafter Crowe Papers); Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise; 
Sharp, `Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office'. 
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Foreign Office superiors on 1 January 1907.9 Only year earlier, Crowe had achieved 
senior status in Whitehall, after being promoted to the rank of Senior Clerk. He was 
soon promoted to Head of the Western Department. He had spent the previous twenty 
years acquiring a breadth of knowledge on a variety of subjects, but particularly 
modern European history. In fact, Crowe had lived in Germany until he was 
seventeen and remained in regular correspondence with relatives and family friends 
who happened to include high-ranking members of the German establishment. One 
decade later, during the war, these connections placed his career, home and family at 
great risk. In 1906 and 1907, they helped give Crowe a remarkable insight into the 
`German character, ' Germany's increasing desire for imperial expansion and the 
future of Anglo-German relations. 
Following the initial section on France, the `Crowe Memorandum' 
analysed the history of how Britain's position as a great power had developed over the 
previous centuries whilst being a small island state adjacent to the continental 
mainland with a vast overseas empire. Crowe emphasised the primacy of Britain's 
national interests, the significance of its naval supremacy and the need to ensure that 
no single power dominated the mainland of continental Europe through the 
9 Friends of Europe, pp. 1-3 1. The Memorandum, a secret state document, was 
considered so remarkable that it was published three years after Crowe's death in 
Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, London, 1928. Praise for it has 
come from many diplomats. In his autobiography, Sir Robert Vansittart, Crowe's 
successor as Permanent Under-Secretary (1930-1938) said that it was with 
"Canning's rhymed despatch, one of the few diplomatic documents that achieved 
fame in the world of technicians" and was a "reasonably explicit warning against 
Germany... written in the stilted style of the period. " Vansittart, Mist Procession, pp. 
63-64. To a more modern diplomat, it was "a classic document ... 
(that) was at a level 
of analysis never reached by any document of post-Bismarck Germany. " Kissinger, 
Diplomacy, p. 192. It was in the summer of 1924 that Ramsay MacDonald took the 
decision to publish selected documents on the origins of the war and, in November 
1924, Austen Chamberlain confirmed this decision. See Documents on Origins of 
War, Volume 6, p. vii. 
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maintenance of a balance of power. As an analysis of Britain's diplomatic and 
military history the memorandum was brilliant in its description and logic, but it was 
in its observations and conclusions about the ambitions of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the 
German military elite that it had the most extraordinary and lasting impact. 
A central aspect of the memorandum was Crowe's detailed review of the 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany in the previous twenty years. Ever 
since Bismarck's shift towards expansionist policies in the 1880s, there had been 
many quarrels between the two nations. Every disagreement had begun with direct 
German government hostility and disregard for the rules of diplomatic etiquette. Yet, 
despite being resented by successive Secretaries of State, Britain had nevertheless 
constantly shown a conciliatory attitude. 
According to Crowe, the antagonism between Britain and Germany was 
not of an ephemeral nature, but it had "existed in ample measure for a long period. s10 
The cause was "an entirely one-sided aggressiveness on the part of Germany" whilst 
"on the part of England the most conciliatory disposition had been coupled with 
never-failing readiness to purchase the resumption of friendly relations by concession 
after concession. s" 
Given this, how were British policy-makers to interpret the aims of current 
German policy? To Crowe, there were two possible alternatives. Firstly, Germany 
was "definitely aiming at general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, 
threatening British vital interests, the independence of her neighbours, and ultimately 
the very existence o England. i12 Eventually, the only ways to avoid conflict would 
be for Britain to sacrifice her vital interests, thus losing her position as an independent 
10 Crowe Memorandum, Friends of Europe, p. 20. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, p. 25. 
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great power, or by making herself too strong to give Germany a chance of winning 
any war against her. The second possibility was that "Germany had no clear ambition 
and that the great German design was really no more than the expression of vague, 
confused and impractical statesmanship, not fully realizing where she was going, 
"and all her excursions and alarms, all her underhand intrigues do not contribute to 
the steady working-out of a well-conceived and relentlessly followed system of policy 
because they do not form part of any such system. s13 In the'view of Crowe, Bismarck 
would never have had such a confused and aimless policy, laut he realised that part of 
the responsibility for "the erratic, domineering and often frankly aggressive spirit of 
German policy... so manifest in every branch of German life" were "the well-known 
qualities of mind and temperament of the present ruler of Germany (Kaiser Wilhelm 
II)... ý, is 
Even so, Crowe accepted that both interpretations should be regarded 
cautiously, but whichever was correct, Britain's response should be firmly based upon 
-the maintenance of a balance of power. Within this system Crowe believed that 
Germany had a significant role to play but he claimed thaI makers later policy 
ignored this advice. He asserted that Germany must retain its position as a major 
power because a Franco-Russian domination of the continent would possibly be a 
greater threat to Britain. Therefore, a strong and vigorous Germany must become part 
of a viable European balance of power and it was even reasonable for Germany to 
possess a large fleet if it was necessary for the defence of its national interests. '5 
13 Ibid, p. 22. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, pp. 26-27; Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 118-119. 
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Even Paul Kennedy, who described Crowe as being part of a group of 
people in the Foreign Office and diplomatic corps who held "the most persistent 
dislike for Germany, " 16 accepted that "Crowe's 1907 memorandum postulated a 
policy of general, non-violent growth for Germany as an alternative to "aiming at 
general hegemony and maritime ascendancy. "" 
Crowe had hoped that Germany would ask for a "close understanding 
with England s18 and he believed that this should always be encouraged. To achieve 
this, he believed Britain should maintain an attitude of "unvarying courtesy and 
consideration in all matters of common concern, but also with a prompt and firm 
refusal to enter into any one-sided bargains or arrangements, and the most unbending 
determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe. s19 
Crowe concluded that the policy of continually granting concessions to 
Germany had not worked 2° He likened German policy to the methods of a 
blackmailer, 21 who demanded more after each submission. Britain's response should 
be "a firmer though still friendly policy " towards Germany. 22 Yet, Henry Kissinger 
said that it also left "no reasonable doubt that Great Britain joined the Triple Entente 
in order to thwart what it feared was a German desire for world domination... " and 
therefore "explained why, in his view, an accommodation with Germany was 
impossible and entente with France was the only option. ' P23 
16 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 253. and also p. 431 for Cecil Spring- 
Rice's question about Germany. On the other hand, Leo Maxse complained that the 
Foreign Office was rife with subservience to Kaiser Wilhelm II - `Potsdamism, ' p. 
317. 
17 Ibid. 
'$ Friends of Europe, p. 27. 
19 Ibid, p. 30. 
20 Ibid, p. 19. 
21 Ibid, p. 24. 
22 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 124. 
23 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 192. 
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Whatever its true aims, there is no doubt the memorandum had an 
immediate and remarkable effect. Copies were circulated to the Foreign Secretary, 
Grey, the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman and the Chancellor, Asquith, with 
among others, King Edward VII receiving a copy. 24 It was not, however, universally 
admired and approved. The retired Permanent Under-Secretary, Sanderson, who was 
far less critical towards Germany, informed Lord Hardinge, his successor, that 
Crowe's summary of the recent history of Anglo-German relations was an 
"unchequered record of black deeds. "25 Zara Steiner agreed with Sanderson's 
stance. 26 Crowe and Corp accused Steiner of being "apparently advised and 
supported"27 by Professor J. S. Grenville, who was an authority on Lord Salisbury's 
foreign policy. Connell said though that, in the years after 1907, Crowe's 
Memorandum "acquired the strength and stability of a revealed doctrine. s28 
Germany also had many other influential supporters within the British 
Establishment. To begin with, the Royal Family had many links with Germany. As 
Kennedy put it: "Perhaps the most persistent lobby for good Anglo-German relations 
were the financial circles in the City of London and their equivalent in Frankfurt, 
Berlin and Hamburg. ' v29 Perhaps surprisingly, Crowe was very critical of the 
`German' influences inside the City of London. 30 
24 Ibid, pp. 119-120. The memorandum was originally asked for by the King who was 
concerned at the prevailing current against Germany and favour shown towards 
France... " This was "most ironic, " wrote Kennedy in Anglo-German Antagonism, 
402-403. 
2S G. P. Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, London, 1942, p. 55. 
26 Steiner, Foreign Office, p. 69. 
27 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 120. 
28 Connell, The 'Office, p. 11. 
29 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 302. 
30 Ibid, p. 419. 
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This begs the question of whether or not Eyre Crowe was an anti- 
German. 31 His daughter and her fellow biographer reject the accusation and claim that 
although often been portrayed as a bigoted Germanophobe, it would have been out of 
character for him to make such a partial and sentimental political judgement 32 In fact, 
Crowe was not opposed to Germany becoming a Great Power and it is very doubtful 
that a `Germanophobe' could have written the following: 
It cannot for a moment be questioned that the mere existence and healthy 
activity of a powerful Germany is an undoubted blessing in the world. 
Germany represents to a pre-eminent degree those highest qualities and virtues 
of good citizenship in the largest sense of the word, which constitute the glory 
and the triumph of modern civilisation. The world would be immensely poorer 
if anything which is specifically associated with the German character, with 
German ideas and with German methods were to cease having power and 
influence. 33 
Crowe was positive about "German competition for an intellectual and 
moral leadership of the world in reliance on her own natural advantages and 
energies. ' s34 What he would object to was if Germany threatened the British Empire 
and British naval supremacy, and sought the expansion of its own territories before 
seeking these ambitions. This would result in conflict. 5 Nor did he see this as a 
purely Anglo-German matter. "Even if the (British) Empire disappeared, the union of 
the greatest military with the greatest naval power in one state would compel the 
world to combine for the riddance of such an incubus. "36 
31 Kennedy referred to both Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson (Permanent Under- 
Secretary, 1910-1913, as "anti-Germans. " Ibid, p. 451. 
32 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. xii. They do not say by whom. This was 
certainly not the view of colleagues such as Harold Nicolson in Peacemaking 1919. 
33 Friends of Europe, p. 16. Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 116. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
36 Ibica p. 24. 
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The evidence of his family background and education is enough to cast 
doubt on the opinion that Crowe was an `anti-German. ' Yet, Hardinge may have not 
been wholly off the mark when he said that Crowe was "palpably German' 07 
because he did possess some of the mainly positive characteristics that have been 
identified as alleged national traits. 38 He was dedicated to the `work ethic, ' to his 
family, respected the military (he was a member of the Territorial Army and had 
volunteered unsuccessfully - he failed a medical - to serve in South Africa) and was a 
lover of serious music who played the piano, being especially fond of playing the 
works of the great German composer, Johann Sebastian Bach. It might also have been 
said that Crowe was not wholly sympathetic to democracy, certainly in matters 
pertaining to foreign policy-making. 39 
Appearances were deceiving. "People meeting Crowe for the first time 
were sometimes repelled by his rigidity and the punctilio of his official manner, but 
there were few, on closer acquaintance, who did not admire his industry and his 
breadth of view. s40 Nor was Crowe blindly obedient or deferential towards authority. 
From his early days in the Foreign Office, he would stand his ground against his 
37 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 47. 
38 See G. A. Craig, The Germans, London, 1982, pp. 5-7,9-10,17,20,112 and 293- 
294. Unlike Crowe, Craig lived through the Third Reich and the Second World War. 
Gordon Craig discussed such traits as being anti-modern, anti-political, deferential to 
authority, parochial, preoccupied with `Germanness, ' and xenophobic. He did not 
discuss the Germar1 sense of humour. 
39 This was also trü of one of Crowe's admirers, a future Assistant Under-Secretary 
at the Foreign Office, who admitted that, as regards democracy, "no one could have a 
more unshakeable faith in its being the highest form of civilized form of society yet 
evolved, despite its shortcomings... it is mere folly to blind ourselves to the defects of 
democracy. Its chief weakness lies in the domain of foreign affairs... " See Wellesley, 
Diplomacy in Fetters, p. 10. 
40 Craig, `The British Foreign Office' in Craig and Gilbert (eds), The Diplomats, p. 
26. 
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superiors. 41 It was not just his biographers who recounted stories of his kindness 
towards his juniors and the genuine sadness at his early death. 42 
Eyre Crowe was born in Leipzig in 1864, the son of Sir Joseph Crowe, an 
English baronet, and a German mother, Asta von Barby, whose brother, Admiral 
Henning von Holtzendorff, would later become chief of the German naval staff during 
the Great War. Crowe's father was British Commercial Secretary in Germany, but a 
lack of funds prevented him from sending his gifted third son to an English public 
school and possibly on to Oxford or Cambridge, the usual breeding-ground for 
Foreign Office officials. After being educated in Germany until the age of eighteen, 
Eyre Crowe then went to England to cram for the Foreign Office entrance 
examination, at which he was to be successful. He therefore did not share many of the 
advantages of his contemporaries. 43 
Crowe began work as a junior clerk at the Foreign Office in 1885, 
gradually building up a vast reservoir of knowledge of a variety of subjects that would 
'help to develop his career and serve his country diplomati ally. In 1905 and 1906, he 
was the main architect of a number of administrative refor s that "transformed a 
writing office to a policy-making bureaucracy. "' In 1912 he was promoted to the 
rank of Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. During the war he 
did highly important work at the Ministry of Blockade. Crowe's move probably 
contributed to the apparent `eclipse' of the Foreign Office that may have accelerated 
after 1916. °S As Assistant Under-Secretary, he was Head of the War Department, but 
after he had quarrelled with Grey he was moved to the Contraband Department. 
41 For example, Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 34. 42 For example, Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 210-211. Also Maisel, Foreign 
Office, 1919-1926, p. 176. 4' Steiner, Foreign Office, pp. 109-111. 
44 Sharp, `Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office', p. 66. 45 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse', pp. 198-218. 
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Crowe's abilities were therefore lost to the political sections of the Foreign Office 
until the war was over. ' 
Throughout Crowe's career he faced obstacles to his progress up the 
career ladder. A useful comparison could be made with his predecessor as Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Lord Hardinge, who was Viceroy of India between two periods in 
the highest post in Whitehall (1906-1910 and 1916-1920). Hardinge was a very able 
administrator, but it has been said that his career was helped by his wife's 
membership of, and influence in, the Court of King Edward VII. 47 Hardinge shared 
many of Crowe's attitudes towards Germany, but he held many prejudices against 
him and attempted to block the path to Crowe becoming his successor. 48 
It was extraordinary that during the war, because of his German connections, 
Crowe and his family were subjected to a scurrilous hate campaign led by, among 
others, the Daily Mail, Horatio Bottomley, Sylvia Pankhurst and Annie Kenney. 
Between the summer of 1915 and September 1918, he was denounced in various 
allegedly `patriotic' publications as a German traitor, 49 the `evil genius' behind Grey 
and personally responsible for the deaths of British soldiers. On several occasions, 
Crowe's honour had to be defended publicly in the House of Commons, for example, 
by Simon, Grey and Cecil. The extreme anti-German, Leo Maxse, defended him in 
the National Review. In appreciation of his outstanding service, Crowe was given a 
substantial pay increase and was knighted in June 1918. Yet, in September 1918, a 
46 Warman, `Erosion of Foreign Office Influence', p. 134. 
47 Dockrill and Steiner, `Foreign Office at Paris', pp. 59-60. 
48 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 290-292. 
49 In Britannia on 12 November 1915, on account of his German family connections, 
Crowe was viciously attacked by several `patriotic' Suffragette leaders and others. 
UK National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter UKNA), Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, 
p. 33. In John Bull on 7 April 1917, there was a shameful open letter to Crowe, ibid, 
p. 48. For other unpleasant letters and cards sent to Crowe's home, see ibid, pp. 42- 
50. 
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crowd of 3,000, led by another militant suffragette, Mrs Dacre Fox, gathered to march 
on his house in Chelsea. The police intervened, but Crowe had a loaded pistol ready 
to defend his family, if necessary. S° Although his career was not destroyed by these 
events, they left scars on Crowe 51 that lasted perhaps for the rest of his life. 
In December 1918, Sir Eyre Crowe and a Foreign Office delegation left 
for the Paris Peace Conference. His work there can be divided into two parts. In the 
first six months of 1919, during discussions on the German treaty, he and his 
colleagues experienced long periods of idleness and frustration as a result of their 
marginalisation by Lloyd George, followed by a few weeks intense activity, 
particularly translating major documents. 52 Then, after Lloyd George and the rest of 
Big Four left the conference, Crowe did remarkable work on some of the other 
treaties. He was given the rank of Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the British 
delegation, serving on the Supreme Council until January 1920.53 
The activities of the British delegation in Paris must be placed in a 
historical context. In December 1918, Lloyd George, a Liberal, and his mainly 
Conservative Coalition government, won a massive, but `pyrrhic' victory at the 
polls. 54 In 1918, Lloyd George personally took much of the credit for the final victory. 
Hardinge, a great critic, later had to remind Lloyd George's French enemies that he 
had transformed the production of munitions in Britain and had popularised the war. " 
so Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 286-290. Crowe was threatened 
because of his German origins and family connections, not because of his attitude to 
the female suffrage. 
51 Interview with Curzon, 14 October 1919, UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, pp. 
92-93. 
52 See Chapter 2, pp. 74-75. 
53 See Chapter 2, pp. 80-81. 
sa Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War. 
55 Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 256. 
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Lloyd George was going to enjoy himself in Paris and enjoy himself he did, according 
to his friend, Lord Riddell. 56 
The British delegation comprised 207 people in total. The Foreign Office 
delegation numbered eighteen, including twelve diplomats and six secretaries. They 
included Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Robert Cecil, his Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Sir 
Eyre Crowe, then head of the Central Section (which included Germany). Robert 
Vansittart and Harold Nicolson were among the junior officials. While Balfour was in 
Paris, Lord Curzon served as Acting Foreign Secretary in London. 57 
Harold Nicolson, having observed him at close quarters, had 
discovered that the Foreign Secretary only occasionally displayed his great ability. 58 
However, Arthur Balfour seemed content to play a minor role at Versailles and allow 
Lloyd George to be `centre stage. ' At this time Balfour believed that as a reward for 
his wartime leadership there should be "a free hand ... (given) to the 
little man. sS9 It 
was not a view shared by many of Balfour's class, including the mandarins of the 
Foreign Office. Nor can it explain his indolence at Versailles. Such was his 
anonymity that a group of French journalists in Paris decided to follow him one day to 
discover where he went while other statesmen were deciding Europe's destiny. His 
destination was a tennis tournament 60 
Michael Dockrill and Zara Steiner gave a more sympathetic view of the 
Foreign Secretary. They believed that Balfour, despite his failings, "when given the 
opportunity... proved to be an able co-ordinator and his many minutes suggest that he 
56 Lentin, Lost Peace, p. 3. 
57 See Johnson, `Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary' 
5, Egremont, Arthur Balfour, p. 305. 
59 Lentin, The Lost Peace, p. 7. 
60 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, p. 125. 
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was not lacking either in astuteness or awareness. 9961 He was sometimes faced with 
the difficulty of communicating with the Prime Minister via the members of the 
`Garden Suburb. ' In Paris, Crowe wrote a minute regarding France's behaviour 
towards Luxembourg and its pro-German dynasty. Balfour and Crowe suspected that 
Philip Kerr was preventing Lloyd George from reading it. When Balfour asked Kerr 
whether the Prime Minister had read the minute, Kerr replied, "I don't think so, but I 
have. " "Not quite the same thing Philip, is it? - yet, ' v62 was the Foreign Secretary's 
caustic observation. 63 
The conference intended to redraw the map of Europe, using the principle 
of self-determination of smaller nations as had been outlined in President Wilson's 
Fourteen Points, and to make peace treaties with the defeated nations - Austria, 
Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria and Germany. Opinions may differ about the significance 
of the Paris Peace Conference in inter-war history. What cannot be disputed is that it 
was an organisational shambles. Harold Nicolson observed, unlike, he claimed, 
contemporary historians, an "element of confusion. "64 Modern business managers 
would criticise it on almost every criterion. In brief, everything seems to have been 
done ad hoc - `on the hoof, ' in current jargon. Nicolson recalled that the diplomats in 
Paris possessed a handbook on `International Congresses' by Sir Ernest Satow in 
which the author "insisted upon the necessity of (a) some previous agreements as to 
the ends in view and (b) a definite and rigid programme. s65 The first priority should 
61 Dockrill and Stei er, `Foreign Office at Paris', p. 85. 
62 Crowe and Corp, blest Public Servant, p. 338. 
63 Lloyd George was personally very attached to Balfour who had defended him 
against his many enemies within his own government. He told Riddell on 7 
September 1919 that "B has always been kind to me. I like him and I am glad to see 
him looking so well. " Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 124. 64 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 6. 
65 Ibid, pp. 80-81. 
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indeed have been the German treaty66 however important it was to promote the claims 
of the smaller nations and to negotiate treaties with the other defeated nations. The 
conference lacked an agenda and the British, critically for future historians, did not 
take minutes. As a result, far too much time was wasted. 
Much work needed to be done, but Lloyd George kept the diplomats idle. 
To an industrious man like Crowe, this meant that he might as well not be there. He 
soon complained to his wife: 
i 
Meanwhile the conference has formally met. None of us was present. At the 
last moment, Hardinge alone was asked to attend. Lloyd George has decided 
to cut out the F. O. altogether and let the British delegation be represented by 
Hankey, who doesn't know a word of French. I don't know where it will all 
end. But you may imagine the state of feeling here. I have told Hardinge that 
our best plan would be all to go back to London at once, but he is no doubt 
right in advising patience. 67 
His frustration continued though: "Since yesterday there is some more 
orderly progress, since it has been decided to appoint various committees. We are 
going to have a talk with Balfour at 6 today: perhaps something more definite will 
emerge. " However, Crowe later added postscript: "Not uch resulted from the talk 
, 6s with Balfour. We live in a realm of argument, with no decision. ' 
Almost two weeks later, he wrote that "we are still treated with an 
amusing degree of mistrust by our great plenipotentiaries. s69 Two days after that, he 
reported that "... Hardinge came over with a request from Lloyd George for a paper 
to be ready by this morning at 7.30. " Crowe accomplished the task, but then wrote: 
"At least I hear, Lloyd George was appreciative. I lunched with Balfour today. He 
66 Ibid, p. 116. 
67 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, MS Eng., e. 3022, letter to his wife, Clema, 18 
January 1919, pp. 61-62. 
68 Ibid, 24 January 1919, p. 84. 
69 Ibid, 4 February 1919, p. 127. 
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was more talkative and human than usual, and full of the intolerable difficulties of his 
own position. s70 
Crowe's personal position began to improve slowly, but the conference, 
he believed, was in disarray. He told his wife that: 
it is true that I am having more and more to do, but I do not feel that what I do 
is going to have any useful results... You cannot imagine the atmosphere of 
general depression in which the whole of our delegation does its work. 
Nothing ever goes right or progresses. How long this chaotic state of things 
can continue, nobody knows. The confusion at the top is complete and reacts 
on everything and everybody below. 7' 
Crowe did become more active. Foreign Office delegates were sent on 
various inter-allied committees. On 27 February 1919, a Central Territorial 
Committee was created, with Crowe the British representative, to coordinate their 
different work. Headlam-Morley was personally asked by Lloyd George to produce a 
compromise on the Danzig and Saar questions. But, the Foreign Office was ignored 
on all other issues such as Russia, reparations and the League of Nations. 72 Mc 
Kercher believed that Crowe and his colleagues made a positive contribution to the 
conference throughout its duration. He said that in Paris, the Foreign Office counsel 
"was felt on a range of issues touching Britain's position in the post-war world. The 
most important came from Crowe. In the first phase of the Conference, he found 
himself immersed in a range of questions concerning the German settlement. "73 
By May 1919, Crowe had the opposite complaint to his earlier one. After 
being idle for so long, the Foreign Office delegation was now being overworked, but 
the knowledge and skills of Crowe, the foremost expert on Germany within the 
70 Ihid, 6 February 1919, pp. 135-136. 
71 Ibid, 12 February 1919, p. 163. 
72 Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, pp. 26-27. 
73 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 90. 
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administrative sphere, were still being misused (on clerical work rather than policy 
formulation). It was a ludicrous situation. In a hurry he wrote to Lady Crowe: 
This must be a short letter we are all busy translating the German reply to our 
peace terms. We got the German text at noon. It consists of about 150 pages of 
close typing. The Council of Five demands a translation by this evening, and 
the command is `all hands to the pumps. ' I act as a kind of referee for all the 
twenty-odd translators and translatresses who are all busy on the document. 
There is one dictionary between the lot! The work shall not be perfect, but we 
shall do it all right. 74 
In the following days, Crowe complained again of the overload of himself 
and his colleagues: "We produced our English translation of the German peace note 
by midnight, a rapid piece of work [ 185 pages of type] but I shudder to think of the 
quality of some of the translations. There was of course no time for revision. "75 
The talents of Foreign Office staff were not being exploited: 
Another avalanche of German notes received from Versailles ties our whole 
establishment down to the work of translation and copying. "76 Critical tasks 
were being completed at breakneck speed: "I had hardly finished writing to 
you ... when a message came up 
from the P. M. that the note from the Germans 
and the revised peace conditions must be got off today, Monday, at all 
costs... 77 
At dinner during the evening of June 16, Malkin, Hurst's Assistant at the 
Legal Division of the Foreign Office, "turned up with a hand almost entirely stained 
with red ink. He had been writing the alterations in the treaty in red ink for the one 
copy which was given to the Germans. " It transpired that Malkin and two others had 
been up until 7 a. m. the previous morning reading and correcting proofs. Crowe was 
appalled. "This kind of thing is really indecent. s978 
74 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, MS Eng, e 3025, letter to his wife, 29 May 
1919, p. 27. 
75 Ibid, 30 May 1919, p. 28. 
76 Ibid, 1 June 1919, p. 33. 
77 Ibid, 16 June 1919, p. 74. 
78 Ibid, 17 June 1919. p. 76. 
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Crowe had expressed doubts previously about the quality of the final 
treaty. He told his wife that "work in the translated document continues. I am afraid 
the result is likely to be a patchwork not nearly as perfect as your darns, nor as 
serviceable. ' )79 
Crowe revealed his frustrations at the performance of his political masters: 
The German negotiations are being badly bungled and things go wrong at all 
comers. ' 80 They were disunited, and, on the British side, characteristically 
inconsistent and unskilled in diplomacy and Crowe said that, as a result of these 
flaws, 
the political atmosphere is getting decidedly unpleasant. Discontent and 
irritation everywhere. Serious friction between the allies on vital points. Blame 
evenly distributable all round. Naturally I feel most what we ourselves are to 
blame for, and it is a good deal. I cannot easily explain all this complicated 
situation. I envy you being able to shut your eyes and ears to all this 
unedifying performance of the politicians. 81 
Crowe highlighted a frequent French criticism of the British - 
inconsistency. He said that the general situation in Paris: 
is not satisfactory. Our insistence on making material concessions to Germany 
is creating very bitter feeling among the French, justifiably, I think, after we 
had deliberately declared a few weeks ago that we would stand on the terms 
we offered without any modification except as regards minor details. Our 
position is consequently not a pleasant one. 82 
Crowe complained about the "flamboyant language" and "outspoken 
tone" of the letter also sent supposedly with the object of "offering changes to the 
treaty ... to make 
it easier for the Germans to sign... "83 The covering note of Britain's 
big reply to the Germans was "the work chiefly of Philip Kerr, the editor of the 
79 Ibid, 4 June 1919, p. 44. 
80 Ibid, 4 June 1919, p. 43. 
81 Ibid, 5 June 1919, pp. 46-47. 
82 Ibid, 8 June 1919, p. 61. 
93 Ibid, 17 June 1919, p. 77. 
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Round Table" and a member of the `Garden Suburb. ' Crowe was utterly 
condescending, saying that if the note "had been an article in the National Review it 
would have read all right. As a formal state- paper it lacks dignity and courtesy. ' 984 
On the following day, Crowe received news that the Weimar Republic 
had voted for signature of the treaty. "So here is the end, as far as the German peace 
is concerned. "85 He noted the recent Scapa Flow incident when the German North 
Sea Fleet was scuppered. To Crowe, "the Germans deliberately broke their word... " 
and he believed that one of the main results would be still more deep-seated mistrust 
of any undertaking. "86 At 5.50 p. m. on Monday 23 June a telephone message was 
received from the Quai d'Orsay stating that Germany was ready to sign 
unconditionally. "All said and done, this is a great moment. The war is definitely 
over. "87 However, Crowe rightly predicted that there would be fighting in Poland, as 
"no one believes that the Germans will make any attempt to carry out their 
undertakings there. , 88 
What was Crowe's view of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919? His initial 
comment is another typical understatement: "The signature of the peace on Saturday 
will I am sure mean much more than some people as yet think. Though Germany may 
have mental reservations as to carrying out their obligations, I think they will in all 
material respects be enforced in due course. I do not see any injustice in any of the 
important stipulations though some may not be very wise - like the trial of the 
emperor. s89 Whether the `Hang the Kaiser' question was more important to Crowe 
1 
84 Ibid, 21 June 1919, p. 86. 
85 Ibid, 22 June 1919, p. 96. 
86 Ibid, 23 June 1919, pp. 97-98. 
87 Ibid, p. 100. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, 25 June 1919, p. 106 
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than the war-guilt clause is a moot point, but for the rest of his life, Crowe believed 
that the treaty was not unjust and should be strictly enforced by the allies. 
Nor did Crowe have a difference of opinion with Lloyd George on one 
vital issue. Crowe did not want Germany crushed by excessive reparation payments 
and he was effusive in his praise for his Prime Minister in Paris. Referring later to the 
`Discussion of the British Delegation on 15 March 1919, ' Crowe wrote that the Prime 
Minister was: I 
i 
constantly pressing the financial experts to tell him what would be a 
reasonable sum. He did not care a scrap about what the effect would be on the 
House of Commons or on British public opinion provided he could find out 
what was the right sum... The last thing he wanted to do was to let Germany 
off paying ... 
before the Germans came to Versailles he wanted to know what 
was a reasonable figure... He wanted such a figure that a business man inside 
Germany would be able to go his government and say: `Well, I think you can 
pay that. ' 90 
Crowe's analysis of the true intentions of Lloyd George were later 
supported by Harold Nicolson, who described him telling an audience in Newcastle 
That German reparation payments must be limited to its ca acity to pay-91 In opening a 
Commons debate on 2 April 1919, Lt. col. Claude Lowther referred to Lloyd 
George's speech in Bristol two days before the General Election and stated that "in 
every speech that he made he never pretended that he was certain that Germany could 
pay in full. He always said that Germany could and should pay to the fullest extent of 
her capacity to pay. ' 92 
90 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, p. 140. This is part of a long letter (pp. 125- 
156), headed `Introduction, ' undated, but written by Crowe soon after the publication 
of Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace in December 1919 and sent 
privately to Curzon. 
Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 22-23. Nicolson said that he was appalled by the 
revelation that President Wilson had told his staff that Lloyd George's endeavours to 
make the Treaty "more just and reasonable" had "left him tired. " Ibid, p. 210. 
92 Hansard, Volume 114, HC Debates, columns 1306-1307, speech by Lowther, 2 
April 1919. 
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Exacting reparations from Germany though "was an area in which the 
Foreign Office was to play no role either during the armistice negotiations or during 
the peace conference. ' v93 Crowe was obviously interested in the matter, for in an 
interview with Curzon, then acting Foreign Secretary, Crowe expressed the desire to 
work on the Reparations Commission. 94 But this key responsibility was offered to a 
Treasury mandarin, Sir John Bradbury, much to the chagrin of the Foreign Office. 
Like Vansittart, Crowe was not convinced by Keynes' famous polemic93 
against the Versailles Treaty. He did though read it with mixed feelings. In a private 
letter to Curzon, he accepted that there were serious flaws in the treaty, as did some of 
the signatories. Yet Crowe supported much of Keynes' general criticisms, but said 
that at the confidential meetings at which he was present there was "no trace of the 
sophistries, the legerdemain of which he speaks. ' v96 Crowe defended the treaty mainly 
on the grounds that there were provisions within it for revision, saying that, "... the 
real answer to Mr Keynes' book is to be found ... 
in the policy which ... 
is being 
pursued by the British Government, of using the opportunity afforded by the Treaty 
itself for modifying some of its provisions. ' s97 
As Crowe explained to Curzon: "At any time within four months of the 
signature of the Treaty, Germany... may suggest any practicable plan, category by 
category or for the reparations as a whole, which will tend to shorten the period of 
93 Dockrill and Steiner, `The Foreign Office, ' p. 55. 
94 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243,14 October 1919, pp. 92-93. 
95 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, London, 1920. 
96 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, p. 132. 
97 Ibid. Citing Article 234, Lloyd George made the same defence of the treaty in his 
memoirs. See Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations, p. 25. 
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enquiry and to bring about a prompt and effectual conclusion... s98 Crowe rejected 
Keynes's more extreme criticisms of the treaty and of France in particular: 
What would be the result for France of a peace of generosity? France would 
have been left upon the continent of Europe isolated and dependent upon 
herself entirely for her own protection.... France would continue to be in a 
weak position vis-ä vis Germany, despite the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 
because of her lesser wealth, population and the vulnerability of her frontiers. 
Furthermore, the war crippled France more than Germany... of all this Mr 
Keynes in his book shows not the slightest comprehension. 99 
Once the Versailles Treaty had been signed in June 1919, the politicians 
returned home. But much remained to be done. It was then that Crowe's true worth 
began to be appreciated. On 12 September 1919 he replaced Balfour as the British 
representative on the Supreme Council and was given the highest possible rank - 
Ambassador Plenipotentiary. 100 Lord Derby, the new British Ambassador in Paris, 
was angry at the award of this title to Crowe, deeming it to be "a personal slight to 
himself and to the Office of Ambassador in Paris" 101 and threatened to resign. 
Dockrill and Steiner believed that Crowe won Derby over within a fortnight. 102 
Erik Goldstein has been effusive in his praise for Crowe in Paris. He 
"was deeply concerned about the altered nature of the Great War and how the British 
Empire would secure itself in this new world. ' 1103 Crowe also "recognized the 
significance of the emergence of the new states based on roughly national lines for the 
future European balance of power, and he knew that Britain would have to find a way 
98 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, p. 133. In early November 1919, Crowe had 
persuaded Clemenceau to send a demand to the German government that it promise to 
fulfil all its obligations after the treaty came into operation. Crowe and Corp, Our 
Ablest Public Servant, p. 366 and note 278, pp. 386-387. 
99 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, p. 133. 
100 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, Lloyd George to Crowe, 15 September 1919, M 
S Eng, d. 2904, p. 93. 
101 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243,26 September 1919. 
102 Dockrill and Steiner, `The Foreign Office, ' p. 80. 
103 Goldstein, Winning the Peace, pp. 118-119. 
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to utilize this situation. ' 9104 Goldstein argued that the links between Crowe and the 
members of the Political Intelligence Department who belonged to Seton-Watson's 
`New Europe' group "did much to determine the face of modern Europe. " 105 
His biographers have also praised his decisive influence in the second half 
of 1919. Crowe wanted an ultimatum threatening military action if German soldiers 
did not leave the three Baltic provinces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. By 14 
December 1919, they had almost all left. The last to go, the `Iron Division', left on 8 
January 1920, two days before the Versailles treaty came into force. 106 They claimed 
that Crowe was opposed, as was "the Foreign Office as a whole, " to a ban on the 
future Anschluss between Germany and Austria. 107 He "had never believed that it 
should be British policy to reduce Germany to the status of a second-class power in 
Europe. It was only as a world Power, with dangerous intentions, that he wished to 
see her weakened. " 108 Gaynor Johnson pointed out that it was Crowe, acting as 
Ambassador Plenipotentiary in the Supreme Council in Paris, who suggested that the 
Allies should agree the conditions under which diplomatic relations with Germany 
would be resumed. 109 This would ultimately lead to the appointment of a British 
ambassador in Berlin in less than one year. 
Crowe's work earned him great accolades from colleagues and foreign 
politicians and diplomats in Paris, but perhaps not from those in London: 
104 Ibid, p. 119. 
105 Mid, p. 118. See also Sharp, `James Headlam-Morley'. 
106 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 3 54-355. 
107 This is a view supported by others in the Foreign Office. Lord Hardinge minuted, 
undated, his agreement with Lewis Namier of the Political Intelligence Department 
that no clause in any treaty could ultimately prevent the `Austrian Germans' from 
joining Germany. See Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p. 129. ios Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 345. 
109 Johnson, Lord D'Abernon, p. 18. 
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I sometimes doubt whether the people at the Foreign Office, however closely 
they follow the negotiations here, fully realise what Crowe has done and the 
position he has created for himself on the Council. It is no exaggeration to say 
that he dominates the Assembly and there is hardly any limit to his power of 
making his colleagues accept his proposals. This is partly owing to the fact 
that he is the only person who has ever sat on the Council who really knows 
the questions with which he has to deal in all their hearings but it is also the 
result of the respect and affection which he has been able to inspire in the 
other representatives bey the combination of firmness with conciliation which 
he is able to achieve. ' 1 
Goldstein believed that some of Crowe's masterstrokes in Paris (for 
example the Memelland question or the Belgian claims on Dutch Flanders) involved 
"the more classical opinion" of saying nothing until necessary. ' 11 Yet, not everybody 
was happy with Crowe's work in Paris. The Foreign Office supplied "the chief 
British negotiator in Paris and, justifiably or not, Lloyd George was not happy with 
the results, especially when he believed that Crowe had committed Britain to a policy 
which might entail the renewal of hostilities with Germany in December 1919. "h12 
Dockrill and Steiner' 13 defended Crowe. Following the scuppering of its fleet at Scapa 
Flow, Germany was required to pay compensation to the allies. In response to their 
failure to do so, Clemenceau wished to send a note threatening a military response. 
Crowe supported him, but Crowe, rightly, told Clemenceau that he required the 
approval of the British government before any action should take place. On 7 
December, Lloyd George then sent Kerr out to Paris to tone down the note. 
Clemenceau was furious, but Crowe had appeared to lose face because of 
the Cabinet action. Curzon sent a letter to Lloyd George praising Crowe's efforts in 
Paris, but, in a repl to it, Lloyd George made an extraordinary attack on Crowe, 
saying that he had ` lundered" and that he did not have "the necessary political 
110 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, 794/2, Mr H. Norman to Mr Campbell, 18 
December 1919. 
111 Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p. 127. 
112 Sharp, `Holding up the flag of Britain', p. 37. 
113 Dockrill and Steiner, `The Foreign Office', pp. 81-82. 
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equipment to handle a grave situation of this kind. "l 3,114 Even Hankey privately stated 
that he felt that Lloyd George was being unfair to Crowe, who, he believed "has 
represented us with great dignity and ability". 115 
His compatriot, Kenneth Morgan, has supported Lloyd George. "Eyre 
Crowe's blunder in presenting what turned out to be something very similar to an 
ultimatum for Germany illustrated for Lloyd George the inadequacy of the Foreign 
Office in supplying the flexibility and sensitivity required. "' It was further 
justification that the time for the `Old Diplomacy' had passed. "Lloyd George's 
method was clear - summit diplomacy on the model of wartime. s116 
The incident does demonstrate an element of consistency in Crowe's 
philosophy. Although, as will be shown in Chapter 4, he was often angered by French 
policies and behaviour, he never lost his faith in close ties with France, an important 
strand of the 1907 Memorandum. Zara Steiner described Eyre Crowe as "traditionally 
Francophile, " 117 but this is an exaggeration. He did not love the French. Crowe was 
'against a break with Britain's wartime ally' 18 because it ws the best policy for 
Britain, for the same reason that he did; not favour a Carthaginian peace with 
Germany. He would have agreed entirely with a minute written by Vansittart to Eric 
Phipps in Paris in 1927, a memorandum that he could have written himself: "You are 
right in thinking I am pro-British. It is a question of our policy, the one that suits us 
114 Ibid, p. 82. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Morgan, Consensus and Diversity, p. 139. Crowe and Corp had a very different 
response to this incident. See Ablest Public Servant, p. 369, as did Lord Derby, who 
told Lloyd George "that the fool was not at the Paris end of the wire but at the 
English end. We got quite hot over it... " Derby Papers, Liverpool Record Office, 920 
DER (17), 28/1/4, diary entry, 15 December 1919. 
117 Steiner, The Lights That Failed, p. 226. 
118 J. F. V. Keiger, `Poincare and the Ruhr', p. 50. 
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best, not of any pro-this or anti-that. s119 All the more understandable that Alan Sharp 
should have observed that it was extraordinary that British statesmen and officials, 
based upon the evidence of their minutes and letters, constantly assumed that British 
policies were altruistic and they could not understand how, especially the French, did 
not assume likewise. 120 
As has been evidenced from Crowe's own papers, 121 he agreed with 
almost all the major specific aspects of the Treaty of Versailles, 122 but historians have 
not agreed on either his or the Foreign Office's attitude to Germany and the 
international situation after the end of the war. Dockrill and Goold believed that while 
Headlam-Morley "was convinced that Germany was now a liberal and constitutional 
republic, and that the powers should take this into account when drafting the treaty, 
others like Crowe and Hardinge had little faith in the possibility of German 
redemption. " 23 
His biographers have rejected this opinion. Crowe 
felt very strongly that she (Germany) should not be permanently weakened 
and crippled by excessive reparations but continue as in 1907 to be regarded 
as a great European power; and at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 he took 
the view that only a minimum of territorial concessions should be demanded 
of her. In the west he favoured only the cession to France of Alsace-Lorraine; 
and in the east he thought that Danzig should remain German and objected 
strongly to the division of East from West Russia (sic) by the establishment of 
a Polish corridor between them. 124 
In analysing Eyre Crowe's attitude to Germany, the historian must 
consider whether the Great War had effected a drastic review of his pre-war stance 
119 Quoted by McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 87. 
120 Sharp, `Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office', p. 77. 
121 Chapter 2, pp. 76-77. 
122 This meant that Crowe accepted the war-guilt clause and reparation chapter, the 
return of Alsace-Lorraine and the gift of the Saar coal mines to France, as well as the 
demilitarisation of the Rhineland and the reduction of Germany's military capacity to 
make war. 
123 Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p. 32. 124 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. xiii. 
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and also attempt to discover what Crowe's response was to the situation in Germany 
in 1918 and 1919. Zara Steiner believed that "Crowe was consistent; his views did 
not change between 1907 and 1914. Nor, in fact, did they alter in the post-war 
periods 125 Unlike some of his Foreign Office colleagues, he does not appear to have 
become embittered by the war. Hardinge and Tyrrell lost sons and Vansittart a brother 
and these tragedies reinforced their beliefs and perhaps prejudices. Crowe's outlook 
remained consistent, logical and with little apparent emotion, other than anger at the 
marginalisation of Foreign Office experts. There is evidence that Crowe was 
unsympathetic to intelligence reports coming from Germany early in 1919, from both 
soldiers and business experts, describing food shortages, although this was primarily 
because Crowe questioned the competence of the writers and their close contacts with 
Lloyd George. 126 
Douglas Newton rightly admonished contemporary politicians and 
historians of the post-war period for ignoring or misrepresenting the turmoil that 
Germany was enduring and for holding prejudiced viewpoints about German 
democracy itself. On the very day of the armistice, Lloyd George had emphasised to 
his War Cabinet colleagues how important it was to conduct wise policies in the 
future. 127 But Newton believed that his government "showed virtually no concern 
with nourishing the new German democracy in 1918-19. s128 As with the fledgling 
democracy in Russia in 1917, the British government's policy towards the Weimar 
Republic was "disastrous. "129 For one conservative British historian though, the 
members of the new Weimar government were the great weakness. They were "a 
123 Steiner, Foreign Office, p. 115. 
126 Newton, British Policy and the Weimar Republic, pp. 388-389. 
127 "The future peace of the world depends more on the way in which we behaved 
after victory than upon victory itself. " Quoted in ibid, p. 1. 128 Ibid, p. 7. 
129 Ibid, p. 6. 
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flimsy republican regime of dingy, well-meaning but inexperienced working-class and 
middle-class politicians. , 130 
German politicians and citizens of every class though were in a state of 
denial. After the end of the war, a commission was set up to inquire into the origins 
and conduct of the war. Field-Marshal Hindenburg made a statement and used the 
word Dolchstoss, or `stab in the back, ' for the first time in public. 131 The attitude of 
Germany to its defeat was perhaps the most important root cause of its post-war 
diplomacy. It refused to accept the reality of defeat in 1918 and this made it "even 
more difficult to establish the treaty's legitimacy. This was a very different world 
from that in 1815, or of 1944-5. s 132 The Auswärtiges Amt, or Wilhelmstrasse, was in 
full accord with these sentiments and acted upon them during these years. German 
diplomats "were not willing to accept Germany's military defeat as a basis for the 
peace" and shared and promoted the illusions of the Right. 133 The reaction inside 
Germany to the war-guilt clause and the reparation chapter was one of fury, the nation 
angrily protesting its innocence (with the notable exception of the German 
Communist Party). Henry Kissinger, a strong critic of the Versailles Treaty, believed 
that because of its pre-war ambitions, it is unlikely that Germany could have accepted 
any peace terms. ' 34 
The opinion of the Prime Minister of the Versailles Treaty could almost 
have been said by Crowe himself. "The official British point of view is that the 
German nation were not responsible for the war, that the Junkers have been ejected, 
130 C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, London, 1972, pp. 249-250. 
131 H. James, A German Identity, 1870-1990, London, 1989, p. 117. 
132 Steiner, Lights That Failed, pp. 68-69. 
133 K. Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking. 
Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1985, 
404. pia 
Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 242. 
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that the German government should be supported, that German industries should be 
revived and that, generally, the Germans should not be treated with suspicion. " 135 
Crowe's views on the new government in Germany are open to debate, but evidence 
has been given to prove that he did want Germany revived as a peaceful major power 
in Europe, not destroyed. It was a view with which most of his Foreign Office 
colleagues concurred for at least the next five years. 
In January 1919, Sir Horace Rumbold, 136 Ambassador in Switzerland, 
sent a telegram to Curzon, based on a confidential memorandum from M. de 
Modzelewski, the Berne representative of the Polish National Committee, who had 
informed him that secret meetings continued to be held in Germany at which 
"important personalities from all parties... exchanged views. " Summarising one 
secret memorandum distributed at one of those meetings, de Modzelewski explained 
that 
everything in Germany, politics, economics, philosophy, social sciences, 
justice, even theology and art had contributed to foster the instinct of 
domination in the German people: the Germans have felt and still feel 
themselves the chosen race to whom God has given the earth to govern. 
German intellectualism goes on the assumption that humanity cannot be 
governed either by love and charity or by justice: only force can win a place in 
the sun. But, as the efforts of the Germans to assert themselves by means of 
force have been crowned with such manifest success, it is clear that God must 
be on the side of this theory and of the people which acts on it. Hence the 
triumphant confidence which animates Germany. Centuries would be needed 
to eradicate this belief from the German mind. ' 
135 Lloyd George's view, described in Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 188. 
136 In 1909, Rumbold had written to his father, saying that "Crowe is quite cracked 
about Germany. " M. Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold. " Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869- 
1941, London, 1973. Rumbold later became an outstanding British Ambassador in 
Berlin from 1928 to 1934, showing consistent scepticism towards Germany's military 
elite and Right-wing politicians. 
137 UKNA, FO 371/3776, C 15098, Rumbold to Curzon, 22 January 1919, p. 171. 
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Rumbold described this as "an astonishing passage, literally 
translated... i138 and explained de Modzelewski's views. Meetings like this occurred 
in other countries, but elsewhere were generated by public opinion, he said. In 
Germany such meetings decided public opinion. The decisions taken by these 
important men were then broadcast across Germany via Parliament and the press that 
would have been only of secondary importance. Thus German thought was organised 
and the population was utterly compliant. The Germans, Reimbold believed, were 
governed by this "occult parliamentarianism, which formed plans, propagated ideas 
and guided the education of the nation. " 139 In de Modzelewski's opinion, according 
to Rumbold, "the only possible way of forcing Germany to abandon her ideas of 
revenge is to limit her territory by surrounding her with states non-German in race and 
anti-German in sentiment. This policy alone would present guarantees for the 
future... s140 Rumbold was so pleased by these views and so much in a hurry to 
convey them to London that he gave Curzon more of them later that day. 
"Modzelewski had stated that "it is clear from these secret fneetings that ever since the 
entry of America into the war the question for Germany hs not been whether she 
would win or lose the present war but whether she would 
not 
preserve her vital forces 
in order to take her revenge in the future. " 41 
German pacifists and militarists had similar aims, but favoured different 
methods. The pacifists believed that "as the Entente would dissolve after the war, 
nothing could prevent a Germany, who had preserved all her vital forces, from 
carrying out pacific penetration in neighbouring countries and even overseas. Such 
was their conception of Germany's revenge on their rivals. " On the other hand, the 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid, p. 181. 
140 Ibid, p. 182. 
141 Ibid, p. 184. 
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militarists believed that if Germany had husbanded her vital forces, then after "ten 
years of rest and preparation Germany would let loose a new and this time decisive 
war. "142 
In yet another despatch on the same day, Rumbold conveyed de 
Modzelewski's belief that, in comparison to her devastated neighbours, "Germany 
has an immense start... both in the west and in the east. " The German professors 
knew that "the Allies were on the horns of a dilemma. "Either they must not take 
harsh financial measures against Germany or if they did it would not be in their 
interests to make Germany pay amounts beyond their capacity. The professors 
suggested that if the Allies did force it to pay large indemnities, Germany "would 
take care to ruin herself and so frustrate the designs of her enemies. "143 
Curzon's responses to Rumbold's despatches are not recorded. 
Perhaps he did not even read them. What was probably true is that some leading 
experts in the Foreign Office would have accepted these theories and the evidence 
upon which they were based as being based highly plausible. Men such as Crowe, 
Tyrrell and Vansittart, all future Permanent Under-Secretaries of State, were very 
sceptical about the intentions of some of those people who wielded the greatest 
influence inside Germany. Germany had replaced the government of the Kaiser with 
that of the Weimar Republic, but the affinity of many German people for the military 
elite remained considerable because of the widespread refusal to accept the stark truth 
of the defeat of the German Army in 1918. However, it will be shown that Crowe's 
influence on his colleagues perceptions of Germany were not the result of the 
understandable antipathy towards Germany in the aftermath of the war, but were the 
product of a flexible policy that had been formulated over a decade earlier and would 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid, p. 186. 
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be seen by many diplomats as having resonance for over a decade after the author's 
death in 1925. 
The British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, wrote that he 
preferred the new democratic Germans to the "Teutonic obstinacy and dourness" of 
the old officials "who were soon again to set the style of the foreign service. s144 Yet, 
these were the German diplomats with whom Crowe and his colleagues were familiar. 
However, as in Britain, their influence was limited. "The direction of German foreign 
policy fell into the hands of the German bourgeois parties after 1920, and among them 
the German People's Party assumed a crucial position... " partly because of the 
increase in its popular vote and also because it represented most of the most important 
German industrialists. They included most of the Ruhr coal and iron magnates and 
their chief political spokesman was Hugo Stinnes. 
Crowe underwent a very difficult period at the end of 1919 and beginning 
of 1920. Despite his very important wartime and peace conference work, he was very 
dissatisfied with past events at the Foreign Office. He told Lord Curzon in October 
1919 that he had been considering resignation for five years and that he was willing to 
resign now if a suitable post such as on the Reparation Commission could not be 
found for him. Crowe, allegedly an `anti-German, ' had tolerated the prejudice against 
himself within the Foreign Office for too long. "In the service I had always been 
made to feel that I had come in as an outsider, yet I was prepared to take a generous 
view of that prejudice. " He was very bitter about his wartime treatment and hoped 
that "my resignation would then be made the occasion for righting me as far as the 
general public was concerned. " Even his knighthood, he felt, "was wholly 
144 Lord D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, London, 1929, quoted by Holborn, 
`Diplomacy in Early Weimar, ' p. 153. 
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misleading. " 145 He was clearly under enormous strain. In January 1920, Crowe went 
on sick leave with a kidney infection similar to the one that would cause his early 
death in April 1925. 
145 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, Crowe to Curzon, 15 October 1919, p. 93. 
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Chapter 3 
The Foreign Office and Conference Diplomacy, 1920 -1923 
This chapter examines the period from the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 
January 1920 to the decision in January 1923 by the French and Belgian governments 
to send troops into the Ruhr industrial region. The research will largely use Foreign 
Office archives, private papers and the considerable number of secondary sources, 
particularly on Anglo-German and Anglo-French relations during these three years. 
The chapter will be divided into a number of parts. Firstly, it will be demonstrated 
that from January to October 1920, even before Crowe was installed as Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, his perceptions of Germany were held 
by most of the leading mandarins as well as by most of the Lloyd George 
government. ' In the following six months, up to the imposition of the final sum by the 
Reparation Commission and the London Schedule of Payments in May 1921, Crowe 
himself may have been marginalised, but it was still his view of Germany that 
prevailed in the Foreign Office (in London, if not in Berlin) and the government as a 
whole. The year 1921 though did witness sharp differences between Crowe and his 
political masters, Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, over a possible British military 
alliance with France should either be attacked by Germany. It will be shown that the 
' One of the most notable exceptions to Crowe's attitudes came from the new British 
Ambassador to Germany from July 1920, Lord D'Abernon. D'Abernon was a former 
banker, not a professional diplomat. His alternative views will be discussed in this and 
later chapters. 
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deteriorating relationship with France did not meet with Crowe's approval, but neither 
did it lead to a better relationship with Germany and the section that analyses the 
months prior to and during the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922) will reinforce the 
view that the scepticism of Crowe and his Foreign Office colleagues to the conference 
was primarily because of their differences with Lloyd George over Soviet Russia and 
not Germany. Finally, the examination of the nine months prior to the Ruhr invasion, 
beginning with Poincare's speech at Bar-le Duc in April 1922 will provide further 
evidence of the influence of Sir Eyre Crowe on Foreign Office perceptions of 
Germany. It will be emphasised that until the fall of the Lloyd George coalition 
government in October 1922, the major foreign policy decisions vis-ä-vis both 
Germany and France remained in the hands of the `Garden Suburb. ' In October 1922, 
a new Conservative administration led by Andrew Bonar Law came to power. Yet, 
the chapter will show that the policies followed by both British governments towards 
Germany were, in almost every case, made in the spirit of Eyre Crowe's 1907 
memorandum, with his full support and with that of the great majority of the Foreign 
Office experts. These officials may have been vehement in their opposition to Lloyd 
George's diplomatic style and methods, but not his policies. During the span of 
approximately ten weeks from the accession to power of Bonar Law to the critical 
Franco-Belgian decision, the attitude of Crowe and the Foreign Office staff to 
Germany remained deeply unsympathetic. Foreign Office perceptions of Germany in 
these three years were very much those of Sir Eyre Crowe. 
At the eginning of 1920, Lord Hardinge was still the Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State. His two Assistant Under-Secretaries were Crowe and Sir William 
(known as `Willie') Tyrrell. Since October 1919, Lord Curzon had been the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs. Curzon's private secretary was Robert Vansittart. All of 
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these men held sceptical attitudes towards Germany. For three of them there were 
personal factors behind their stances. Tyrrell and Hardinge had lost sons during the 
war and Vansittart had lost a much-loved brother. They all believed that Germany 
wanted a war of revenge. 2 Curzon did not like the Germans either. He claimed that the 
German mentality was "at once the most formidable and the stupidest in Europe. s3 
But, he had little sympathy with the French: "what treacherous dogs they are, ' 14 Even 
Lloyd George was not immune from criticising Britain's former enemy, talking of 
"this miserable thing called Germany. "5 
The Foreign Office had played a minor part in the events leading to the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. Yet the leaders of the victorious 
allies had decided at the Paris Peace Conference that they would meet regularly to 
discuss the implementation of the treaty. It seemed `Open Diplomacy' had replaced 
the `Old Diplomacy. ' Lloyd George relegated the `experts' to the background role of 
translators of diplomatic `notes' and reserved the aspect of decision-making to an 
inner circle of like-minded individuals. For the next three years, British foreign policy 
towards Germany was conducted in this manner. But even though Crowe was either 
not present at a post-war reparations conference, or a silent witness at another one, in 
terms of British policy, Eyre Crowe's views on Germany remained deeply influential. 
Crowe realised that British governments must not give in to Germany, but he also 
believed Germany must not be treated too harshly and it had to be possible to extract 
reparations from it that were not excessive. 
l Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 38. Tyrrell subsequently believed that 
Germany was deliberately weakening its own economy in order to avoid paying 
reparations, ibid, p. 56. 
3 Ibid, pp. 90-91. 
4 Ihid, p. 91. 
s K. Middlemas (ed. ), Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Volume 4, London, 1969, p. 
117. 
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In 1920, feelings of antipathy towards Germany ran high in Britain, but 
far more so in France and Belgium. The main aim of the inter-allied conferences of 
1921 and 1922 was to ensure that the Treaty of Versailles, and in particular the 
Reparation chapter, was implemented. Within the British government and the Foreign 
Office between January 1920 and January 1923, perceptions of Germany were still 
generally uncompromising, but any signs of `appeasement' infuriated French policy- 
makers, especially President Millerand and his occasional Prime Minister, Poincare. 
As a result, the conferences witnessed increasing enmity between the Entente powers 
about how Germany should be treated. 
Differences between the French and British leaders at Versailles in 1919 
had been considerable. When Clemenceau told Lloyd George that the British would 
turn against France as soon as the war was over, he replied casually, "well, was it not 
always our traditional policy. s6 Crowe did not believe that the war had destroyed 
German militarism and nationalism and he had correctly predicted that Germany 
would not comply with the requirements of the treaty. 7 But he opposed what he 
believed to be the illegal coercion of Germany. Lloyd George wanted Germany to 
accept its liability and to pay up and then disarm. Within weeks of the ratification of 
Versailles, the German government was deliberately failing to fulfil its reparation 
quotas and the disarmament clauses. Lloyd George "was convinced that only when 
Germany's liability was definitely fixed and accepted would it be able to raise the 
necessary international loan to cover its unfavourable balance of payments, regain its 
economic stability, and pay the reparations that he was unwilling to forego. "8 
Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, p. 19. 
Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, pp. 50-5 1. 
Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 193. 
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But at a meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris in February and March 
1920, President Millerand of France demanded an allied occupation of the Ruhr to 
ensure compliance. Yet he backed down on this demand when British support for it 
did not materialise. Then, on 6 April 1920, Millerand unilaterally sent French troops 
into Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Hannau, Dieburg and Homburg. Following the Kapp 
putsch, German soldiers were sent into the demilitarised zone and Millerand claimed 
that he was simply ensuring their prompt withdrawal, as the treaty demanded. The 
British government and the Foreign Office were united in their opposition to what 
they perceived as Napoleonic `sabre rattling' on the part of the French government. 
Millerand had also, in the process, broken the post-war agreement on united action. At 
the San Remo conference (19-26 April 1920), Lloyd George "forced the French into 
withdrawing their troops"' 0 from the five German towns. Crowe and Corp 
emphasised that the strong opposition of the Foreign Office, particularly from Eyre 
Crowe, to what was considered, under the treaty, an illegal invasion by the French had 
helped to take the heat out of the situation. l l 
Throughout 1920, Lloyd George, the Foreign Office and the Treasury 
became equally concerned that a restoration of Anglo-German trade was vital to 
fixing German liability and helping ensure payment of reparations. Holborn believed 
that this was preferable to an interim plan over a number of years because, until a 
final sum was fixed, Germany was not likely to receive the foreign credits it needed to 
restore its economy and to enable it to pay reparations. 12 Discussions at Boulogne in 
June 1920 about Germany's total liability failed to arrive at a final figure. The matter 
was then referred to another conference at Spa in July, but, for the first time since the 
9 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp 430-431. 
10 Morgan, Consensus and Diversity, p. 141. 
11 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 431. 
1Z Holborn, `Diplomacy in Early Weimar', p. 158. 
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peace conference, Germany sent delegates. In Parliament, after the conference, Lloyd 
George said that it was "the first occasion on which we had a real talk with the 
Germans... It was impossible at Versailles... in the atmosphere which then 
prevailed. s13 
After Spa, Lloyd George praised the two leading political representatives, 
Chancellor Muller and Foreign Minister, von Simons, describing them as "two 
perfectly honest upright men doing their best to cope with a gigantic task. s14 By the 
summer of 1920, German foreign policy had been taken over by bourgeois parties, 
especially the People's Party (the D. V. P. ), that represented most of the Ruhr coal and 
iron magnates. The leading political spokesman of this clique was Hugo Stinnes, 
whose coal, iron, steel and press empire amounted to almost one-third of all 
production in the Ruhr. '5 Stinnes was chosen to be a delegate at the Spa Conference. 
When Stinnes was given the opportunity to speak, he launched an astonishing attack 
on the reparations policy, saying that the allies "were sick beyond the means of 
recovery. s16 Even Lloyd George was moved to describe Stinnes as "a real specimen 
of the jack-boot German. " 17 He would have been unimpressed also when General 
von Seeckt, described by Harold Nicolson as "a man of extreme honesty and 
courage, " 18 admitted that Germany had not yet fully disarmed. 19 It still had twice the 
number of troops and five or six times the armaments permitted by the military 
13 Hansard, 132, HC Debates, columns 486-487, speech by Lloyd George, 21 July 
1920. 
14 Ibid, col 487. 
is Stinnes's business enterprises collapsed shortly after his death in 1924. See 
Holborn, `Diplomacy in Early Weimar', p. 156. 
16 Notes of an International Conference held at Spa, 10 July 1920, DBFP, 1, VIII, p. 
521. 
Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, p. 188. 
Nicolson, Curzon, p. 227. 
19 Lentin, Lost Peace, p. 65. 
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clauses of the Versailles Treaty. 20 Following Stinnes' outburst, Lloyd George spoke 
to Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson regarding a possible invasion of the Ruhr. 21 In 
the summer of 1920, the Prime Minister was not pursuing what could be termed a 
policy of appeasement towards the German government. On the contrary, his policy 
was in complete accord with the relevant principles of the Crowe Memorandum, 
namely, firm, but fair treatment of Germany, without making concessions. 
The main outcome of the conference was the decision granting what 
became known as the `Spa Percentages. ' German reparation payments were to be 
distributed as follows: France 52%, the British Empire 22%, Italy 10%, Belgium 8%, 
Serbia 5% and others 3%. There was also an insistence that Germany should deliver 
two million tons of coal. At Spa, Lloyd George, quoting verbatim from a Note sent by 
the British government to the French, repeated "the deliberate policy" of Britain on 
the issue of the German liability: "It is our interest that Germany should pay the 
highest figure that can be exacted from her. "22 
The latter part of 1919 and the early months of 1920 were difficult ones 
for Crowe, the Foreign Office and Germany. As previously stated, 23 in an interview 
with Curzon in October 1919, Crowe had expressed his grievances, particularly about 
the prejudice against him inside the Foreign Office and threatened resignation. In 
December 1919, Crowe received the unfair criticism from Lloyd George. 24 Within a 
few days of the ratification of the Versailles Treaty in January 1920, Crowe was very 
sick. 25 
20 Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 227-228. 
21 Notes of a Meeting held at Spa, 13 July 1920, DBFI', 1, V1II, p. 583. 
22 Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations, p. 45. 23 See Chapter 2, pp. 89-90. 
24 See Chapter 2, pp. 81-82. 
25 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 390. 
97 
When Crowe returned to duty in the middle of February 1920, the Foreign 
Office was in the process of structural reorganisation. 26 Several departments directly 
connected with the war were closed down, whilst functions of some departments were 
transferred to other ones or their officials were given new roles elsewhere. For 
example, Headlam-Morley of the Political Intelligence Department became Historical 
Adviser of the Foreign Office. Hardinge had been the moving spirit behind these 
reforms, among which was the reduction of the over-burdened Western Department 
and the creation of a Central Department including, among others, Germany, while 
the reduced Western Department included, among others, Iresponsibilities 
for Anglo- 
French relations. 27 
In the early months of 1920, there was a great debate inside the Foreign 
Office as to the most suitable diplomat to be the first post-war British Ambassador in 
Germany. Since 10 January 1920, Lord Kilmarnock had been Charge d'Affaires in 
Berlin. On 1 July 1920, it was announced that Sir Edgar Vincent, V' Baron (later 
Viscount) D'Abernon, was to be sent to Berlin with full 1mbassadorial status to 
replace him. D'Abernon was an old acquaintance of Llo d George, a merchant 
II 
banker, but with no experience as a diplomat. To many at the Foreign Office it was 
not only another example of the Prime Minister's contempt for their expertise, but 
also a devious ploy to keep them `in the dark, ' by controlling information 
dissemination and thus policy-making. Others saw it as another reward for services 
rendered (or money given) to the Prime Minister and his political group. 
26 Ibid, pp. 390-397. 
27 In August 1920, Crowe played a more important part in another group of changes, 
including those connected with the implementation of the amalgamation of the 
Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. Ibid, pp. 392-393. 
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Gaynor Johnson has suggested that the truth is somewhat different. It was 
Curzon, not Lloyd George, who was behind the appointment. Johnson does not 
provide sufficient evidence to support her claim, but does give some plausible 
reasons. It was Curzon who appointed Sir Auckland Geddes, another businessman, to 
go to the Washington embassy in April 1920, describing him as a "new type of 
ambassador. s28 D'Abernon had experience of work in the near East and had little 
prior knowledge of Germany - similar to Curzon himself, which could have proved a 
blessing. He knew that the appointment would enrage Hardinge. It did, and so he did 
not consult with him about the decision, which would have been easier had it been 
someone else's. 
The choice of D'Abernon was received with little short of 
hostility in Germany. On 3 July, the Tagliche Rundschau published an article that 
criticised D'Abernon's appointment. He was described as an international banker with 
a murky past in Cairo and Constantinople. There was some truth in this accusation. 
He had been a soldier of fortune, who became a banker of fortune and was therefore 
not a member of the established banking elite, but belonged to a new financial and 
service class that operated on the periphery of the empire, if not necessarily according 
to the rules. 29 From 1883 to 1889 D'Abernon was a financial adviser to the Egyptian 
Government and he had resigned from the governorship of the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank in 1897 after speculating unsuccessfully in South African gold mines. 
During the six years of his ambassadorship, Lord D'Abernon would often 
find his views of Germany at odds with the Foreign Office experts in London. In 
Germany in 1920, however, he shared many of the views of the soldiers under the 
28 Oriental and India Office Library, Curzon Papers, Curzon to Geddes, 27 May 
1920, Eur F 112/206 cited in Johnson, Lord D'Abernon, p. 21. 
29 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism - Innovation and Expansion, 
1688-1914, London, 1993, pp. 406-407. 
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control of the War Office. It was the opinion of some of them that the Treaty of 
Versailles was designed to crush Germany and must be revised, if the spectre of 
Bolshevism was to be avoided. Hardinge and Crowe were furious at the desire of 
soldiers to be diplomats. The Foreign Office believed that it was not British policy 
either to appease or to crush Germany. 
In administrative terms, the Foreign Office had already suffered a number 
of blows to its control over German affairs in 1920. On 2 February, the Treasury and 
the Foreign Office agreed that Sir John Bradbury should be directly responsible to the 
former and not the latter. Bradbury had been confirmed as His Majesty's 
Government's principal delegate to the Reparation Commission in1919 and Sir 
Frederick Leith-Ross would be Britain's representative on its Finance Board. It was 
stipulated that Treasury ministers and Bradbury would keep the Foreign Office 
informed on all reparations questions on which it might be interested. Bradbury and 
other Treasury officials frequently delayed or failed to send key documents on 
reparations to the Foreign Office, or made announcements without first informing it 
of the content. The consequence of this accidental or deliberate lack of competence 
was that at precise moments in Anglo-Franco-German relations in the critical years 
after the end of the war the Foreign Office struggled to keep in touch with important 
developments on British foreign policy. 
For the Foreign Office, and Crowe in particular, there were serious 
question marks against both the nature and the personnel of the Reparation 
Commission from the outset. It was meant to be `independent' but this was "a fiction 
except as far as we were concerned; it is childish to imagine that a body of this 
importance will not act as an organ of the Governments, if only because its actions 
must, unless it is superseded by the Governments at every moment, have far reaching 
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political effects. ' 00 For Crowe, the critical period began twelve months earlier when 
the total sum was fixed. A decision should have been taken as to whether the 
Commission was "a cipher... a convenient facade behind which, while it was busy 
with the unrealities of the reparation chapter of the treaty, the Governments were 
arranging a real settlement; or, we might have tried systematically to use it as the 
instrument through which to translate into practice our conception of a real 
settlement. " 
31 
The French chose the first policy, the British the latter, but was not sure 
with the consequence that "we have fallen between two stools. s32 Crowe then 
observed that, 
logically, the position assigned to the British delegate, responsible to the 
Treasury alone, although the only real importance of the Reparation 
Commission is political, is all in the direction of treating the commission as a 
cipher. But, if that was to be the arrangement, the logical corollary was that 
the Foreign Office should be responsible for policy at every stage of the 
commission's work, whereas questions of policy, as well as detail, have been 
deliberately left to Sir J. Bradbury and to the Treasury. The result has been the 
maximum of friction with the French, who at each successive crisis have had 
reluctantly to accept the substitution of the Supreme Council for the 
Reparation Commission, combined with the minimum of power to secure due II 
weight for the British point of view in the working of the commission. It 
seems likely that the future historian will attribute the failure of British policy 
in no small degree to this circumstance; he will in any case be amazed at the 
departmental incoherence which was permitted, nay, which was encouraged to 
produce this result in a matter of such moment. He will ask why the British 
representative was not a man of ripe political experience, versed in 
negotiations with foreign Governments, and endowed with those qualities of 
the British character which seldom fail to influence the French mind; he will 
enquire why it was supposed necessary that he should be a financial expert 
and no more; and he will find no intelligible answer. 33 
30 Memorandum respecting British Central European Policy in its relation to Genoa, 
9 May 1922, DBFP, 1, XX, pp. 37-38. 
31 Ibis, p. 38. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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Crowe's argument was that, on the Reparation Commission, Britain 
should have been represented by someone with political and diplomatic experience - 
someone from the Foreign Office, presumably himself. The matter was further 
complicated by the choice of the British Ambassador to Germany, a post that had not 
existed since the summer of 1914. In 1920, as well as Crowe's own elevation to the 
highest post in the Foreign Office, new Ambassadors were put in place, including 
D'Abernon. 
In the autumn of 1920, Hardinge was elevated to the most prestigious 
position in the Diplomatic Service, when he was made British Ambassador at the 
Paris Embassy. Crowe was able to gain promotion to the position of Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State in September 1920. Lloyd George had probably not 
forgotten the events of the previous December and would have preferred another 
candidate, but was persuaded by Curzon to select Crowe. 4 Hardinge had wanted a 
diplomat, Ronald Graham, to succeed him, 35 but Crowe was appointed, largely due to 
the support of powerful political patrons, including Balfour, Curzon and Cecil, all of 
whom respected his work during the war. 36 It was a decision that met with greater 
II 
approval within the Foreign Office itself. Lancelot Oliphant sent his wife a letter 
expressing his happiness at Crowe's promotion, the latter claiming that there was 
widespread pleasure within the Foreign Office ranks as well. "I wish you could have 
realized the intensity of feelings in the office and our unbounded joy... "37 These 
reactions were not based upon sentimentality or personal friendship. They were 
34 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 48. 
35 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 397-399. 
36 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new, p. 91. 
37 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, d. 2907, letters from Tyrrell and Oliphant to 
Lady Crowe, 30 September 1920, pp. 85-88. There is also a note of congratulation 
from the foreign correspondent of The Times, Valentine Chirol. "Of course there 
ought not to have been the slightest room for doubt. But in these days one never 
knows. " Ihid, 30 October 1920, p. 88. 
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indications of professional respect, not only for Crowe's industry and talent, but also 
for his diplomatic manifesto, especially on German matters. 
Crowe became the head of a post-war Foreign Office structurally changed 
and which had seen its participation in German affairs diminish. When, in July 1919, 
it amalgamated with the Diplomatic Service, it also became, against its will, part of 
the Home Civil Service. 38 In 1920, two outsiders, Geddes and D'Abernon, were 
appointed to key diplomatic posts in Washington and Berlin. The Foreign Secretary 
and the Permanent Under-Secretary did not intend that the Foreign Office should 
remain `in eclipse. ' McKercher has argued that Crowe and Curzon worked together to 
lay the ground "for the Foreign Office's recapture of the centre of policy-making 
once Lloyd George left office... '09M Lloyd George had filled the great embassies 
with his men, they "ensured that as second-level embassies and legations fell vacant, 
they were filled by career diplomats who shared their views. "40 Crowe promoted his 
own men in Whitehall. Miles Lampson41 became head of the Central Department, 
responsible for Germany. Vansittart became Curzon's private secretary, John Gregory 
an assistant secretary, Gerald Villiers was appointed head of the Western Department, 
responsible for the League of Nations and Victor Wellesley became head of the Far 
Eastern Department. "In essence, Curzon and Crowe played a bureaucratic waiting 
game until Lloyd George left office - placing the right men in positions of 
authority. s42 Thus, it is not surprising that Crowe's classic principles of the balance 
of power and the national interest continued to be propagated throughout the Foreign 
Office, as well as a sceptical attitude towards Germany and a desire for a 
38 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 393. 
39 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new, pp. 91-92. 
40 Ibid, p. 92. For example, Horace Rumbold was sent to Constantinople. 
41 Lampson "always adopted a harsher attitude to the Germans than Crowe, " 
according to Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 431. 42 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 93. 
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continuance, even a strengthening, of close relations with France. McKercher said 
that whatever the initial effects of the Crowe Memorandum, "Crowe's juniors 
embraced it after 1920. s43 
Crowe's outlook had much in common with his Prime Minister. He and 
Lloyd George profoundly disagreed over the role of the Foreign Office experts and 
diplomatic styles, 44 but not always over the policies towards France and Germany. 45 
"The key to Lloyd George's foreign policy ... 
is that ... le believed 
firmly in Britain 
and its empire as a force for order and civilisation in the world, at all times placed its 
interests first, and fought... to make those interests "46 Lloyd George also 
shared similar attitudes to Germany. "No one at Paris spoke more tellingly against 
over-harsh humiliating terms that would drive Germany to extremes, or more clearly 
foretold the consequences of `injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of 
triumph. " sA7 
Both men therefore believed in the contradiction that the major European 
nations must adhere to the provisions of Versailles and yt they resisted 
demands for severe treatment of Germany. They underst od that it was in Britain's 
interest for the German economy to revive, but also for it to submit large reparation 
sums. The situation was complicated by German internal politics. The Weimar 
Republic replaced the monarchical regime that had taken the country and Europe to 
war. What Crowe and Lloyd George wanted was a moderate German government that 
43 Aid, p. 85. 
44 Chapter 1, pp. 13-14. 
45 A great exception was the future of the former emperor. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, Lloyd George wanted Wilhelm II put on trial. Crowe saw no 
value in this action. See Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 192; Bodleian Library, Crowe 
Papers, MS Eng e. 3025,25 June 1919, p. 106 and Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, pp. 24- 
27. 
46 Lentin, The Lost Peace, Basingstoke, 2001, p. xi. 
47 Ibid, p. 10. Yet, Lloyd George always defended the war-guilt clause that was, to a 
large extent, for his benefit, ibid, p. 12 and ibid, pp. 17-18. 
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would cooperate in the execution of the treaty, 48 but neither the government nor the 
Foreign Office knew whether the Republic's leaders or the German Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt) could be trusted. 
It is unsurprising that Alan Sharp believed that the Foreign Office was 
perhaps uncomfortable with the new German rulers and diplomats. He argued that 
"... Headlam-Morley instinctively wished to encourage the new liberal and 
republican Germany of Ebert, Muller and Noske, whereas one has the feeling that his 
colleagues felt more at ease with the old guard, despite the war. s49 Certainly, in 
terms of social class and party political affinity this might have been true, but, in 
Berlin, Lord D'Abernon wrote in his diary that he preferred the new German 
democratic policy- makers. He disliked the old officials and complained that they 
were "difficult to deal with, slow to be persuaded... disposed to quibble on small 
points, over-careful... "so Holborn believed that although D'Abernon's opinions 
should not be taken too literally, "they point up some of the shortcomings of the old 
time professional diplomats who were soon again to set the style of the foreign 
service. "" 
In the early years of the Weimar Republic, President Ebert insisted that 
German ambassadors should sometimes come from outside the bureaucracy, a policy 
followed by Britain and France at the same time. Dr Friedrich Sthamer, a 
businessman, was sent to London and he proved to be a good choice. His "absolute 
honesty and tactfulness helped to allay British resentment and, at least after Locarno, 
to give Anglo-German relations a rather cordial nature. "52 Yet, within weeks of the 
48 It was also necessary, in 1920, to avoid embarrassing the Millerand government. 
Introduction by J. P. T. Bury, DBFP, 1, X, p. vi. 
49 Sharp, `James Headlam-Morley', p. 277. 
S° Quoted by Holborn, `Diplomacy in Early Weimar', p. 153. 
51 Ibid. 
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ratification of the treaty (January 1920), Germany was not fulfilling its requirements. 
The response of Britain and her fellow allies to the repeated defaults of, or requests 
for one moratorium after another from their former enemy was the major issue for the 
next three years in European diplomacy. 
The key difference between the two men was over France. "After all, we 
must remember that our friend America lives a long way off. France sits at our 
door. ' 53 As part of the Versailles Treaty, France was promised a security pact with 
Britain and the U. S. A. S4 This collapsed when the United States Congress refused to 
ratify the treaty. France was left insecure, although Lloyd George promised that 
should Germany ever attack Alsace-Lorraine, Britain would rush to France's 
assistance immediately. 55 
The drift to isolationism by the United States transformed the 
international situation after 1920. Crowe was not an admirer of the U. S. A., an opinion 
shared by some but not all of his colleagues. 56 When Foreign Office colleagues, 
including Harold Nicolson suggested the formation of an 'Anglo-American Institute 
of Foreign Affairs' in 1919, Crowe opposed it. " Cohrs rightly described the long- 
established attitude of British foreign policy culture towards the United States as 
being condescending. The Americans were `arriviste. '58 In March 1925, weeks before 
52 Ibid, p. 152. 
33 Minute by Crowe, 7 December 1918 cited in Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without 
Promise, p. 23. 
54 See chapter by Lentin, `The Treaty that never was: Lloyd George and the abortive 
Anglo-French Alliance of 1919' in Joades (ed. ), Lloyd George, pp. 115-128. 
ss Ibid. 
56 Vansittart lampooned Senator Borah of Idaho, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee for twenty years, before which time he had never left America. 
He called this "the worst joke in democratic history". Vansittart, Lessons of My Life, 
6. 
N. Rose, Nicolson, p. 96. 
58 Cohrs, `The First "Real" Peace Settlement', p. 25. 
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his death, Crowe minuted that the appeasement of the U. S. A. should stop: "I hope 
that we may cease to be obsessed by the idea of `placating' the United States ... I 
have never believed in the policy of dragging the U. S. into our European affairs. "59 
Yet, Cohrs said that in 1924, Ramsay MacDonald (in the dual role of Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary), "forcefully seconded ... 
by Sir Eyre Crowe, the eminence 
grise of British foreign policy... took not only Britain's European policy but also its 
co-operation with the elusive U. S. partner to a new level. 2v60 
Crowe understood that European peace was the responsibility of Britain 
and France, particularly after 1920. Despite having differences around the world they 
had to co-operate. Without American involvement, French attitudes to Germany 
hardened, resulting in a stricter reparations policy, but he believed that what the 
French government wanted most was guaranteed security against a future attack on 
the Rhine. It would then moderate its reparations demands. 61 There were various 
barriers to an Anglo-French security pact. From 1920 to 1923, there were differences 
between the two powers in the near East over the issue of Greece and Turkey. Both 
Lloyd George and Crowe favoured the Greeks, 62 but in October 1921 France and 
Turkey formed an alliance. 
In February 1921, just before the start of the inter-allied 
conference in London, Crowe had suggested to Curzon that the government should 
consider a radical review of the Entente and giving France a guarantee. Britain had 
nothing to gain from a quarrel with France and feared a rupture with France. Without 
S9 Goldstein, `The evolution of British diplomatic strategy', p. 122. 
60 Cohrs, `The First "Real" Peace Settlement', p. 14. 
61 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. xii. 
62 "Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister ... was greatly 
favoured by Lloyd George, 
and even the normally sharp-sighted and level-headed Foreign Office official Eyre 
Crowe admired the Cretan charmer... " Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 83. See also 
Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 217. 
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other allies, this would not be in Britain's interests. An offer of a guarantee of security 
to France similar to the 1919 guarantee "might make France more conciliatory, both 
in their attitude to Germany and in their policy in the Near East, and many sections of 
British opinion would support it. s63 But, the suggestion never reached the Cabinet. In 
1921, Crowe appealed four times to Curzon to gain the agreement of the Cabinet for 
an offer of a Rhenish security guarantee pact to France. His biographers claimed that 
Curzon and Lloyd George rejected the discussion of such a pact until the differences 
in the Middle East had been resolved. 64 Lloyd George was also aware that British 
public opinion was against foreign entanglements so soon after the war. 
Also many British politicians, diplomats and military leaders struggled to 
renounce the Francophobia of their forebears, despite the recent victorious wartime 
alliance. The traditional fear - that France would always strive to become the 
dominant power on the European continent - was revived in the immediate post-war 
years. It had always been one of the foundations of British foreign policy that no 
power should dominate the continent and the Great War had been fought to disabuse 
Germany of that intention. Thus Hardinge believed that he had seen through a French 1 
scheme to achieve their ends through an Anglo-French Alliance. Throughout this 
period many British diplomats and politicians would complain of French mendacity 
and the French would complain about British inconsistency. Hardinge was certainly 
consistent about French politics: "I mistrusted all French Governments, and 
especially Briand's, as being extremely imperialistic in their aims. "65 
In December 1921, Lord Hardinge received a long despatch from Curzon 
about a conversation that he had with St. Aulaire, Paul Cambon's successor as the 
63 Orde, Great Britain and International Security, p. 8. 
64 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. xiv and Orde, Great Britain and International 
Security, pp. 7-8. 
65 Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 264. 
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French Ambassador in London. St. Aulaire had proposed a new defensive alliance 
with France. When Hardinge met Briand, he discovered the French leader to be in 
ignorance of the Ambassador's plan. Yet, although Briand criticised St. Aulaire for 
exceeding his authority, he also expressed such enthusiasm for the idea that he went 
to London to discuss it. Briand claimed that it had been discussed with Lloyd George 
and Curzon, the latter being particularly interested. In his letter, the Foreign Secretary 
denied this. 66 
Briand returned to Paris where he met Hardinge and apparently proposed 
a wide military `entente, ' which would secure and maintain European peace by 
accepting French military might on the continent and British naval supremacy. By his 
own account Hardinge was horrified, accusing Briand of using language similar to 
that of the Kaiser in 1908 when he had wanted a very similar alliance for Germany. 
Lloyd George, Curzon and Hardinge favoured a guarantee of British assistance should 
Germany invade France. 67 But, Crowe disagreed. Britain needed French co-operation 
and that depended on an Anglo-French alliance. In a memorandum written during his 
Christmas `holidays' in December 1921, he said that "The one great preoccupation of 
the French mind is the danger of a German war of revenge. That Germany will 
prepare for it systematically, relentlessly so long as any hope of success remains, is 
indubitable. This danger clouds the French outlook like a nightmare. ' '68 William 
Tyrrell, Crowe's Assistant Under-Secretary and later successor, agreed that Germany 
wanted a war of revenge, 69 a belief shared by Hardinge and, following a visit to 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibis, pp. 263-264. 
68 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 116. 
69 Ibid, p. 55-56. 
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Germany in May 1924, `Jack' Troutbeck, then Second Secretary in the Central 
Department. 70 
Therefore, in December 1921, prior to the Prime Minister's departure for 
the Cannes Conference, the Cabinet had a brief discussion on the question of an 
Anglo-French alliance. The Foreign Office chose to investigate the matter further, but 
en route to the conference, Lloyd George re-stated that Great Britain would only agree 
to a guarantee. Crowe though favoured an alliance limiting military assistance to the 
example of an unprovoked German attack on France and which provided for 
consultation if either country's interests were threatened by another state. Other 
nations, including Germany, would agree to the latter contract, which would conform 
the terms of the Covenant on ways of dealing with disputes that might lead to war. 
Germany could join the League and all this would provide considerable guarantees of 
peace. 7' 
The alliance alone would help keep any German aggressive designs on France 
in check; any danger from the Russian quarter, more particularly Russian or 
Russo-German movements against Poland, would be, if not absolutely 
prevented, at least rendered infinitely less probab e, without at the same time 
finding England committed to go to war for Pola id's sake in circumstances 
72 when Poland might be to blame. ii 
In terms of western European diplomatic policy, the main area of 
disagreement between the two men was the choice between an alliance and a 
guarantee pact. Alan Sharp rightly pointed out that Crowe played almost no part in the 
meetings of the inter-allied reparation conferences of the early 1920's, 73 but analysis 
of the minutes reveals that the Prime Minister seldom veered away from a line that 
70 Ibid, p. 38. Troutbeck was a senior official at the Foreign Office during the Second 
World War. 
71 Orde, Great Britain and International Security, p. 14. 
72 Ibid. See DBFP, 1, XVI, No. 768. 
73 Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse', p. 212. 
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was not in accord with almost all of Crowe's major principles, namely, make 
Versailles work, firm, but fair treatment of Germany, especially if it had peaceful 
intentions and to maintain good relations with France, while always putting Britain's 
interests first. In Paris in January 1921, Lloyd George told Briand that 
there was no question of (Britain) not carrying out the Treaty of Versailles. 
This treaty was our charter, and, so far as Great Britain was concerned, she 
proposed to stand by it. There was no question of modifying the treaty, but we 
would have to interpret it rationally, having regard to conditions of the 
moment and making allowances for the present state of affairs... The question 
for consideration was whether Germany is really trying to avoid carrying out 
the treaty, either in respect of disarmament or reparation. If the conference 
agreed that she is attempting to do so, it would be necessary for the allies to 
take stern steps, but if she were found to be trying to live up to the treaty, 
although under difficulties, the Allies should make allowances for those 
difficulties. This has been the spirit in which Great Britain has acted so far. 74 
The year 1921 should have been one during which the Entente was 
tightened. In the tense weeks in the spring of 1921, when the British and French 
governments awaited the response of the German government to the deliberations of 
the Reparation Commission on the final sum, there was much common ground 
between the allies. Attitudes to the former enemy were not softening apparently. In 
Paris in January 1921 the allies had recommended that Germany pay an overall figure 
of 269 milliards of gold marks (over thirteen billion pounds) in reparations. 75 At 
Hythe, Briand complained of an "accumulation of bad faith and bad action on the 
part of Germany... s06 This was particularly so on the vexed question of the 20 
milliards of gold marks to be paid by Germany by 1 May 1921. The Reparation 
74 British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held in Paris, 24 January 1921, 
DBFP, 1, XV, pp. 9-10. 
's Vansittart believed that there was no significant link between reparations and the 
accession to power of Hitler. See Vansittart, Lessons of My Life, p. 114. It may be 
noted though that on 3 February 1921 the NSDAP held its largest meeting until then - 
at the Circus Krone in Munich. See I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, London, 
1998, p. 157. 
76 Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of Hythe (or Lympne), 23-24 April 1921 
DBFP, 1, XV, p. 455. 
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Commission told Berlin on 26 February that it still had to pay at least 12 milliards and 
that a first instalment of one milliard must be paid by 23 March. Germany stated that 
it had already fulfilled its obligations. 77 When, also in March 1921, Germany 
defaulted in her deliveries of timber, Lloyd George decided to co-operate with France 
in a joint occupation of the towns of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort. Williamson 
said that, at Hythe, "Briand was able to manoeuvre a reluctant and hesitant Lloyd 
George into agreeing to a Ruhr occupation should Germany not accept its findings. s78 
Economic sanctions were imposed on 8 March via a customs line between the 
occupied and unoccupied territories. On 5 May, Germany was sent an ultimatum 
threatening the occupation of the Ruhr, but the threat was not carried out as Germany 
accepted their obligations on 11 May. 
In the days prior to the German `surrender, ' the fourth London 
Conference took place. Curzon and his privite secretary, Vansittart, represented the 
Foreign Office, but said little, the discussions being dominated again by the British 
and French Prime Ministers. The attitude of the Germans irritated the allied leaders. 
Aristide Briand said that, on 27April, Dr Simons "had declared that the 
Wilhelmstrasse were busy collecting documents to show that the question of the 
responsibility of Germany for the war was still open. ' '79 But on 28 April, the 
Reparation Commission informed the German government that the total amount of 
the debt under the Versailles treaty had been fixed at a total of 132 milliards gold 
marks. 80 When asked by Lloyd George whether Germany had been given an 
opportunity to state their case, Bradbury told the conference that the commission had 
77 Ibid, note 8, p. 455. 
78 Williamson, British in Germany, p. 150. 79 Notes of an allied conference held in London on 30 April 1921, DBFP, 1, XV, p. 
489. 
'to Ibid, p. 493. 
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received 130 separate memoranda from the Germans and that they had been heard 
verbally at twenty-two separate meetings. 81 Yet, in the Berlin note of April 24-25, Dr 
Simons had asked the American government "that Germany's capacity should be 
assessed, not by the Reparation Commission, but by international experts. ' 82 Briand 
said that Germany now refused to pay the debt of 1 milliard marks by I May. The 
allies should discuss the occupation of the Ruhr. "The time for action had come, " 83 
he believed. 
Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the German proposals 
were "thoroughly unsatisfactory. "84 The Allies, he said, were unanimous on this 
point. On 3 May, Austen Chamberlain told the House that earlier that day, the 
Supreme Council had discussed "the military measures necessary for the occupation 
of the Ruhr - if that occupation became necessary - and agreed upon them. They 
further discussed, and agreed to study more precisely, naval measures of coercion, if 
military measures be invoked and not be sufficient. "85 
Lloyd George told the House that Germany had defaulted "on some of 
the most important provisions of the Treaty - disarmament, trial of war criminals, 
II 
reparation and four or five other Clauses of the Treaty... " For the previous two years, 
the allies had "shown considerable forbearance. " In every case "when Germany had 
given legitimate explanations of her difficulties, the Allies made concessions, 
extended time and generally made it easier for Germany to meet her difficulties... "86 
He said that since the Spa Conference, the Germans "had made a real effort" to 
reduce their army and to disarm. But there were "still far too many machine-guns and 
" Ibid. 
82 Ibid, p. 503. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Hansard, 141, HC Debates, col 344, speech by Lloyd George, 28 April 1921. 
RS Ibid, col 869, speech by Lloyd George, 3 May 1921. 
86 Ibid, cols 1275-1276, speech by Lloyd George, 5 May 1921. 
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rifles unsurrendered. "87 He did not accept the German argument about the need to 
maintain arms against revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Germany had not 
paid the £1,000,000,000 in cash and kind by I May 1921 as stipulated by Versailles. 
It had only paid a maximum of £400,000,000, much of which was to cover the cost of 
the Army of Occupation. On the reparations question, the default was "a very 
palpable one, and we have been driven to take strong action, not merely from the fact 
that Germany has defaulted, but by her general attitude to the whole question, and by 
the growing indication that Germany did not intend to carry out her obligations. She 
was making excuses, not merely for delay, but for avoidance. She was beginning to 
challenge her responsibilities. " 88 
Many contemporaries and historians have criticised the apparently 
exorbitant overall figure of reparations demanded in May 1921. Yet, a German 
historian concluded that the reparations plan was "more realistic than the high total 
sum implied" as it was "first divided into three separate bonds - the so-called A, B 
and C Bonds - of which only the first two initially rise to annual payments (at 
different levels). "89 A and B Bonds amounted to the total of 50 milliard gold marks 
(£2,500,000,000) and C Bonds to the total of 82 milliard gold marks 
(£4,100,000,000) 90 The London Schedule of Payments also required Germany to pay 
a total sum in 1922 of 3.3 milliard gold marks. 
The response of Crowe and the Foreign Office to the actions of Lloyd 
George in the spring of 1921 should have been on the whole positive. The treaty had 
been respected, Ge any treated firmly, but fairly, and the entente with France 
87 Ibid, cols 1276-1278. 
88 Ibid, cols 1279-1280. 
89 Peukert, Weimar Republic, p. 54. 
90 India Office Library, London, Treasury Memorandum to Curzon, May 1921, 
Curzon Papers, F 112/241, p. 38. 
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upheld. Yet, in 1923, "Tyrrell said that Lloyd George's consent to the allied 
occupation in 1921 placed the French in a very strong position. "91 There was 
certainly much personal animosity towards Lloyd George within the Foreign Office, 
but there was also much support for his policies. Responding to criticism of the Prime 
Minister in an article in `Le Matin' by Alfred Zimmern, his former colleague in the 
Political Intelligence Department, Headlam-Morley wrote: "... after all, though the 
prime minister's methods may be often open to criticism, it'seems to me that the 
ultimate objects for which he is trying to work are nearly always right. v992 
Yet, Lloyd George was becoming too ambitious. His response to Saint- 
Aulaire's suggestion that Britain should `guarantee' French borders against an 
external attack, presumably by Germany, was an extraordinary solution to the 
reparations problem and the European economic slump. At two meetings at Chequers 
and London in December 1921, he proposed a scheme to solve every possible issue of 
disagreement. In return for its main wish, security against a German attack, France 
must agree to a moratorium on reparations for Germany, he opening up of markets in 
Central and Eastern Europe to German goods (thus facilit ting the payment of 
reparations) and the establishment of an all-European body to manage the economic 
reconstruction of Europe. There would be recognition and economic aid for Bolshevik 
Russia if it permitted this organization decision-making powers and the right to 
private ownership within its borders. Unfortunately, by the time that Lloyd George 
went to the next conference, he had not told Curzon or the Foreign Off ice that he had 
made the offer of a guarantee pact or about the conditions attached to it 93 Foreign 
91 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 432. See also Chapter 4, pp. 148-149. 
92 Sharp, `Sir James Headlam-Morley', p. 277. This view was supported by Nicolson 
in Curzon, p. 55. 
9' Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 80. 
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Office distaste for Conference Diplomacy would be further increased by events in the 
next few weeks. 
The Cannes Conference was called in January 1922 to discuss reparations 
and economic recovery. Rathenau, the German Foreign Minister, was allowed to 
speak and Germany was granted a temporary moratorium. The foundations were laid 
down for the spring economic conference at Genoa and extending relations with 
Bolshevik Russia. Also at Cannes, the allied experts recommended a reduction to only 
720,000,000 gold marks and deliveries in kind to a maximum value of 
1,450,000,000 gold marks. 94 But when Briand suddenly resigned" and was replaced 
by Poincare, no definite decision could be taken. The German government was then 
summoned to make its own proposals and to guarantee that they would introduce 
budgetary and currency reform in return for the granting of a partial moratorium by 
the allies, which were received on 28 January 1922. These were "not unreasonable as 
far as the guarantee of budgetary and currency reforms were concerned " but " they 
contained ... no 
definite proposals for the 1922 payments, the German Government 
contenting themselves with pleading their inability to make such large payments as 
those suggested... 1996 On 21 March 1922 the Reparation Commission demanded that 
the German government raise taxes by a further 60 milliard of paper marks. The 
German government seethed at such interference in its internal affairs. 
94 DBFP, 1, XV, p. 763. 
95 This followed the infamous incident when Lloyd George was 
photographed giving a golf lesson to the French Prime Minister. The French press 
reported that Briand's relationship with Lloyd George was similarly `master and 
pupil' elsewhere. See Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 118; Orde, Great Britain 
and International Security, p. 15. Lloyd George's version was rather different. He 
moved Briand out of the way for his own safety as "... if the ball hit him, it would be 
"Briand zap! and then ... Poincare! " See Kieger, Poincare, p. 276. 96 DBFP, 1, XIX, p. 740. 
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It was against this background that Lloyd George's great conference on 
European reconstruction took place at Genoa in Italy in the spring of 1922.7 Prior to 
Genoa, there was much discussion of the composition of the British delegation. On 30 
March 1922, the Leader of the House, Austen Chamberlain, told the Commons that 
there would be twenty Foreign Office staff at Genoa (altogether ninety people and 
three to five Ministers). Of these there were twenty-four "experts. , 98 During the 
conference, Curzon was ill and unable to attend. Chamberlain was asked by Mr G. 
Murray "... if any steps have been taken to fill his place at that Conference by 
someone versed in foreign affairs ...? "99 Sir W. Davison asked Chamberlain: "Does 
the Rt. Hon. Gentleman see that if foreign affairs were left to the Foreign Office we 
should not have got into the tangle we are now in? 39 loo 
The Genoa Conference was the concept of Lloyd George. It was bitterly 
opposed by the Foreign Office. '°' Lloyd George wanted to welcome Soviet Russia 
and Germany into the Concert of Europe. In a speech in the House of Commons, 
Lloyd George said that European problems had been blamed on the reparations 
97 See Fink, The Genoa Conference and Fink, Frohn and Heideking (eds. ), Genoa, 
Rapallo and European Reconstruction. 
98 This information drew a request from Mr Lyle-Samuel to know: "What is meant 
by the word `experts'? Could we have the names of these experts and in what are 
they expert? " Hansard, 152, H C. Debates, col 1527, question from Lyle Samuel, 30 
March 1922. The Times revealed that the British delegates to Genoa were believed to 
be ("So far as the names ... are accessible... 
") Lloyd George, Hankey, Grigg, etc. 
(the Prime Minister's group would be about eight ). Lord Curzon, plus Vansittart, J. D. 
Gregory and Sir Cecil Hurst would represent the Foreign Office and Sir Robert 
Home, Blackett and Hawtrey, the Treasury. 
99 Hansard, 153, HC Debates, cols 962-963, question by Murray, 3 April 1922. 
100 Ibid, col 962, question by Davison. 
101 Crowe and Curzon were very anti-Bolshevik - Maisel, The Foreign Office, 1919- 
1926, p. 54. He was also indignant at the attempt by a Board of Trade committee to 
discuss peace and disarmament. From January to March 1920, the Board of Trade had 
negotiated with the new Russian government - ibid, p. 198. Lloyd George told John 
Gregory that the Foreign Office was "out of touch. " Gregory believed that that 
would have been true fifteen years earlier, but not then. In Gregory, On the Edge of 
Diplomacy, p. 18. 
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executed by post-war treaties. "May I just say that those treaties did not create the 
reparations. ' 9102 The problem was not that the allies were exacting reparations, but 
that there was "something to repair. " 103 If the Versailles Treaty had been altered, 
reparations would not be wiped out. Their burden would simply be passed to Great 
Britain, Belgium and especially to France - from those responsible to the victims. 
"So it is no use criticising reparations and saying that this gigantic debt of reparations 
is what is responsible for the economic disintegration of Europe. The point is - is the 
damage there? Has it to be made up? Who is to pay it? If Germany does not pay, 
France and England and Belgium must pay. " 104 
He admitted that there was a difference between the payment of external 
debt and the payment of internal obligations. There were undoubtedly two 
considerations to be borne in mind on the reparations questions. Firstly, "... if we 
insist now upon payments beyond the power of a war-exhausted country, it would 
precipitate a crisis which would be by no means confined to Germany "los and 
secondly "... that Germany's ultimate capacity to pay must not be judged by her 
capacity at this moment, " when, like other nations she was in difficulty, struggling to 
recover from the war, but by the machinery of the Versailles Treaty, "which is very 
elastic. "lob 
102 Hansard, 153, HC Debates, col 1889, speech by Lloyd George, 3 April 1922. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid 
106 Lloyd George also responded wittily to criticism from Labour members of his 
diplomatic style. "I do not understand criticism of conferences coming from the 
Labour Party. They have been brought up on conferences. " They were good for 
letting off steam and Labour naturally thought "that a good eruption now and again is 
better than a bad earthquake. " Lloyd George foresaw the imminent end of his 
Coalition, as his enemies had predicted and therefore offered the last words of advice 
"of a dying Minister. " He lambasted the press critics of his conference diplomacy by 
name, but did not "mention the `Times' because it is only a tasteless rehash of the 
`Daily Mail'. But he did want " to utter one kindly word of warning to this grotesque 
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The Genoa Conference did fail though partly for the reasons that Nicolson 
later identified as weaknesses of Conference Diplomacy. Its aims were imprecise and 
the national leaders, particularly Lloyd George and Poincare were not on good terms. 
The French Prime Minister refused to even discuss reparations at Genoa. In the 
U. S. A., the Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, believed that the result of the Genoa 
Conference was "positively harmful. ' o107 But it was events outside the conference 
that dealt it the most shattering blow when news arrived that the two pariah nations, 
Germany and Bolshevik Russia, had concluded a treaty of friendship - the Treaty of 
Rapallo. The German government's most influential figure, the Foreign Minister, Dr 
Walter Rathenau, had been pursuing a policy of `Fulfilment' of the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles with the aim of treaty revision and German recovery. His 
frustration at perceived allied, particularly French, inflexibility and vindictiveness 
over major issues such as reparations, may have made him look east. 108 He was also 
unsettled by parallel negotiations between the Soviet Union and the victorious allies, 
including talks on reparations and war debts. Rapallo though merely confirmed 
Anglo-French mistrust of Germany. Curzon called it "a gratuitous insult directed by 
conglomeration not to tie their hands in advance about conferences. They will find it 
impossible in the state of Europe to get on without them. " They should not condemn 
"the only process, short of force, of bringing the world gradually back to something 
like normal conditions, and from normal conditions to something which is better. " 
Ibid, col 1890. 
107 Schuker, 'American Policy at Genoa, 1922', p. 121. 
108 Detlev Peukert believed that it was "an additional trump card in the continuing 
strategy of developing cooperation and dialogue with the western powers. " But, to 
Britain, "the German proponents of a policy of fulfilment, having only just begun to 
make some headway, now appeared to have turned to be unreliable customers after 
all. Britain would now therefore adopt a restrained but loyal attitude towards the 
coming offensive mounted by her French ally, as long as the Germans continued to 
insist on an open-ended revision of Versailles. " Peukert, Weimar Republic, p. 59. 
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Germany against the Powers. s109 Poincare believed it to be a clandestine military 
alliance. l lo 
From the British perspective, much of the blame for the surprise created 
by the news has been allocated to the Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, who 
had known about secret talks between Germany and Russia since January 1922 and 
had not reported them to the Foreign Office. Salzmann said that even before Rapallo 
"he had been watched suspiciously by many of his (Foreign Office) colleagues since 
he was not a career diplomat but an outside financial expert and Lloyd George's 
choice. As British ambassador, he had to work for `native' British interests. His task 
was to observe and to analyse German policy, to report to London and to execute 
Foreign Office directives in negotiations with the German government. However, the 
longer D'Abernon stayed in Berlin, the more he identified himself with the German 
point of view on many issues, thereby losing the critical distance necessary to 
represent British interests. i1"' 
In Germany in April 1922, the assistant state secretary and head of the 
Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office was 
Ago 
von Maltzan. Carl von 
Schubert was head of Department III, which included Britain and The United States. 
Peter Krüger said that they were the "coming men" in the German Foreign Office. 112 
The news of the Rapallo treaty horrified Schubert who had favoured a conciliatory 
German policy to support Lloyd George at Genoa, whilst Maltzan told his colleagues 
repeatedly that Germany needed "the Russian cloud over Europe. "' 13 Kruger 
'09 C. Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis, p. 22. 
"o Ibid, p. 22. 
"' Salzmann, Rapallo and After, pp. 25-26. 
112 Peter Krüger, `A Rainy Day, April 16 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy 
Perspective for German Foreign Policy, ' in Fink, Frohn and Heideking (eds. ), Genoa, 
Rapaio and European Reconstruction, p. 60. 
113 Ibid, p. 60. 
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believed that "Maltzan's decision to push the treaty was ... pure power politics. " 
114 
Rapallo was, he said, the work of Maltzan and Joseph Wirth, the Chancellor. 
President Ebert, the Social Democrats and the Foreign Secretary, Walter Rathenau, 
had opposed it. ' 15 On 6 April 1922, Gerhard von Mutius, the acting head of the 
Western Department of the German Foreign Office, stated that he believed that 
unilateral French action, especially in the Ruhr, was imminent because it was the only 
action that they could take without united allied consent. Germany should not take 
any action that might provoke France. 116 Yet, on 7 April 1922, the German 
government rejected the Reparation Commission's plan to put Germany's finances 
under its control. 
In France, Poincare capitalised on the opportunity presented to him. On 24 
April 1922, he made a speech at his birthplace, Bar-le Duc, close to Verdun, which 
"was intended to return the British to fundamentals, above all to the possibility of a 
German default on the reparation payment due on 31 May and the prospect of a 
French punitive response. " 117 He said that if Great Britain failed to support France 
against Germany within the Reparation Commission, then France would defy Britain 
and act alone. On 7 June 1922, Poincare told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that an occupation of the Ruhr was a last resort that meanwhile might be useful in 
forcing Britain and America to make financial concessions. ' 18 
The Foreign Office, in an unusual bout of self-criticism, admitted some 
degree of culpability. In a memorandum on reparations and security, Sydney 
Waterlow of the Central Department, said that Britain had wanted pensions included 
114 Ibid, p. 59. 
115 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 119. 
116 Kruger, `A Rainy Day', pp. 58-59. 
117 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 213. 
Iss Keiger, `Poincare and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 53. Also Trachtenberg, Reparation in 
World Politics, pp. 245-261. 
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in the bill "and her record over the lapse of the 1919 guarantee was not good. s119 But 
Waterlow's proposed policy revision did not match the depth of his analysis. He 
merely recommended a weightier political figure on the Reparation Commission and 
a more positive attitude to the League. When a sceptical Tyrrell made his own 
proposal, Waterlow wrote another memorandum, this time recommending the renewal 
of the offer of a pact with France, plus a set of agreements including Bulgaria, Italy 
and eventually Germany and an offer to reduce France's debt to Britain in exchange 
for a fair settlement of the reparations issue. 120 In the tense atmosphere following 
Genoa and Rapallo such a proposal had little chance of being pursued. 
A policy of `paying reparations to France'' earned Rathenau, the hatred of 
the extreme Right in his country, and led to his assassination. But his murder in June 
1922 was received somewhat ambiguously by the Foreign Office. Addison, in Berlin, 
reported that "Rathenau was murdered this morning about eleven o'clock while in 
his motor on the way from his house to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Murderers 
were three men who overtook him in another motor, shot at him with revolvers and 
also threw a hand grenade. s121 To Lloyd George, it was an "abominable crime, " 122 
but some in the Foreign Office may have believed that it could have positive effects. 
Because of allied policy towards the Versailles Treaty and Germany, Rathenau had 
been an opponent of German application for membership of the League of Nations, 
something that Cecil, Balfour, D'Abernon, Hardinge and Crowe all considered to be a 
good thing. 
1 19 Orde, Great Britain and International Security, 1920-1926, p. 31. 
120 Ibid, p. 32. UKNA, FO 371/7567, C 6875/6200/18,9 May 1922. 
121 Balfour to Addison in Berlin conveying a message from Mr Lloyd George to the 
German Chancellor, 26 June, Note 1, telegram from Mr Addison, 24 June 1922, 
DBFP, 1, XX, p. 476. 
122 Balfour to Addison, 26 June 1922, ibid, p. 476. 
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The policy of fulfilment effectively died with Rathenau. Could it have 
succeeded? Many French commentators believed so. During the Genoa Conference, 
Jules Sauerwein, writing in Le Matfn described a garden party given by the managing 
director of Berliner Tageblatt, Theodore Wolf, at which the speakers were J. L. 
Garvin, the editor of The Observer, Keynes and Rathenau. He reported that "... when 
Keynes spoke of the impossibility of Germany's paying the reparations imposed on 
her, Rathenau quietly but firmly contradicted him. s123 
Nor did the murder of Rathenau help international confidence in German 
currency, which was already depreciating at an alarming rate. On 12 July 1922 the 
German Government asked for a moratorium on cash reparation payments until the 
end of 1924 and a reduction of the clearing payments due under Article 296 of the 
Versailles Treaty. The British responded favourably. Germany did pay the instalment 
due on 15 July, but when its request was rejected by France and Belgium it then 
refused to pay the clearing debt of 40 million gold marks due at the end of July and 
the 50 million gold marks cash reparations payment due on 15 August 1922. 
Lloyd George was content for Poincare to be allowed to act alone and 
"learn by experience. " 124 Meanwhile, he irritated the United States in an act of 
unreality that would be considered selfless wisdom by successive British governments 
for the next ten years. On 1 August 1922 Lord Balfour, temporarily back at the 
Foreign Office due to the indisposition of Curzon, sent a note to the French 
Ambassador "which stated that Britain was prepared to abandon all further claims to 
German reparations and to repayment by her Allies of their debts, provided this 
renunciation were part of a general plan to solve the problem of international 
123 Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, p. 57. 
124 UKNA, CAB 23/30 cited in Kent, Spoils of War, p. 188. 
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indebtedness. s125 The `Balfour Note' highlighted the frequent British failure to 
empathise with their former allies. "This note was ill-received in France and met with 
much scepticism in America. " The American financier, Bernard Baruch, 
understandably complained to Loucheur that the British were trying to place the 
blame on the American `Shylocks, ' having previously tried to blame the French 
`Napoleons. ' 126 The British government failed to understand that other nations might 
too have self-interest. Most of all, they failed to appreciate the extent to which the 
driving force behind American foreign policy towards Europe after the Great War was 
Wall Street and, in particular, the great American banking houses. This lack of 
understanding would persist for the next ten years. 
Historians have been highly critical of the Balfour Note. What is 
extraordinary is to discover that British policy-makers placed so much faith in the 
policy and were so hostile to other nations. Trachtenberg thought that by this time 
Lloyd George's policies were due to his increasingly strong feelings of resentment as 
the contemporary documents "record sharp bursts of anger at France, America and 
even Germany -a clear indication that Lloyd George was losing his grip on 
events. ' 127 Alan. Sharp called it "an international disaster" and "an abdication of all 
responsibility for all European affairs. s128 Zara Steiner said that it "was seen as a 
slap in the face to France. s 129 
The rejection of the `Balfour Note' was discussed at a meeting of the 
Supreme Council in the same month. In a speech at Bar-le-Duc on 21 August 1922, 
Poincare propose that Germany be made to pay in other ways. The Allies should 
125 W 6402/2618/50, Balfour to Saint-Aulaire, 1 August 1922, DBFP, 1, XX, p. 99. 
126 Preface by Douglas Dakin in ibid, p. v. 
127 Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, p. 258. 
128 Turner, Cost of War, p. 70. 
129 Steiner, Lights That hailed, p. 217. 
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take possession of six `productive pledges' in the Rhineland and the Ruhr, including 
the exploitation of state mines and forests. He believed that these pledges would yield 
as much as the required reparation receipts. How, he did not say, but until they did 
there would be no moratorium. 
The `Balfour Note' was a rare occasion during the Lloyd George 
premiership when the Foreign Secretary made a significant intervention in the 
Reparations Question. As Alan Sharp has shown, the Foreign Office was in a state of 
`eclipse' during those years and particularly on German masters. But, in October 1922 
the architect of conference diplomacy would himself be brought down, never to return 
to high office. 130 The issue that precipitated the downfall of Lloyd George was not 
Germany, but the Chanak crisis in the Near East. At the famous Carlton Club 
meeting, Conservatives, including Balfour, Austen Chamberlain and Lord 
Birkenhead, who favoured the continuation of the Coalition government, were 
defeated by those, among them Baldwin, Younger and notably Bonar Law, who 
wished to end it. Curzon hesitated, "a; little afraid of ove hrowing himself too, but 
eager to be a real Foreign Secretary, " t` and so joined th coup. He kept his job, but 
never gained the office that he coveted. When Bonar Law resigned less than seven 
months later he himself would be the victim of political intrigue, literally a `palace 
coup. ' 
It must be stated that the differences between the Foreign Office and the 
Prime Minister were over style and character and not substance. Crowe had praised 
130 His enemies though received the news of the removal of Lloyd George with 
delight. Leopold Maxse, the editor of the National Review, was ecstatic. "What a 
triumph for the National Review, the Morning Post and the Diehards. " The reaction 
was equally enthusiastic among his enemies in France. "Hoping never to see you 
again, Mr. Lloyd George, " was the headline in Le Malin. See Chichester Record 
Office, Maxse Papers, undated and G. Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, p. 56 respectively. 
131 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 294. 
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Lloyd George's moderate, but firm policies in 1920: " It comes to this, that it is open 
for Germany to point out the clauses in the Treaty which it is impossible for her to 
carry out and to suggest an alternative procedure... it was with this object that Mr. 
Lloyd George pressed at San Remo that the representative of the German Government 
should be asked to meet the Council of the Allies at Spa; he quite rightly saw that we 
could not before the Treaty was signed. 99132 
The Lloyd George premiership was a turning-point in the history of the 
Foreign Office. Its prestige never regained the heights that it briefly attained pre-1914, 
but nor did Great Britain's. After 1922 Lloyd George went to the backbenches along 
with his Liberal party. "I never dreamed that the British would dispense with his 
dynamism `for good and all, ' but he had little regard for Stanley Baldwin and Neville 
Chamberlain. They despised him and he was later frozen out of their Coalition 
governments. s133 Few at the Foreign Office regretted his removal or isolation. At 
times, its senior personnel used a similar degree of abuse to the Prime Minister as that 
given by senior members of the Conservative Party. Willie Tyrrell, in a letter to the 
editor of The Spectator, John Strachey, referred to "... the foreigner who happens to 
be our Prime Minister. s134 O'Riordan has shown that Curzon was appalled at Lloyd 
George's diplomatic activities, but tolerated the situation because the Prime Minister 
was only really interested in European affairs. 135 
There were those who remained loyal to their former colleague. "The 
changeableness with which Lloyd George is usually charged was never shown in the 
course of the Conferences on Reparation. On the contrary, the line or policy taken 
from the first was adhered to steadfastly throughout. He was, indeed extremely 
132 UKNA, Crowe Papers, FO 800/243, letter to Curzon, p. 134. 
133 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 294. 
134 Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, Strachey Papers, 20 March 1922. 
135 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 15. 
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obstinate. " 136 Lloyd George was hated by elements within the Foreign Office, but on 
Germany there was very little difference of opinion between him and Crowe. 
There was also much respect from both critics and admirers. 137 Vansittart reflected a 
traditional Foreign Office view when he wrote many years later: "I often think of 
Lloyd George with the old fascination, though he started the ruin of professional 
diplomacy both by superceding it by the extravagant futilities of diplomacy by 
conference and in his ejection of professionals for amateurs of wealth or weight. 99139 
Yet by supporting the appointment of an international banker in the British Embassy 
in Berlin, Lloyd George demonstrated that he understood the realities of the present 
more than he valued tradition. Hardinge's refusal to create an economics section 
typifies the pre-war mindset of many diplomats. What really mattered though was that 
Britain had lost a Prime Minister who was not afraid to take decisive action. 
The administration of Andrew Bonar Law was the first 
Conservative government since that of Balfour seventeen years earlier. The new 
Prime Minister had a reputation for blunt-speaking in domestic politics, but had little 
experience in foreign affairs, despite his Canadian links and work in the wartime 
Cabinet. Austen Chamberlain, previously loyal to Lloyd George, had declined to 
become a member of the government. Bonar Law chose to keep Curzon at the Foreign 
Office where he had the unfinished business of the treaty with Turkey. He may have 
soon regretted his decision when he received a communication from Lausanne: "I 
sent yesterday a telegram to the Foreign Office telling them that it is quite impossible 
136 D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, Volume 1, pp. 36-37. 
137 Nobody worked more closely with him than the Cabinet Secretary. Hankey's 
admiration for Lloyd George's courage in adversity, concern for the under-privileged, 
personal magnetism and rhetorical skills was tempered by an awareness of his many 
faults, including his devious and idiosyncratic methods. Yet, he was still greatly 
impressed by him. See S. Roskill, Hankey, Volume II, p. 302. 
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for me to deal with the question of reparations here, or to answer the telegrams that 
pour in from Paris and Brussels. I had gathered that as soon as you were free from 
Parliamentary duties you were disposed to take up the job. .. s139 Thus, 
in the critical 
weeks of December 1922 and January 1923, it was Britain's Prime Minister who was 
leading the diplomatic campaign prior to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr. 
Conference Diplomacy did not end with the departure of Lloyd George. 
The Foreign Office may not have had to work with a new foreign 
minister, but following the departure of Lloyd George it may have expected to restore 
much of its lost prestige and influence. Britain's allies, especially the French, were 
also eager to know how much continuity and change would be demonstrated by Bonar 
Law's policies and personality. One Foreign Office mandarin was eager to inform 
them. In Paris, Willie Tyrrell told Poincare that the new Prime Minister would be 
more co-operative than his old nemesis. In his opinion, "the French Government 
would find in our new Prime Minister a man who would be both friendly and 
businesslike in his dealings, and who would look at things as they really were, and 
never become involved in far-reaching Utopian schemes. s 140 
His words delighted Poincare who told the Belgian Ambassador in Paris 
on 30 November that, now that Lloyd George had gone, he was very confident that 
his new British counterpart would support any future French policy and action. '4' 
Poincare and the Belgian Prime Minister, Theunis, now agreed on the necessity of a 
139 House of Lords Record Office, Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, 
Document 35c, Curzon to Bonar Law, 28 November 1922. 
140 C 16688/99/18, letter from Tyrrell to Sir G. Grahame in Brussels, 30 November 
1922, Tyrrell to Crowe, 30 November 1922, DBFP, 1, XX, p. 306. 141 C 17361/99/18, Hardinge (in Paris) to Crowe, 1 December 1922, ibia p. 307. 
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changed approach "and that the Allied Powers should take Germany by the scruff of 
the neck and make her pay. " 142 
Tyrrell, realising that he had blundered, quickly telegraphed Curzon in 
Lausanne giving a traditional Foreign Office spin on the unfortunate conversation, 
saying that "I thought it best to impress upon Poincare that if he was able to submit to 
Mr Bonar Law a businesslike plan for the exaction of reparations out of Germany, he 
would find that his scheme would be considered in a sympathetic and businesslike 
spirit, and that if it entailed coercion I did not think that the new Ministry would 
shrink from applying it, provided it were convinced that it would yield reparation 
payment. s143 Curzon then instructed Tyrrell to limit the damage by writing to 
Grahame in Brussels who could then "disabuse M. Theunis both as regards my 
position and influence in the Foreign Office and the tenor of my remarks to Monsieur 
Poincare. s144 
Tyrrell's extraordinary visit to Paris was the subject of a question in the 
Commons. E. D. Morel asked whether he had "conversations" with M. Millerand. 
Ronald McNeill, the Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made an 
astonishing and ridiculous reply. In his statement he said that he could not confirm or 
deny such conversations, but "all I can say is that Sir William Tyrrell was not sent to 
Paris by His Majesty's Government to carry on negotiations with anybody. " 145 
He had gone on a private visit to Paris, where he had many friends and if he met 
Millerand for a private interview he could not say. 
Nor was the new government helped by the performance of its man at the 
Reparation Commission. The persistent criticism of Sir John Bradbury by officials of 
142 Ibid. 
143 Tyrrell to Grahame, 30 November 1922, ibia pp. 305-306. 
144 1bica p. 305. 
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the Foreign Office, especially Ralph Wigram, reached their height prior to May 1921 
and the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. On 11 November 1922 D'Abernon 
informed Curzon that Bradbury had recommended to Dr. Wirth, the German 
Chancellor, that the German Government "should take its courage in both hands" 
and seek a moratorium of two years. 146 On 23 November Ralph Wigram sent a note 
to Miles Lamp son that contained a fierce attack on Bradbury. 147 According to 
Wigram, in a memorandum dated 14 November 1922, Bradbury had spoken to the 
media without consulting his superiors, was naive in his poIitical judgements and had 
failed to supply the Foreign Office with "adequate and up-to-date information on 
reparations and other foreign relations matters, including copies of requests for 
instructions from the Treasury. s148 Wigram accused Bradbury of having great self- 
confidence in his own ability to solve every reparations crisis as well as the entire 
problem, a view shared by nobody else. 
It was one month earlier that Bradbury had committed the blunder that 
graphically demonstrated his diplomatic ineptitude. He p blished a Note advocating a 
moratorium on all German reparation 
payments, 
somethi g that greatly displeased 
Poincare, at precisely the time when the Chanak crisis was threatening to cause a rift 
in Anglo-French relations. The Foreign Office learned about the Note too late to 
prevent its publication. `Willie ' Tyrrell minuted the feelings of many diplomats: "I 
confess to a feeling of bitter resentment to seeing part of our foreign policy in the 
146 C 15685/99/18, note by D'Abernon of a conversation with Dr Wirth, 11 
November 1922, D'Abernon to Curzon, 1I November 1922, DBFP, 1, XX, pp. 288- 
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hands of Sir J. Bradbury. Apart from the evils of such a system, the individual, whom 
I have known for years, is wholly unfit to deal with foreign affairs or people. " 149 
O'Riordan believed that in the autumn of 1922 the Treasury did take 
effective control of reparation policy, but some in the Foreign Office were content 
that it should be so. Miles Lampson, head of the Central Department, "felt that the 
Treasury had already bungled the reparation issue so much that it was better to leave 
it holding ultimate responsibility! "ISO Thus, the Foreign Office had little faith in the 
Treasury plan proposed by Bradbury on 15 December 1922.151 These proposals would 
form the basis of the plan that Bonar Law took to Paris early in January 1923 and 
which was ridiculed by Carl Bergmann, the German reparations expert, who said that 
he would rather Germany pay reparations than have to try to understand it. 152 It seems 
that the plan had the main purpose though of enabling Britain to save face 
internationally if Poincare did occupy the Ruhr. 153 
Yet, Crowe believed that the proposals could be used to demonstrate more 
evidence of German calumny if Germany refused to fulfil even these more reasonable 
demands. His attitude to Germany was not softening and he still wanted to work with 
France. He said that "the occupation of the Ruhr would be an effective means of 
coercing Germany into acceptance and fulfilment of the reasonable demands... 
Therefore provided such reasonable demands can be formulated, we should not refuse 
our associating ourselves with the occupation in case of Germany not carrying out 
what she may be induced to promise... '" 54 
149 UKNA, FO 371/7486, C14305/99/18,18 October 1922. 
150 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 20. 
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But, in this period of increasing tension during the final months of 1922 
the British political leadership proved incapable of any meaningful action. Bonar Law 
was a Prime Minister of just a few weeks experience and little in foreign affairs. 
Baldwin, the new Chancellor and to whom Bradbury was ultimately responsible, was 
never comfortable in foreign affairs. '55 Curzon was frequently in Lausanne and 
wanted to concentrate on the Near East, a point confirmed by an addition to an urgent 
telegram from Grahame in Brussels that he wrote on 28 November 1922: "I sent a 
telegram to the Foreign Office yesterday saying that it is quite impossible for me to 
deal with this case here. I have also written to the Prime Minister asking if he is 
prepared to take it in hand since at present we are making everyone angry by our 
assumed indifference. Would it not be well to submit the papers as they come in to the 
Prime Minister so that he may be familiar with its political aspect? " 56 The Belgian 
Foreign Minister, Henri Jaspar, had told Grahame that he was "quite in the dark as to 
what policy of British cabinet is likely to be in face of Monsieur Poincare's 
attitude. " 57 This is an understandable comment given that even Bonar Law admitted 
that he was going to the London Conference without a clear policy in his mind: "I 
may have to choose between two evils - between a breach with France which would 
mean chaos in Europe or concessions to France which would also involve great 
misfortunes. s 158 
The political indecision at the apex of British government was tragically 
mistimed, but the Foreign Office was not inactive in the weeks prior to the invasion. 
Following the failure in London to settle the dispute, the Foreign Office sent a 
Iss The Bonar Law Cabinet was called "the government of the Second Eleven. " See 
Hughes, British Foreign Secretaries, p. 26. 
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telegram on 16 December to Geddes in Washington, asking him to seek the support of 
Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, and the American government to help Britain 
prevent a catastrophe. The United States might even send an observer to the 
forthcoming Paris Conference. Hughes though wanted an invitation to come from all 
the allies and so, two days later, he rejected the British idea. Kent believed that "the 
underlying impediment to action was his insistence that the United States `could not 
enter into discussion' of war debts. " 59 
Yet, on 29 December 1922, Hughes made a statement at New Haven in 
which he publicly declared that the United States supported the idea of appointing an 
expert financial committee to investigate the reparations question and particularly 
Germany's capacity to pay. On 7 November, the U. S. A. had actually made such a 
proposal to France and on 14 December, Hughes repeated the suggestion to the 
French Ambassador. When the Foreign Office heard about these `private' exchanges, 
Crowe rightly predicted that France would reject the concept of an American 
arbitrator. 160 On 21 December, Poincare rejected Hughes plan, saying in effect that 
the European allies needed to settle the matter and that time was limited. Five days 
later, Bradbury was outvoted when the Reparation Commission declared Germany to 
be in default of deliveries of timber and coal. Germany's deficiency was as follows: - 
i) Wood - it owed 200,000 metres of telegraph poles and had delivered only 65,000 
metres and ii) Coal - deliveries worth 24 million Gold Marks were owed, yet 
Germany had already delivered coal to the value of 1,480 GM. Bradbury sarcastically 
commented that "since, in the tenth year of the war, Troy fell to the strategem of the 
wooden horse, history recorded no similar use of timber. The situation was at present 
somewhat different, it was the fifth year of peace, and the city under attack was not 
1 59 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 203. 
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Troy, but Essen. i 161 Hughes declaration at New Haven "came far too lates 162 to 
prevent Poincare, in Bruce Kent's opinion, `from launching his nation into a self- 
indulgent act of criminal folly. " 163 
On 11 January 1923, thousands of French and Belgian troops invaded and 
occupied the Ruhr. The action remains highly controversial, yet it had been threatened 
since the early conferences of 1920 and Lloyd George had supported the occupation 
of the three German towns. What did Poincare want? At meetings in London in 
August 1922, he demanded `gages productif, ' productive guarantees or pledges that 
Germany had to give France and Belgium in lieu of reparations payments. "These 
were to consist of (1) the control already exercised by the Rhineland High 
Commission over the granting of export licences; (2) a customs barrier between the 
occupied territories and the rest of Germany; (3) Allied exploitation of German state 
mines and forests; (4) Allied participation in 60 per cent of the share capital of 
German chemical industries on the left bank of the Rhine; levies in the occupied 
territories; and (6) the German customs. " 164 These could only be gained by the 
administration and exploitation of the Ruhr. But would any occupation of the Ruhr be 
legal? 
The events that led to the occupation of the Ruhr revolved partly around a 
difference of legal opinion about the interpretation of this controversial section of the 
peace treaty. Clauses 17 and 18 are as follows 
17: In case of default by Germany in the performance of any obligation under 
this part of the present treaty, the (Reparation) Commission will forthwith give 
notice of such default to each of the interested Powers and may make such 
161 Quoted by Kent, Spoils of War, p. 202. 
162 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 29. 
163 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 203. 
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recommendations as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default as 
it may think necessary. 
18: The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right 
to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not 
to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and 
reprisals, and in general such other measures as the reective Governments 
may determine to be necessary in the circumstances. 16T 
The difference of opinion between the rival lawyers on either side centred on their 
interpretations of the word `respective. ' The semantic and legalistic dispute stimulated 
by this word and the complete clause would continue throughout and beyond the 
crisis of the following year. 
At the London Conference of 9-10 December 1922, Britain hoped to 
prevent an invasion of the Ruhr, but it failed to settle the issue of German Reparation 
as well as the end of Allied Military Control of Germany and they therefore decided 
to meet again in Paris in early January. Poincare could wait no longer once he had 
received confirmation of Belgian support for his threatened invasion. Few in Britain 
sympathised with the French position, but the French were equally frustrated with 
their partner in the entente. "... it wa,: s not always easy fr us to follow Britain's 
policy, for it was subject to abrupt, confusing changes. i; But this also applied to the 
French as throughout the second half of 1922 Poincare explored a variety of 
possibilities. Zara Steiner said that his intentions "are still the subject of debate. s167 
However, in January 1923, the French laid the blame fairly and squarely 
for the invasion of the Ruhr on Britain. St. Aulaire told Curzon that the French 
engineers (the M. I. C. U. M. ) sent into the Ruhr "would not have been accompanied by 
troops had His Majesty's Government been able to co-operate with the French 
Government... " and "hoped that as soon as the engineers were installed, His 
165 UKNA, The Treaty of Versailles, Paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII. 
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Majesty's Government would send engineers to co-operate. s168 On the direction of 
Bonar Law, Crowe diplomatically rejected the French proposition. French historians 
have not necessarily concurred with the contemporary analysis. Having stated that the 
participation of inter-war Presidents in foreign affairs declined gradually up to 1940, 
Georges Dethan believed that an exception had to made for Alexandre Millerand, 
"who in 1923 (sic? ) gave Poincare the idea of the occupation of the Ruhr, after 
having brought about his fall by recalling Briand. s169 
In London in December 1922 Germany informed the allies that it was 
unable to pay the instalment demanded and therefore Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno asked 
for a two-year moratorium on reparation payments and also made an `offer' of fifteen 
years guaranteed peace. The allies rejected the German proposal. France and Belgium 
stated their intention to send troops into the Ruhr if payment was not forthcoming. 
Britain requested another conference in the hope of preventing the occupation 
occurring. 
In Paris in January 1923 the British government failed to persuade 
the French and Belgian governments from ordering the invasion of the Ruhr, which 
began on 11 January 1923. Bonar Law presented the Bradbury/Treasury plan that 
Bergman mocked. Its failure was inevitable. Allied debts to Britain would be 
cancelled and German reparations reduced, after a four-year moratorium. Belgium 
would give up her claim to reparation payments. France's share was reduced from 52 
168 C 541/313/18, Curzon to Crewe in Paris, 10 January 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 23. 169 Zara Steiner (ed. ), The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World, 
London, 1982. p. 211. President Millerand was a consistent advocate of the 
occupation of the Ruhr. On 13 November 1922, he claimed that, in a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers, his Prime Minister had expressed opposition to the idea, 
denouncing "the dangers which he foresaw from the enterprise. " Millerand 
interrupted him, saying that "the military operation will not be a disaster or a 
bankruptcy. " Poincare's melodramatic response was to say, "I resign. " He did not. 
See Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 222. 
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to 42 per cent and there was no mention of `productive pledges. ' Zara Steiner 
believed that the plan reflected the Treasury's "distrust and dislike of the French and 
appeared deliberately provocative. s10 It was furthermore little different to a plan 
rejected by France after the failure of the Balfour Note. What is extraordinary, as 
O'Riordan asked, is why Crowe and the Foreign Office did not oppose it, or try to get 
the Cabinet to veto it, 171 unless it had their full support. The invasion of the Ruhr was 
ultimately a failure of Lloyd George's `Conference Diplomacy, ' during which he had 
tried to exclude the Foreign Office experts on Germany and in particular Sir Eyre 
Crowe. But the invasion can also be seen as an outcome of British policy towards 
Germany after the war, of which Crowe was a great influence. 
It is not acceptable any more to lay the blame for the Franco-Belgian 
invasion of the Ruhr entirely at the door of the French government. It was in part due 
to the vacuum at the heart of British government. O'Riordan has argued that the 
events of January 1923 demonstrated "the confusion of British domestic policy. " 72 
In her view, the Ruhr crisis "began in the autumn of 1922, when French patience with 
Germany over reparations was finally exhausted. s173 Also, in October 1922, the 
Lloyd George coalition fell and was replaced by a Conservative administration. But, 
O'Riordan said that " Bonar Law was elderly and his health was failing. s174 In fact, 
he was only sixty-four (younger than Churchill in May 1940 and October1951 and 
almost twenty years younger than Gladstone in August 1892) and he had not yet been 
diagnosed with the cancer that killed him in October 1923. But it was true that he 
"lacked the energy and decisiveness necessary to lead a largely inexperienced 
170 Ibid, p. 220. 
171 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 26. 172 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 225. 
1" Ibid, p. 224. 
174 Ibid, p. 225. 
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Cabinet at precisely the point when the reparation crisis was at its most critical. "175 
Also Curzon was in Lausanne at the end of 1922 discussing the Near Eastern situation 
and was happy to pass on the responsibility for the Ruhr to the new Prime Minister. In 
September, while in Paris discussing the vexed question of Turkey, Curzon had been 
brought close to a nervous breakdown by a tirade of abuse from Poincare that was 
allegedly only interrupted by an intervention by Hardinge, the British Ambassador . 
176 
Crowe and Corp showed that, in Lausanne, after sending for him on 17 January 1923, 
Curzon was extremely dependent on Crowe. In fact, Crowe was given a room next to 
Curzon and was at his beck and call for the next three months. '77 Michael Hughes 
believed that Curzon was "much less willing (than Lloyd George and Balfour) to 
delegate important decisions about policy" to Hardinge and Crowe. 178 However, three 
years after the death of both Crowe and Curzon, John Gregory extolled the Foreign 
Secretary's great knowledge, but was mystified by his unwillingness to make a crucial 
decision. 179 Even in October 1922, in the critical final days of the Lloyd Coalition, 
Curzon hesitated over whether or not to support the plot against Lloyd George. One 
175 Ibid. 
176 See Maisel, Foreign Office 1919-1926, p. 122. Maisel quoted Hardinge, Old 
Diplomacy, pp. 272-273, as well as Nicolson's version of the conversation in an 
adjoining room. "Curzon collapsed upon a scarlet settee. He grasped Lord Hardinge 
by the arm. `Charley, ' he panted, `I can't bear that horrid little man. I can't bear him. I 
can't bear him. He wept... " in Curzon, pp. 273-274. See Maisel, Foreign Office 
1919-1926, note 208, p. 263. 
177 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 419. Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, 
d. 2906, Letter to Clema, complaining about the arrangements, 17 January 1923, pp. 
75-76. 
178 Hughes, British Foreign Secretaries, p. 17. 
179 Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy, p. 250. After a one-hour long, masterly 
exposition to Gregory in response to his memorandum about Russia, Curzon then 
turned to the astonished official and said, "Now, what ought we to do? I was 
dumbfounded: for this was ridiculously putting the cart before the horse. Surely it was 
for me to expound the situation... and for him to take the decision. " Curzon's 
biographer supported this opinion. He quoted the description given by the former 
minister, H. A. L. Fisher to Harold Nicolson - see Gilmour, Curzon, p. 510. 
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biographer said that "it is difficult to avoid the conviction that, throughout this 
period, Curzon was in a dither. He had lost his grip and did not know what to do. " 8° 
There was confusion in the weeks following the departure of Lloyd 
George in October 1922 leading up to the Franco-Belgian invasion of 11 January 
1923. Curzon was more interested in the settling of near Eastern matters at Lausanne 
and the Treasury became more involved in diplomatic matters than it should have 
been. Bradbury's actions at the Reparation Commission were, at best, unhelpful, but 
then so were Tyrrell's words to Poincare in Paris. Yet, even during this awkward 
period the main tenets of the Crowe Memorandum were still visible. Britain did not 
appease Germany, but tried to be firm and fair. The British government stated its wish 
to remain friendly with France. Britain's interests came before everything else. 
The ultimate failing of Conference Diplomacy was that, for it to be 
successful, it required decision-makers such as Lloyd George (as proven at Versailles) 
and not just situation analysts, however brilliant, such as Curzon. After Lloyd George, 
Britain's political leadership on the international stage was in chaos. O'Riordan 
argued that while the Treasury had a strategy (based on the financial aspects of the 
matter), "the Foreign Office... did not recommend a definite strategy to the new 
government... " but instead "took refuge in inaction. s181 This is unsurprising. As 
leading members of Lloyd George's government in 1921, Bonar Law and Curzon had 
rejected Crowe's proposal of a military alliance with France. Had this been accepted 
there probably would have been no Ruhr crisis. However, a fit of official pique is 
unlikely to have been the reason for inaction. The British were simply in a dilemma. 
To support France might have made France too powerful on the Continent and worsen 
'so L. Mosley, Curzon: The End of an Epoch, London, 1960, p. 236. 181 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 226. 
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Franco-German relations, whilst to oppose the invasion would have ruptured the 
Entente and would have been a great triumph for Germany. 
What then was the attitude of the Foreign Office to Germany between 
1920 and 1923? Salzmann suggested that there was "a division of opinion inside the 
Foreign Office about Germany. The `old' high ranking officials such as Crowe and 
Tyrrell had been prejudiced against Germany since before the war, whereas the 
younger ones (supported incidentally by Curzon), such as Wellesley and Gregory 
(assistant secretaries) and clerks such as Lampson and Harold Nicolson believed that 
the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty had inflamed Germany and made it likely to 
ally with Moscow. s182 This view is too simplistic and ignores the German education 
of Crowe and Tyrrell, Crowe's repeated wish for a peaceful Germany to take its place 
in the international fraternity, as well as the friendships within the Office based on 
their shared perceptions. In December 1922, Lampson expressed his view that until 
the safety of France's western frontiers was permanently guaranteed against German 
attack, there could be no lasting settlement of the reparation question, whilst another 
official warned of the dangers of treating Germany too leniently on the same issue. 183 
Salzmann then said that "despite the diverging opinions on German policy within the 
Foreign Office there never was an open confrontation between the two groups. The 
prevailing view was that, for the moment, the treaty of Versailles was the basis of 
European relations. Moreover, until 1922 no long-term strategy for a policy towards 
Germany had been formulated. s184 In the absence of such a clear policy, the views of 
1 
182 Salzmann, Ra 11o and After, pp. 21-22. 
183 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', pp. 226. 
184 Ibid, p. 22. 
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Sir Eyre Crowe's 1907 memorandum still acted as an indispensable guide to British 
policy towards Germany. 
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Chapter 4 
The Foreign Office and the Ruhr Crisis 
This chapter will examine the twelve tense months from the Franco-Belgian invasion 
of the Ruhr in January 1923 to the election in January 1924 of the first Labour 
government led by Ramsay MacDonald. It will demonstrate again the influence in the 
critical year of 1923 of Crowe's views on Germany within the Foreign Office. The 
chapter will be divided into four sections: firstly, the period of so-called benevolent 
neutrality, ' when the policy of the British government was one of minimum 
involvement in the Franco-Belgian dispute over the Ruhr; secondly, the involvement 
of Crowe and Foreign Office in the `Curzon Note' of 11 August 1923; this perhaps 
marked the beginning of a more active strategy in the Ruhr; thirdly, the response of 
Crowe, the Foreign Office and the government to the collapse of the mark and hyper- 
inflation in Germany in the autumn of 1923; finally, the role of Crowe and the 
Foreign Office in the renewal of American participation in European affairs, the final 
outcome of which was the Dawes Report and Plan of 1924. 
As has already been shown, most of the literature on the Ruhr crisis has 
tended to concentrate on the role of the French government and, in particular, Prime 
Minister Poincare. Only recently, the roles of Curzon, Crowe and the Foreign Office 
have been scrutinised more vigorously. Even then, the emphasis has tended to be on 
Franco-British relations. It has already been stated that Curzon depended heavily on 
Crowe at Lausanne. In 1923, during the Ruhr crisis, this dependence increased 
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because the Foreign Secretary was less knowledgeable about European affairs. ' It has 
generally been assumed that Curzon's mistreatment of Crowe was a type of industrial 
bullying. "Curzon acquired a reputation as an inconsiderate chief. "2 Owen 
O'Malley, a senior Foreign Office official, is often quoted: "Can't the man realize, " 
Crowe used to say, "that long after he has gone home in his Rolls-Royce I have to 
catch a No. 11 bus for Elm Park Road and sup off sardines or cold sausages before 
dealing with the evenings telegrams? s3 The evidence will suggest that in 1923 Crowe 
was more than just a senior adviser to the Foreign Secretary. The chapter will also 
show that even when not personally at the heart of British decision-making, Crowe's 
beliefs in firm, but fair treatment of Germany, positive Anglo-French relations and 
avoiding the dominance of one power on the continent still dominated British foreign 
policy in 1923. 
Following the defeat of the British in the Reparation Commission two 
days earlier, Franco-Belgian troops invaded the Ruhr on 11 January 1923. This action 
threatened the already shaky post-war entente between France and Great Britain. 
British policy-makers were placed in an extremely difficult situation. Their immediate 
aim was to ensure that there was not a rupture with France, whilst expressing clearly 
that Britain would neither participate nor take any responsibility for the invasion of 
the Ruhr. Every effort was to be made to ensure that relations with France remained 
cordial. It was also decided that Britain would not oppose the invasion by declaring it 
to be illegal. 
' Harold Nicolson said that "he possessed, in European matters, little stability of 
objective... ". Curzon, p. 223. 
2 K. Rose, Superior Person -A Portrait of Curzon and his Circle in Late Victorian 
England, London, 1969, p. 300. "I have to travel in the Underground, " complained 
Crowe about being sent for in the evening by Curzon. Ibid. 
3 Owen O'Malley cited in Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 50. 
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When the Ruhr was invaded in January 1923 and pledges were seized in 
the Rhineland, the Foreign Office and the British government had to choose between 
three alternative policies. It could contest the legality of the Franco-Belgian claim to 
act outside the limits of French and Belgian Sovereignty and withdraw the British 
representative from the Rhineland High Commission. It could contest every action 
taken by the French or Belgians that broke the Rhineland Agreement. The British 
chose to accept the final alternative. This was to disclaim all responsibility for the 
actions of her wartime allies, which the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office, Sir 
Cecil Hurst, believed to be illegal under Paragraph 18 of Annex II to Part VIII of the 
Versailles Treaty. It was chosen because it was the least likely to offend the French 
government. At Paris, Bonar Law had told Poincare that although Britain could not 
support or take any responsibility for the French measures, her feelings towards 
France and the French people remained amicable. 
Therefore, as Curzon explained to Lord Kilmarnock, " Our object is to 
avoid friction with the French whilst at the same time keeping aloof from the 
application of and responsibility for a line of policy of which His Majesty's 
Government disapprove. ' 94 To achieve this aim would have required a high level of 
diplomatic skills from both politicians and the officials in the Foreign Ministry, but 
they had other matters of concern as well. The government had to be aware that public 
opinion may have favoured the withdrawal of British troops from the Rhineland, 5 a 
message that Curzon instructed Lord Crewe to convey to the French Government. 
4C 988/313/18, Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock in Coblenz, 17 January 1923, DBFP, 1, 
XXI, p. 40. 
5C 1301/313/18, Curzon to Kilmarnock, 24 January 1923, ibid, p. 59. 
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There were also repeated concerns about British trade including the delivery of coal to 
the Rhineland and Ruhr. 
The question of the legal status of the Franco-Belgian actions was another 
major cause of debate in the next few months. When Dr Sthamer, the German 
ambassador, asked Miles Lampson if the reports in the British press were true that the 
Foreign Office law officers had expressed the view that the actions were a breach of 
the Versailles treaty, he replied that "there was not a vestige of truth in the 
allegation. s6 In fact, Lampson said that he was not prepared to discuss the matter, but 
instead posed another question: "Was there not an admitted right under general 
international law for any Power to take forceful measures to compel another 
Power to fulfil its treaty obligations? I had been informed that this was so. "7 This was 
true, but the Law Officers often failed to give clear decisions. The British government 
had never considered that the Franco-Belgian actions in the Ruhr and the 
Rhineland "could properly be taken under paragraph 18 ... 
(but) on the other hand 
His Majesty's Government have never considered that the French and Belgian action 
was, because it was not covered by the treaty, contrary to the treaty. "8 A further 
complicated matter for the British government was that in March 1921 Britain had 
supported the French plan to occupy Dusseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort. In 
December1922, the Solicitor-General, Sir Thomas Inskip, sent a note to the Foreign 
Office agreeing with the conclusion of the Attorney-General, Lord Hewart, in March 
1921 that the planned occupation would not have been contrary to the treaty. By April 
1923, though, Inski had changed his mind and, along with the Attorney-General, 
6C 1818/313/18, Cuzon to D'Abernon, 30 January 1923, Note by Mr Lampson, 29 
January 1923, ibid, pp. 82-83. 
7 Ibid, p. 83. See also C 1572/313/18,25 January 1923, ibid, pp. 69-71. 
8 Ibid, p. 70. 
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Douglas Hogg, now declared the invasion of the Ruhr to be illegal. 9 Tyrrell wished 
the legal question to be avoided, a view with which his friend would probably have 
disagreed, but the Permanent Under-Secretary was on holiday at the time. In April 
1923, as O'Riordan pointed out, "the scope for effective pressure on France 
disappeared when the Law Officers reported that the French did have a plausible legal 
argument. s1°Yet, Crowe and Corp rightly emphasised that what was really beyond 
doubt, and, of greatest significance, was the fact that Poincare had broken the solemn 
pledge given to Britain by President Millerand in April 1920 that France would not 
act independently of its allies in the future. " 
Attempts to sway the mandarins of the Foreign Office against the invasion were 
regularly made by the German government. They were consistently batted back, 
sometimes very strongly. In a note of 17 January 1923 to Dr Sthamer, Miles Lampson 
stressed "the folly of anything in the nature of resistance to French measures. Surely 
the German Government must realise the inevitable consequences of anything of that 
nature... the German Government had told Lord D'Abernon that there would be 
nothing beyond passive opposition. 'ýI 12 Five days later, Lampson rejected Sthamer's 
protest against the shooting in the Ruhr of two Germans by the French. He stated that 
he needed to make no comment, as the British had no connection with those events. 
When Sthamer wanted to know the position of the British government, Lampson 
reminded him of the formal declaration made by Bonar Law at the end of the Paris 
Conference. "Whilst disclaiming all responsibility for separate action, of which he 
9 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 431-432. 
10 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 231. 
11 Ibid, p. 430. 
12 C 989/313/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, 17 January 1923, note by Mr Lampson, 
DBFP, I, XXI, p. 41. 
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disapproved, Mr. Bonar Law had left no doubt in the minds of the public that Great 
Britain would throw no obstacle in the way of France. s13 Sthamer argued that British 
permission for the French to carry out arrests in their zone of the Rhineland was 
legally unacceptable, but Lampson told him that he "could conceive of no more 
foolish attitude (on the part of the German government) than to take action which 
would render our position increasingly difficult. ' *14 In a final thrust, Lampson 
defended the British press and public against the inference that it was biased, telling 
Sthamer that he "would do well to remember the memories of the war were by no 
means dead in this country. Moreover, the general opinion here was not that of 
sympathy with Germany; not at all. The average man no doubt thought that Germany 
had brought it (sic) on herself by not fulfilling the treaty; but he equally thought that 
France was applying a mistaken method of getting her debt out of Germany. " 5 
Lampson's statements very much represented Foreign Office attitudes to 
Germany at the start of 1923. They tend to support Crowe and Corp's aside that he 
"always adopted a harsher attitude towards the Germans than Crowe" 16 It is hard to 
discover within the Foreign Office evidence of sympathy for Germany in January 
1923, except from D'Abernon in Berlin who never ceased to mistrust France. '? Again 
though, despite the alternative view of the former banker, D'Abernon, it must be 
stressed that within the ranks of the Foreign Office mistrust of France ought not to be 
confused with a knee-jerk sympathy for Germany and certainly not in January 1923. 
Thus, it is not a contradiction to accept Douglas Dakin's conclusion that the Foreign 
13 C 1257/313/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, 22 January 1923, Note by Mr Lampson, 
ibid, p. 53. 
14 Ibid, p. 53. 
15 Ibid, p. 54. 
16 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 431. 
17 C 1567/313/18, D' Abernon to Curzon, 24 January 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, pp. 61- 
62. 
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Office watched with some satisfaction the growth of German passive resistance in the 
Ruhr and the Rhineland, for it had always been their contention that the Franco- 
Belgian action would involve costs exceeding the amount of reparation forcibly 
extracted; and they were more inclined to believe 
in reports that bore out this contention... than in M. Poincare's claims... that 
the venture had been rewarding. 18 
At the start of 1923, the Foreign Office experts were no longer regarded 
with suspicion by the head of the British government and they were presented with an 
opportunity to regain much lost prestige. But it was the decision of the Bonar Law 
Cabinet on 11 January 1923 to adopt a position of what was later termed `benevolent 
neutrality' (or `wait and see') that had to be enforced by them. Unfortunately, as 
Elspeth O'Riordan said, this policy "may have sounded all very well, (but) it proved 
virtually impossible to implement in practice. s19 The German government supported 
the campaign of passive resistance by the workers in the Ruhr and France and 
Belgium responded by increasing their forces and adopting harsher measures. Britain 
remained in dread of an open breach with France, but had to be very wary of 
appearing to criticise France for fear that this would be interpreted as supporting 
Germany. 
In fact, every effort was made to support the French in the early weeks of 
1923. The British government and the Foreign Office did not appease Germany, as, 
for example, Bonar Law agreed to Poincare's decision to seize German customs 
receipts in the whole of the occupied territory, including the British Zone, provided 
that there was "no question of the use of British troops. 9P20 Britain allowed France to 
"x Preface by Dakin, ibid, p. vi. 
19 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 229. 
20 Foreign Office to Kilmarnock, 17 January 1923, FO 371/8704, fos. 63-64, quoted 
by D. G. Williamson, British in Germany, p. 223. 
148 
use a railway line in the British Zone. 21 Less than a week later, even the usually anti- 
French Kilmarnock wrote to Curzon: "... much as we disapprove of French action, we 
cannot afford to let them be defeated. If, as we anticipate, (the) struggle proves to be 
long and bitter (the) time will come when we shall have to decide what would be the 
position if (the) Germans were to win. The last shot of the Allies would have been 
fired and would have failed in its effects. 9v22 
On 13 February 1923, Parliament re-opened and in the King's Speech 
Bonar Law government's policy in the Ruhr was stated to be as follows: 
My Government, in their desire to hasten a complete settlement of the 
Reparation question, offered to the Allied Governments far-reaching 
concessions on Allied debts to this country. I greatly regret that it proved 
impossible to reach a general agreement. The French and Belgian 
Governments have, therefore, proceeded to put into force the plan which they 
favoured, and the Italian Government have countenanced their action. My 
Government, while feeling unable either to concur or participate in this 
operation, are acting in such a way as not to add to the difficulties of their 
Allies. 23 
It has been argued that, soon after the invasion took place, the Foreign 
Office became responsible for the government's decision-making on the Ruhr crisis, 
although, given past and future events, it is debatable who really ruled in Whitehall. 
Zara Steiner linked the return of Curzon from Lausanne in February 1923 and his 
resumption of control of the Foreign Office with the policy of passivity until April. 24 
Harold Nicolson believed that within the Cabinet, from that time, Curzon kept control 
of foreign policy away from Bonar Law and Baldwin, the Chancellor. 23 O'Riordan 
said that during the first weeks of the occupation, "policy in practice ... 
(was) guided 
21 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 230. 
22 Williamson, British in Germany, p. 223. 
23 Hansard 160, column 5, speech by King George V, 13 February 1923. 
24 Steiner, Lights That failed, p. 226. 25 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 367. 
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by officials on the spot in the Ruhr. "26 She believed that within the Foreign Off ice, 
"it was officials such as Lampson who were doing much of the work, with apparently 
little input from Crowe. ' t27 But then, on 5 February 1923, Curzon returned to London 
and "European policy at last received some of the guidance it had been lacking. ' 928 
Yet, in a footnote, O'Riordan admitted that it was "worth mentioning that Crowe 
went to Lausanne to assist Curzon from 17 January until 5 February. , 29 
The Bonar Law Cabinet continued to pursue the line of `wait and see' at a 
meeting on 14 March 1923. For more than two months, the government had had to 
fend off considerable criticism from all sides in Parliament for a policy that it 
described as `passive acquiescence, ' or `benevolent neutrality, ' while opponents, such 
as Herbert Fisher called it things such as "a settled policy of inertia. ' 30 Fortunately, 
for Curzon, he enjoyed shelter in the Lords, while his Under-Secretary, Ronald 
McNeill, had to deflect the main attacks in the Commons. There was little sympathy 
for Germany during debates on the matter. Sir William Davison pointed out that given 
that one-quarter of the German Reich was "under timber... For Germany to have 
made default, above everything else, in the delivery of timber, is one of the most 
flagrant abuses of which she could have been guilty. s31 
On 14 March 1923, Curzon met Sthamer at the Foreign Office. Sthamer 
criticised the French for treating reparations as both an economic and a political 
question. To Germany, it was just an economic one. It wanted reparations put on a 
sound basis and the German government was interested in Hughes' declaration at 
New Haven, woul agree with the appointment of an international committee of 
26 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 64. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, p. 193. 
30 Hansard, 161, column 1368, speech by Fisher, 13 March 1923. 
31 Ibia column 1384, speech by Davison, 13 March 1923. 
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financial experts and would accept its report and then apply for an international loan. 
Sthamer asked Curzon, confidentially, for his opinion and if the German government 
should take its suggestion to Bonar Law "with a view of being forwarded to the 
s32 interested Powers. . 
Curzon replied that Bonar Law would be prepared to talk with Sthamer 
and himself, but felt sure that it would be a great mistake to communicate its 
proposals to Britain alone. France would instantly reject them. Any German proposals 
should be communicated to all the powers, and, if they wished, the United States. 
Again, Britain refused to advise the German government as to the nature of their 
proposals. Curzon warned Sthamer, though, that it would be very unwise to repeat 
earlier proposals or to make ones that were inadequate. This could only worsen the 
situation. 33 This applied particularly to relations with France. 
The occupation of the Ruhr did not bring France the swift rewards that the 
government had promised and the franc fell. Poincare was in trouble. In April 1923, 
the former Minister of Reconstructioln, M. Louis Louch r, made an `unofficial' visit 
to London. He hoped that it would lead to Anglo-French, negotiations, but when 
Loucheur spoke to Bonar Law and Baldwin on 7 April he revealed a plan to create an 
autonomous region in the Rhineland. Loucheur's visit "revealed the extent of French 
ambitions to... Bonar Law and Baldwin... Ramsay MacDonald objected strongly to 
Loucheur's suggestion for the creation of an autonomous, neutralized Rhenish 
state. )04 0' Riordan believed that the Loucheur mission demonstrated that France 
32 C 4876/1/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, 14 March 1923, DBFP 1, XXI, p. 158. 
33 Ibid, pp. 158-159. 
34 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 225. 
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wanted a settlement of the Ruhr question and that it was becoming harder for Britain 
to maintain a policy of inaction. 35 
On 20 April 1923, Curzon made a speech in the House of Lords in which 
he invited the German government to submit an offer to help settle the dispute. It was 
based on Treasury memoranda of 18 April. 36 Gerald Feldman said that Curzon was 
responding "to his own domestic pressures that Britain do something... s37 
O'Riordan argued that this speech inaugurated a new British policy approach which 
she termed `tentative intervention. '38 Neutral Britain, said Curzon, might be 
"converted into an agent, and a very useful agent... "39 Steiner also felt that Curzon's 
tentative move "marked the beginning of a change in British diplomacy. s40 In fact, 
Crowe had previously urged the French and Belgian ambassadors in London to clarify 
the ultimate aims of their occupation of the Ruhr, a tactic followed by Curzon. 41 
During the early phase of the crisis, the Foreign Office made great efforts to discover 
the aims of the other powers involved in the dispute, as well as the aims of the powers 
on the periphery. It soon became clear that the German Government wanted to enlist 
the support of the British in their opposition to Poincare, the aim being to drive a 
wedge between the allies, especially between Britain and France. Its initial diplomatic 
tactic was to attempt to entice British politicians and diplomats to give advice to 
Germany, breaching her neutrality in the dispute. In the early stages of the crisis, the 
Foreign Office personnel in London and the diplomatic staff in Germany constantly 
35 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 50. 
36 C 7177/313/18, DBFP, 1,21, D'Abernon to Curzon, 22 April 1923, Note 1, p. 222. 
37 Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 662. 
38 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 67. 
39 Ibid, p. 70. 
40 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 227. 
41 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 432-433. Also see minute by Crowe 
on Grahame to Curzon, 12 March 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, pp. 149-150. 
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had to avoid succumbing to this temptation. 42 The response of the diplomats was to 
repeatedly tell Germany's representatives that it was their responsibility to make 
suggestions as to how to end the crisis. There were to be no concessions granted to 
Germany. The spirit of the Crowe memorandum endured. 
Yet, O'Riordan was right to conclude that the Curzon speech "triggered a 
protracted diplomatic exchange which did nothing either to relieve the stalemate on 
the Continent or to ease the domestic political difficulties facing British policy- 
makers. s43 Even D'Abernon was unhappy at the German note of 2 May 1923, 
submitted by the unimaginative Cuno government. It was little more than a repetition 
of the `Cuno Offer' of December 1922. This offered, in return for a moratorium on 
reparations payments, a promise by Germany of peace for fifteen years. 44 The French 
press was incensed. Crewe, the British Ambassador in Paris, sent Curzon a summary 
of their views. They described "this insult to France... French politicians and 
journalists express the hope that Your Lordship will deal severely with the frivolous 
nature of the German offer. s45 
Feldman inferred that the 2 May note was partly the result of the 
discovery by Chancellor Cuno and Foreign Minister von Rosenberg "that the Curzon 
speech involved no change in British policy. "46 He pointed out, rightly, that Cuno's 
critics had realised that the note was bound to offend the British, as in Paris in January 
1923, Bonar Law had presented a plan that set a new total sum, in real terms, of 25 
billion gold marks (one and a quarter billion pounds). The German reparation plan of 
42 C 1572/313/18, Lord Kilmarnock to Curzon, 25 January 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 
77. 
43 O' Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 67. 
44 For a more detailed summary of the `Offer' see Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 
662. See also, Rupieper, Cuno Government and Reparations. 
45 C 7896/1/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, 2 May 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 243. 
46 Feldman, Great Disorder, p. 662. 
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December 1922 offered to pay a total sum, in real terms, of fifteen billion gold Marks. 
(three-quarters of a billion pounds). Cuno and Rosenberg declared that the 2 May note 
was the absolute limit of Germany's capacity. 47 
The unfortunate illness and subsequent resignation of Bonar Law 
hindered the conduct of British foreign policy in the spring of 1923. Curzon was 
acting Prime Minister by the end of April 1923 and when Bonar Law resigned on 20 
May, it seemed certain to many that the position would soon become permanent. 
Curzon was the most experienced member of the Cabinet. Yet, after the involvement 
of the King's Secretary, Lord Stamfordham and Bonar Law's Private Secretary, 
Colonel Waterhouse, it was the Stanley Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
who was appointed. The reasons were apparently Curzon's membership of the House 
of Lords48 and criticism by Bonar Law of his temperament in a crisis. 49 
The late Conservative minister, Alan Clark, believed that the 
disappointment destroyed the Foreign Secretary. "Curzon's despair at being 
overtaken by Baldwin must exceed - excepting possibly the pain and 
incomprehension suffered by Margaret Thatcher when she was deposed in 1990 - the 
misery ever felt by any Conservative politician. "50 Harold Nicolson described him as 
being "shattered, " his wife having to console her sobbing husband and listen to his 
dismissal of the inexperienced and largely unknown Baldwin who was "not even a 
public figure, " in Curzon's opinions' Elspeth O'Riordan though argued that "Curzon 
behaved with great magnanimity. On 23 May he congratulated Baldwin on his 
appointment, and agreed to continue to serve as Foreign Secretary, believing it to be 
a' Ibid. 
48 House of Lords Record Office, Davidson Papers, Introduction. 
49 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 69. 
50 A. Clark, The Tories 1922-1997, London, 1999, p. 29. 
51 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 355. 
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in the public interest. 902 Whatever Curzon's personal feelings, "these dramatic 
events were bound to affect foreign policy. s33 Baldwin was considered an 
inexperienced leader on the national and international stage. 
Close analysis of O'Riordan's work revealed some inconsistency. She said 
that the Foreign Office, having encouraged the Germans to produce two notes, met 
with no success "largely because of the attitude of France. sS4 Earlier, O'Riordan 
wrote that the German note of 2 May 1923 "merely amounted to a revamped version 
of the one they had prepared in December 1922... "SS She said that the German note 
of 7 June 1923 "was a great improvement on the 2 May plan, " 56 but Crowe was 
angry that it "made no reference to the crucial issue of passive resistance. ' v57 He 
predicted, rightly, that Poincare would ask Britain to join France in demanding the 
end of passive resistance as a precondition to the renewal of negotiations on 
reparations. 58 This, of course, opened up the question of the legality of the occupation, 
"thus highlighting what was in effect the crux of the British dilemma. sS9 If Britain 
supported France, it would effectively be declaring that its occupation was legal and 
the German actions an `act of war. ' If Britain did not support France, it would by 
default be seen as supporting Germany, viewing passive resistance as legitimate and 
therefore the occupation to be illegal. O'Riordan's implication here is that Crowe and 
the Foreign Office seemed to be attaching much of the blame to Germany for the 
impasse. 
52 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 69. 
33 Ibid. 
sa Ibid, p. 174. 
ss Ibid, p. 70. 
56 Ibid, p. 71. 
57 Ibid. 
58 C 10185/1/18, Curzon to Crewe (Paris), No. 1955,11 June 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 
333. 
59 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 72. 
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On 30 July, a very agitated Dr Sthamer, the German Ambassador, went to 
see Curzon at the Foreign Office. 60 As a result of acute food shortages in Germany 
there had been riots and deaths in cities such as Leipzig, Dresden and Frankfort-on- 
Main. The value of the mark had collapsed in the most extraordinary fashion. Curzon 
asked what solutions the German government proposed and whether the unrestricted 
production of paper marks would continue? The Ambassador's answer astonished 
him. It intended to issue a gold loan immediately, to introduce new taxes, including 
one on capital, and a new system of levying these taxes. Why were these measures not 
introduced before if they were so necessary, he asked? Sthamer told him that there 
was no alternative to the issue of the paper currency until the new measures had been 
executed 61 
When Sthamer wanted to know what the British could do to help, 
Curzon gave him the standard response. What could Britain do and could the 
Ambassador be specific? Sthamer had learnt little about the British diplomatic mind 
and the policy of `masterly inactivity. ' Would Britain support Germany's application 
for membership of the League of Nations at the imminent meeting of the Assembly, 
he replied, and would Britain support her attempt to refer the reparations question 
either to the League or to an international investigative body? Germany already knew 
of Britain's support for German membership of the League, but, Curzon told him, it 
would be best advised to postpone making public this request about the reparations 
60 C 13161/2719/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, 30 July 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, pp. 444- 
446. 
61 Ibid, pp. 444-445. 
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question lest she receive an embarrassing refusal from the French and the Belgians. 
Sthamer should really not have expected any other answer. 62 
Not even the most sympathetic British ear accepted the German 
perspective in its entirety. D'Abernon gave Curzon a vivid description of the 
economic situation and potential for social chaos inside Germany: 
... unless some rapid solution 
is arrived at, there is grave danger of 
anarchy... Depreciation has gone so far that it is today almost comic. Fares 
indicated on the meter of a taxi-cab have today to be multiplied by 150,000; 
tomorrow the multiplicator will be 200,000; one cannot pay a charwoman 
without a table of logarithms; a theatre ticket costs over 1,000,000 M., and a 
motor-car 10,000,000,000 M. 63 
D'Abernon did not though accept the popular explanation for it. He felt 
that 
There is unquestionably exaggeration in the German thesis that the Ruhr 
occupation is alone responsible for the financial catastrophe. German finance 
was in a perilous condition before 10 January 1923. No serious measures had 
been taken to restore order or stability in them. No government and no 
minister had enunciated any valid scheme of reform. Accusations of 
selfishness and want of patriotism have been brought against some of the 
larger German industrials and some of the financial interests. I am not 
disposed to contravert these accusations; on the contrary, I believe that certain 
leaders of industry and finance have exercised far too much influence and that 
their views have been at once selfish and, what is much worse for the country, 
short-sighted. 64 
D'Abernon was careful in this despatch not to plead for a change to an 
interventionist policy towards Germany. On 11 August though, he informed Curzon 
of the imminent departure of the Cuno Cabinet as it had failed to prevent the 
escalation of food prices and the Communists were threatening a general strike. 63 On 
the same day, Curzon sent a very long note to the French and Belgian ambassadors 
expressing his government's "most sincere disappointment" at their governments' 
62 Ibid, p. 445. 
63 C 13770/313/18, D'Abernon to Curzon, 8 August 1923, ibid, p. 466. 
64 Ibid. 
65 C 13799/203/18, D'Abernon to Curzon, 11 August 1923, ibis, p. 467. 
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identical criticism of Britain. He said that His Majesty's Government was not 
inconsistent in its policies. It had participated in the occupation of the three towns in 
1921 because of Germany's failure to fulfil its treaty obligations, "some of which had 
no connection whatsoever with Reparations. 7s66 
The inconsistency for which the British Foreign Office and Government 
was justly criticised was certainly less apparent in 1923 and their ability to maintain 
the policy created in the early months of the year proved a critical disappointment to 
their German equivalents. Sthamer complained to Crowe that the British now 
appeared to be supporting the French position in the Ruhr. Crowe had to remind him 
that Britain had always demanded that Germany abandon its policy of passive 
resistance. 67 A month later, a bitter Sthamer read two letters that he had received to 
Cadogan, then serving in Whitehall, from Schubert, the head of the English section of 
the Wilhelmstrasse. Cadogan minuted Schubert's belief that "the silence and inaction 
of England was stultifying the policy which he, von Schubert, had consistently 
pursued, that those in Germany who had always maintained that nothing was to be 
expected from us were being proved right, and that in fact it was evident that in 
placing any hope in us he (Sthamer) had "backed the wrong horse". '68 
The disrespect, even contempt, of the Foreign Office mandarins for their 
German counterparts, is evident here. Tyrrell "had known him (Schubert) a great 
many years, and all I could say was that, when I discovered that he was the head of 
the English section of the German Foreign Office, I regretted it exceedingly, as I did 
not think he was at and proper person for such a post... If, therefore, this incident 
66 C 13659/1/18, Curzon to Saint-Aulaire and Moncheur, 11 August 1923, ibia p. 
475. 
67 C 13399/1/18, Curzon to D'Abernon, Note by Crowe, 3 August 1923, ibid, p. 459. 68 C 16199/313/18, Tyrrell to Curzon, note 1, minutes by Cadogan, 12 and 15 
September 1923, ibid p. 525. 
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leads to the eventual elimination of Schubert, I think good will have come of it. "69 
Tyrrell though would be disappointed. Within months Schubert would become 
Secretary of State of the Wilhelmstrasse in succession to Maltzan. On Crowe's death 
in 1925, Tyrrell would become his British counterpart. 
On 13 August 1923 Wilhelm Cuno resigned and was succeeded by 
Dr Gustav Stresemann, who remained as Foreign Secretary. It was well known to the 
Foreign Office that, during the Great War, Stresemann had been a fervent supporter of 
the expansionist aims of German foreign policy. It did not! take Stresemann very long 
to adopt a pro-active approach. In Stuttgart on 2 September, he made a speech in 
which he stated his desire for a settlement of the frontiers adjoining the Rhine. He 
proposed a pact that would include France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, as 
well as Britain and the United States. The pact had similarities with that suggested by 
the. former Chancellor, Cuno, in December 1922, but did not propose either a limit of 
just a generation for its duration or a referendum. On the matter of reparations, 
productive pledges and the Ruhr, the tresemann Govern ent 
was ready to oblige owners of industrial and agricultural property not only of 
one particular region but of the whole Empire to Mortgage their property for 
reparation purposes and the Allies would receive these mortgages as pledges. 
(The) German government was ready also to consider a mortgage on railways 
and the participation of the Allies in German industry... (and) cessation of 
passive resistance if an agreement in principle could be concluded on these 
bases and they thought it would be possible for evacuation of the Ruhr to be 
considered at the same time. 70 
On 11 August 1923 the so-called `Curzon Note' was sent to Poincare. 7' 
69 Record by Sir William Tyrrell of a conversation with the German Ambassador, 15 
September 1923, ibid. 
70 C 15404/1/18, Sir G. Grahame Brussels to Curzon, 5 September 1923, ibis, p. 
505. 
71 C 16359/1/18, Curzon to Saint-Aulaire and to Baron Moncheur, 11 August 1923, 
DBFP, 1, XXI, pp. 467-480. Maisel said that "Crowe and Curzon induced the 
Cabinet to accept a full and strong statement of the British case... " See Maisel, 
Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 126. 
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According to the recollections of Grace, the Marchioness of Curzon, the `Curzon 
Note' was not written by the Foreign Secretary originally at all, but by Crowe. 72 
Judging from Vansittart's remark, one should not, at first, be surprised by this. 73 But it 
was not simple plagiarism. Crowe wrote a first draft, which was given to the Cabinet, 
which approved its statement of the British case, but wished to soften parts of it, in 
respect of French public opinion. Curzon said that he toned down Crowe's most 
acerbic passages, re-phrased badly-expressed parts and omitted sections on French 
and Belgian financial demands as well as references to Lloyd George and the events 
of March 1921. The final paragraph stated that the British government "was reluctant 
to contemplate the possibility of separate action" instead of feel 'compelled. 04 Yet, 
Crowe and Corp believed that "it is not obvious that the minor alterations in phrasing 
introduced by Curzon had the effect of expressing any better than before the phrases 
that they replaced; and there were certainly many `acerbities' left in the draft, for 
Crowe did not mince his words, and hammered home his arguments with relentless 
force. ' s75 
In Germany, the impact of the `Curzon Note' was "magical, ' 1, according 
to D'Abernon. Gustav Stresemann called it the "clearest and strongest" State 
document that he had ever read. 77 He had the note published in every German 
newspaper. Several million copies were printed in parallel columns in German and 
72 Quoted by Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 436-437. 
73 Her late husband was, according to Vansittart, prone to taking the credit for his 
officials work which "he annexed ... as the 
Germans annexed Shakespeare. " Quoted 
by Rose, Superior Person, p. 300. 
Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 437. 
7s Ibid. 
76 Quoted by Nicolson, Curzon, p. 365. 
77 Ibid. 
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English. 78 On 14 August 1923, Stresemann, making his first speech in the Reichstag 
as Chancellor, stated that passive resistance "has its deepest roots in the 
consciousness of the German people of its incontestable rights, which are now clearly 
recognized by the British government. " 79 
Crowe and Corp said that the Germans had now been informed that 
Britain, on the advice of its highest legal experts, agreed that the invasion of the Ruhr 
was not sanctioned by any clause of the Versailles Treaty. Crowe had also said though 
that neither was passive resistance sanctioned by the treaty and it therefore must cease 
immediately. Germany must pay to the limits of its capacity, but there remained no 
estimate of this amount. 80 But, Harold Nicolson said that "the advantage gained by 
the Note of August 11 should have been pursued with unremitting vigour and 
consistency. It was not pursued. " The blame lay with the Foreign Secretary, who 
contracted another bout of phlebitis and during his recovery in Bagnolles preferred to 
write his book on British Government in India. 81 O'Riordan argues that "Crowe's 
subsequent backtracking helps explains why the notes threats were never 
implemented. )M Maisel and O'Riordan both stated that Poincare was unmoved by the 
note83 and Britain was left impotent. 
Nicolson, however, pointed out another factor that derailed the Foreign 
Office. 84 Following the murder of an Italian general on Greek soil on 31 August Italy 
occupied Corfu. 85 The ensuing crisis lasted until 27 September when Mussolini 
78 Ibid, p. 366. 
79 Quoted by Kent, Spoils of War, p. 224. 
8° Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 437. 
81 Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 367-368. 
82 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 244. 
83 Maisel, The Foreign Office 1919-1926, p. 126 and O'Riordan, Britain and the 
Ruhr Crisis, p. 81. 
84 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 368. 
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withdrew his army. The incident undermined the League of Nations, "but most 
important for the British from the perspective of the Ruhr, " according to 
O'Riordan, "was that the events revealed Britain's dependence on French support in 
such international conflicts. ' s86 O'Riordan also saw from another different perspective 
the aftermath of the `Curzon Note'. "The sending of the controversial, 11, August 
note can only be understood in the context of Treasury/Foreign Office relations and 
the temporary ascendancy of the Treasury view within the Foreign Office. "87 What 
happened in her opinion was that "from late September 1923 the Treasury and 
Foreign Office worked together and the driving force behind the Treasury approach 
was ... 
Sir John Bradbury. s88 
Yet, Crowe's firm stance against passive resistance had already borne 
fruit as on 26 September 1923, Stresemann declared an end to the action. Kent 
believed that, for the first few weeks of his office, the Chancellor was sensitive to 
Nationalist criticism, but he gave in to Hilferding, the Finance Minister, who wanted 
to end the struggle to prevent the collapse of the mark and a descent into financial and 
political anarchy. 89 Another reason was the failure of the German government "to 
obtain any tangible British support. "90 On the previous day, German isolation was 
emphasised when Baldwin and Poincare claimed unity of purpose and principle 
between Britain and France and a renewal of the Entente. In the middle of the Corfu 
85 Greece, with British help, appealed to the League of Nations, but France blocked 
the appeal, fearing that the League would then have had a precedent for it to negotiate 
a settlement of the Ruhr crisis. Instead, the Conference of Ambassadors was given the 
task of investigating the matter. Having avoided the involvement of the League, 
France then supported Britain. Greece was given a large fine and Mussolini claimed a 
great propaganda victory. See O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 96. 86 Ibid. 
87 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 244. 
88 Ibid. But, O'Riordan also believed that "Crowe ... played a 
key role in the 
Autumn of 1923. " Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 177. 
R9 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 224. 
90 Ibid. 
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crisis, Baldwin had gone to Aix-les-Bains. Saint-Aulaire arranged that, on his return 
journey, the British and French Prime Ministers would have a private meeting in 
Paris. 91 The end of German passive resistance in the Ruhr can be understood not only 
as a response to the growing hyperinflation, but also the repetition by the British 
government of classic Crowe principles of firmness towards Germany and a close 
bond with France. 
The main criticism from within the Foreign Office came from an enraged 
Curzon. At the end of the meeting on 19 September 1923, a communique was issued 
that said that the two Prime Ministers "had been happy to establish an agreement of 
views and to discover that on no question is there any difference of purpose or 
divergence of principle which could impair the co-operation of the two countries, 
upon which so much depend the settlement and the peace of the world. ' *92 Curzon 
was "aghasts93 that his Prime Minister had apparently repudiated the policy of strict 
neutrality between France and Germany that he had enforced since his return in 
February from Lausanne. Much of his fury in London was vent on Saint-Aulaire, the 
French Ambassador. During his previous few months in office, Curzon became 
obsessed with the belief that the French were plotting against him. Christopher 
Andrew showed that they were doing so. In October 1923, Curzon discovered, from 
French intercepts, an "intrigue between Poincare, Comte de Saint-Aulaire and H. A. 
Gwynne (the editor of `The Morning Post') to supplant me at the Foreign Office. "94 
91 According to Ni olson in Curzon, p. 372, this meeting took place on 20 September 
1923, but O'Riordan in Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 97, stated that it occurred on 
the afternoon of 19 September. For a full account of the meeting see C 17871/1/18, 
notes on Conversation of September 19,1923 between Mr Baldwin and M. Poincare, , DBFP, 1, X30, pp. 529-535. 
92 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 87. 
93 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 372. 
94 C. Andrew, Secret Service, p. 297. 
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The telegrams that were intercepted between Poincare and Saint-Aulaire revealed that 
the French hoped that Gwynne could persuade Baldwin to replace Curzon with a 
more Francophile Foreign Secretary. " Henceforth, Curzon made any excuse to avoid 
speaking to Saint-Aulaire again. He also refused to speak to Tyrrell, the author of the 
communique, and, according to Curzon's widow, blocked Crowe's wish for Tyrrell to 
succeed D'Abernon in Berlin. 96 
These events beg questions about the control of British foreign policy 
towards Germany in the autumn of 1923. Two factors are! dif iicult to deny. Curzon's 
influence was diminishing, while Crowe's firm line was still pursued by the 
government and within the corridors of the Foreign Office. O'Riordan insisted that 
after the collapse of the German economy on 26 September 1923 British policy 
became much more consistent, contrasting positively with the earlier phase. 97 
Stresemann's decision to end passive resistance in the Ruhr led to an 
extraordinary sequence of events in Germany, which the-Foreign Office in London 
and their representatives `on the spot) watched with mix d emotions. The decision led 
to a crisis in Bavaria where right-wing nationalists saw it as surrender to France. The 
Bavarian Prime Minister appointed von Kahr, a right-wing nationalist, as dictator of 
Bavaria, claiming that he acted in order to suppress both the revolutionary left and the 
extreme right, particularly Hitler. 98 But when Hitler's meetings continued and his 
newspaper still appeared, John Thelwall, Commercial Secretary to the Berlin 
93 Curzon said that it was "the worst thing that I have ever come across in my public 
life ... I 
had not realised that diplomacy was such a dirty game. " Baldwin also 
admitted that he "unaware that such dirty things were done in diplomacy. " Ibid. 
96 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 87. 
97 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', pp. 236-237. 
98 The Foreign Office in London had been kept well-informed of the growing 
popularity of the N. S. D. A. P. or `Nazi Party' in Bavaria by officials such as R. H. 
Clive, the Consul-General of Bavaria, who was based in Munich. 
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Embassy, thought that perhaps Bavaria planned to break away from the German 
federation. 99 
In response to the appointment of von Kahr in Bavaria, Stresemann 
appointed the Minister of War, Geisler, as dictator of the whole Reich, causing a crisis 
between the Bavarian and Berlin governments in which a key factor was the control 
of the army of the German nation, the Reichswehr. The appointment of Geisler was 
also opposed though by the remnants of Stresemann's more liberal coalition 
supporters and he failed to gain victory in the Reichstag for an Enabling Act that 
would have increased his emergency powers. On 4 October 1923, Stresemann 
resigned as Chancellor, but six days later he formed a new government of similar 
character and therefore equally prone to collapse. 
The threat to the German government from the revolutionary Left 
increased on 9 October when the Communists in Saxony made a deal with the 
Socialist government in which the K. P. D. gained some Cabinet posts in return for 
their support. Thuringia then seemed likely to follow suit. D'Abernon reported that 
the government in Berlin sent much greater numbers of troops to Saxony than to 
Bavaria, persuading O'Riordan to believe that the Stresemann government reacted 
more cautiously to the Bavarian Right than to threats from the Left. In November, in 
protest against Stresemann's turn to the Right, the Social Democrats withdrew their 
participation in his coalition, forcing his resignation. President Ebert, their former 
leader, attacked his erstwhile colleagues. He would be proven correct. In German 
politics they were to have a peripheral role for many years to come. 
99 FO 371/8745, C 17887/313/18, Thelwall to Wigram, 12 October 1923 cited in 
O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 198, note 5. 
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Meanwhile, in October 1923, the German economy collapsed into 
hyperinflation. Belatedly, on 21 October, the Reichstag granted Stresemann the 
powers necessary to introduce a new mortgage currency. However, the effects of 
these measures took time to work and therefore the hyperinflation continued. Edward 
Thurstan, Consul-General in Cologne, warned of the danger to Europe of the paralysis 
of German industry. '00 In Berlin though, the government was also in danger of 
paralysis. The anger of the Left to the greater severity towards the Communists than 
towards the Bavarian Right led to the departure of the Socialists from Stresemann's 
coalition. When he decided to fill his Cabinet with members of other political parties, 
the Nationalists were furious. Not only was Stresemann besieged politically from both 
the Right and the Left and was struggling to overcome the devastating economic 
difficulties, but he also faced opposition from the workers in the Ruhr to the possible 
threat to their unemployment payments. 
There then occurred the bizarre, yet highly significant event known as 
`The Munich Putsch. ' In November 1923, Hitler attempted to overthrow the 
government in Bavaria in a violent coup. It failed and some Nazis were killed. Hitler 
himself was arrested and charged with treason. After a somewhat farcical trial, he was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. The notorious events in Munich on 8 and 9 
November 1923 were witnessed by R. H. Clive, H. M. Consul-General for Bavaria and 
his despatch is an invaluable document for historians. 101 The putsch is often linked 
with the collapse of the German economy in 1923, a direct result of the swingeing 
allied reparations demands and the occupation of the Ruhr. Clive though does not 
100 "The measure of impending disaster is so stupendous that it would be idle for me 
to mince my words or to attempt to gloss over facts. " O'Riordan, Britain and the 
Ruhr Crisis, p. 103. 
101 C 19811/16779/18, Clive to Curzon, 11 November 1923, ibid, pp. 885-889. 
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mention reparations at all or the occupation of the Ruhr. It is described as an almost 
entirely internal Bavarian matter, a personal struggle between Hitler and the almost 
equally right-wing (and monarchist) regional dictator, von Kahr. Clive did identify 
how Hitler had already gained the sympathy of women and young men in particular 
but he was, "obsessed with `La folie de la grandeur' ... 
is an atheist, anti all religion 
(which means a lot in this country) and not even a Bavarian. s102 Hitler did demand an 
end to what he called the criminal November Government of President Ebert, but the 
timing of the putsch, five years to the day after the abdication of the Kaiser, and 
Clive's description, give the impression that it was an attempt to reverse history, 
rather than primarily a revolt against the Stresemann Government in Berlin and its 
abandonment of passive resistance. However, on 9 November 1923, the day of the 
putsch, Crowe minuted that "the threatened disruption of Germany is the direct result 
of French policy" 103 and it was difficult "not to believe that it represents an object for 
which they have systematically worked. " °4 He also wrote that the revolutionary 
movement in Germany was "the direct outcome of, or at least is closely connected 
with, the Separatist movement on the Rhine... "los that Poincare's government had 
encouraged. 
President Ebert reacted to the `putsch' by giving greater powers to the 
head of the Reichswehr, von Seeckt. More troops were sent to Berlin and von Seeckt 
banned the Nazi, Communist and Deutschevölkische parties. Stresemann's 
government then lost even more support from the Left and when he lost a vote of 
confidence in the Reichstag, he was forced to resign. However, the new German 
102 C 19473/16779/18, Clive to Curzon and Clive to Lampson, 14 November 1923, 
ibid, p. 889, note 2. 
103 Carsten, Britain and Weimar, p. 118. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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Cabinet, led by Dr Wilhelm Marx, was very similar to the previous one. Stresemann 
even remained as Foreign Secretary, a position that he held until his premature death 
in October 1929. On 8 December 1923, the Reichstag granted the necessary 
emergency powers to the new government, thus ending the political crisis that had 
lasted since the end of passive resistance. O'Riordan believed that "the irresponsible 
tendencies of the Weimar political parties' 006 were largely to blame for the 
prolonging of the political crisis in the autumn of 1923. 
Prior to the invasion, the official view of the Cuno government was that in 
view of "rejection of English proposal at Paris, German government refrained from 
submitting their proposals as there was no prospect of their being considered. s 107 
German leaders had therefore placed themselves in a stalemate situation, preferring to 
pose rather than prevent a most serious international dispute. The simplest domestic 
political aim to accomplish was to secure the support of the German people for the 
opposition to the Franco-Belgian occupation. Capitulation could not be considered. 
The policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr was accepted by leading industrialists and 
workers, in particular the coal miners. The longer the occupation lasted though, the 
greater would be the strain on the struggling German economy. It appeared to be 
imperative to end the dispute quickly, unless there really was a deliberate plan to 
allow the German economy to implode. 
Analyses of the wider political-economic aims of the German 
government have had to be revised following the opening up of the Reich Chancellery 
archives. These have revealed that "in 1922 and 1923 German leaders deliberately 
chose to postpone tax reform and currency-stabilization measures in the hope of 
106 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 104. 
107 C 277/1/18, D'Abernon to Curzon, 5 January 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 7. 
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obtaining substantial reductions in reparations. s108 Yet, in 1923, many observers, 
including some from within the walls of the Foreign Office, but particularly some 
from inside the Treasury, felt that the reparation demands on Germany were simply 
too great and that she did not have the capacity to pay. The question of her 
willingness to pay was irrelevant. The German Government may have believed that, 
since the publication of Keynes's book, there were many in Britain and the U. S. A. 
who sympathised with their case. 109 Yet, the British Ambassador in Berlin was not 
even one of them in the autumn of 1923. "I remain of they simple view... the point 
being not to endeavour today to estimate Germany's capýcity to pay, but to get 
German finance on to a relatively sound basis. Any report of Germany's financial 
position today is a mere guess in the dark. " 10 
The British attitude in 1923 was "extremely interesting, ""' wrote 
O'Riordan laconically. " The documentary evidence reveals the British to have been 
singularly unsympathetic towards the German collapse. "112 Throughout the 
catastrophe, the Treasury opposed ay aid to Germany. The Foreign Office, though, 
was never as hard-line as the Treasury and "was always; alert to the dangers involved 
in a total German collapse. s113 The Treasury wanted to let things get worse, partly to 
demonstrate that the Ruhr crisis was the result of both French and German stupidity 
'° Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 110. Stresemann though denied that the 
German government deliberately collapsed the mark. The Times, 25 August 1923, p. 
8. 
109 This included many in the Labour Party. See Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 
342. 
110 D'Abernon diary entry, 29 October 1923, Ambassador of Peace, 2, p. 268. 
111 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 104. 
112 Ibid. 
113 O'Riordan, British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 238. 
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and partly to enable Britain to be in a position to get its own way on the settlement of 
the reparations question. 14 Throughout the collapse of the German economy, the 
Treasury favoured no aid being given to Germany, 115 believing, improbably, that the 
route to the pockets of the German rich was via the starving bellies of the German 
poor. The Foreign Office partly agreed with this policy, but was against Germany's 
disintegration and the effective French colonization of the Rhine-Ruhr area, for 
reasons that again can be found in the spirit of the Crowe Memorandum. If, as 
O'Riordan believed, "the Treasury was driven purely by financial considerations, " 116 
the Foreign Office always remembered the primacy of British interests and the need 
to prevent a continental power becoming dominant. 
In 1923 the U. S. A. was not disinterested in European affairs. Although in 
isolation from direct participation since the infamous vote in Congress in 1920, many 
American citizens and political leaders were keen observers of the unfolding events in 
Germany. There were still American troops in the Rhineland and there was the matter 
of enormous war debts to financial houses in the U. S. A.. For most people any 
involvement in European affairs aroused anger that so many young American lives 
had been lost in 1917 and 1918 defending old empires, particularly the British, 
although there was, as elsewhere, still the residue of wartime hostility towards the 
Germans. In the early months of 1923, Geddes in Washington reported that public 
opinion was increasingly pro-France and anti-Britain. President Harding and 
Secretary of State Hughes were personally sympathetic to His Majesty's Government, 
but these views met with opposition. It would have been even greater if the British 
1 14 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 104. 
115 O'Riordan, `British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis', p. 238. 116 Ibid. 
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press or Parliament had favoured any early American involvement that would 
undermine French policy in the Ruhr. "7 
Hughes appeared "to hope that a situation ultimately will arise in which it 
will be possible for United States government to undertake some form of mediation 
leading to an expert examination of Germany's capacity to pay which powers 
concerned might or might not have agreed in advance to accept ... 
"the mediation 
preferably being done by the United States alone, "however, he has not committed 
himself even in his own mind to any definite plan. s118 The U. S. A., like the Foreign 
Office, preferred to wait and see. 
Having received a blunt rejection of the `Balfour Note' in August 1922, 
the Foreign Office must have been both amused and surprised when in the summer of 
1923 Poincare asked the American Government to write off some of France's 
considerable wartime debts. President Calvin Coolidge's oft-quoted response was 
characteristically brief- "They hired the money, didn't they ? s119 Yet, in February 
1923, Ambassador Geddes had told Curzon that " (American) public opinion is 
tending more and more to support France in her dealing with Germany. s120 Certainly, 
this had something to do with an emotional sympathy for France and Belgium, both of 
whom had suffered so much in the war, but American investors and newspapers were 
aware that the U. S. A. would not receive its debt repayments unless France and Britain 
received reparations from Germany. 
117 C 2461/313/18, Geddes to Curzon, 8 February 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 94 and C 
3633/313/18, Geddes to Curzon, 26 February 1923, ibis, p. 126. 
118 C 3633/313/18, Geddes to Curzon, 26 February 1923, ibis, p. 127. 
119 P. Neville, France, 1914-1969, p. 32. 
120 C2461/313/18, Geddes to Curzon, 8 February 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 94. 
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In 1923 British diplomats were in a dilemma regarding the United 
States. They often resented American interference, but as the extraordinary events of 
1923 unfolded, the participation of the Coolidge administration in future discussions 
on German reparations and her capacity to pay became essential. There was also the 
sensitive matter of inter-allied war debts. For the United States Government the 
timing of any commitment to Europe was important. American public opinion had to 
be considered and there was still a legacy of ill-feeling, particularly towards Britain. 
At the start of the year, the French position was favoured and the diplomats in 
Washington had to tread warily until their moment came. 
It was as late as October that Britain decided that the moment had come. 
In December 1922, The U. S. Secretary of State, Mr Hughes, declared that his 
government was willing to give assistance to Germany. 121 For the Europeans' 
inability to provide a unified response, Britain entirely blamed France. 122 On October 
9 1923, President Coolidge repeated the offer. 123` Curzon and the Foreign Office 
responded positively and quickly. 124 On 13 October, Hughes told Chilton that, 
although he could not give a definite reply before speaking to the President and 
Cabinet, "you know what my own views are on the subject" and that "he had 
'Z' DBFP, 1, XX, p. 157. 
122 C 17662/1/18, Curzon to Mr Chilton in Washington, Part 2,12 October 1923, 
DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 563. On the abandonment of passive resistance, France resumed 
ýament in kind of reparations, Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 439. 
23Y The Times, 11 October 1923, p. 12. 
124 C 17662/1/18, Curzon to Chilton, 12 October 1923, DBFP, 1, )OU, p. 563. 
Crowe's role in the days prior to the Curzon response was discussed by Crowe and 
Corp. They wrote that on 1 October 1923, Baldwin "asked Crowe to come and see 
him in order to advise him as to what possible action we could take about the Ruhr. " 
Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 439. Crowe thought that a speech should 
be made calling for Poincare to publicly state his future intentions. He refused. The 
"one thing left to do ... was to appeal to the United States, " ibid, p. 440. Coolidge had already made his offer on 9 October. 
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warned French Ambassador some time ago that France should renounce her obstinate 
attitude and come into line with the other Powers. " 125 
On 30 October 1923, having acquired the consent of the French, Italian 
and Belgian governments, Curzon formally invited the American government to 
participate in committees to be set up by the Reparation Commission to investigate 
Germany's capacity to pay and to make recommendations "as to an appropriate 
financial plan for securing such payment. s126 By December 26 1923, the Reparation 
Commission had appointed the members of the two committees. 127 The First 
Committee, under General Charles Dawes, met on 14 January 1924 and the second 
met one week later. It was a successful conclusion for Curzon, Crowe and the Foreign 
Office. But it was one year too late. 
As we have seen, when the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr took place 
in January 1923, Crowe and the Foreign Office faced many great difficulties. Firstly, 
it had to deal with a situation that senior officials believed would have been avoided if 
Crowe's proposal for an Anglo-French alliance had been accepted in December. 
Secondly, there had been a political vacuum since the resignation in October 1922 of 
the Lloyd George government. Curzon had shown great reluctance to become 
involved in European affairs and especially the reparations question. His priority was 
Turkey and the Lausanne Conference. Bonar Law was inexperienced as a diplomat, 
but his illness was probably not a factor at that time. Thirdly, the British faced an 
intransigent French government (which had Belgian support) and an unrealistic 
German one. The United States was observing European events from afar. The 
Foreign Office and the British government could not support the invasion or the 
123 C 17706/1/18, Chilton to Curzon, 13 October 1923, DBFP, 1, XXI, p. 565. 
126 C 18741/1/18, Curzon to Crewe, 30 October 1923, ibi4 p. 610. 
127 Reparation Commission to the British Delegation, Reparation Commission, 26 
December 1923, ibis, pp. 734-736. 
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recipients of it. In the circumstances, neutrality was the only option. But, Britain was 
unable to execute an active policy in January 1923. Yet, O'Riordan's line that British 
inactivity in the early months of 1923 was indicative of an indecisive government 
strategy, whilst a 'laissez-faire' attitude to the collapse of the German economy was 
one of the elements of a more dynamic British policy seems hard to comprehend. 
In the final analysis, it must be emphasised that the crisis presented the 
Foreign Office with opportunities it had been denied for over a decade. To begin with, 
the `Garden Suburb' no longer conducted foreign policy towards Germany from 10 
Downing Street. The Foreign Secretary, Curzon, was not only less knowledgeable 
about European affairs than the Near East, but was an indecisive minister128 who had 
relied heavily greatly on Crowe in Lausanne. Furthermore, the Foreign Office was 
composed of many senior officials, for example, Tyrrell, Lampson, Sargent and 
Wellesley, who shared Crowe's views on Germany. In 1923, even the British 
Ambassador in Berlin, the former banker D'Abernon, normally sympathetic to 
Germany, became frustrated at its government's failure to take remedial action during 
the economic crisis. 
The events of 1923 showed that the principles of the Crowe Memorandum 
were not a dogma, but were capable of flexibility. In January 1923, Crowe did not 
crudely support France against Germany. In fact, he and the Foreign Office were 
frequently highly critical of France, Poincare and the Quai d'Orsay. But they did not 
want to rupture the Entente. Only briefly, at the end of October, when Poincare was 
causing problems following the American offer of participation, did they seriously 
consider an Anglo-French breach. 129 
128 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 32. 
129 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 439. 
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At no stage during1923, no matter how poor relations were with the 
French, nor how bad conditions were inside Germany, could the Foreign Office and 
the government be accused of moving towards sympathy, let alone support for 
Germany. The German government, often through the medium of its ambassador in 
London, tried repeatedly to get the British government to depart from its neutral 
position. Any British support for the campaign of passive resistance in the Ruhr 
would have been a victory for Germany, but it never happened. Lampson, the head of 
the Central Department, a Crowe appointment, countered every ploy by Dr Sthamer 
with such ease that the ambassador's own government eventually recognised that his 
gamble on Britain had failed. Sthamer's political masters at this time failed his 
country even more. When given the opportunity to put political pressure on the allies 
in the spring of 1923, Chancellor Cuno and Foreign Minister Rosenberg displayed a 
lack of vision and courage, merely repeating much of the earlier German offer. 
Poincare was given an `open goal. ' The British government was let down. 
Yet, Crowe and the Foreign Office wanted the crisis resolved. In private, 
the ministry expressed doubts about the legality of the invasion. Britain became 
increasingly concerned that France's real aim was to create an independent state in the 
Rhineland. Officials `on the spot' though had the awkward task of opposing German 
passive resistance, not appearing to oppose the French army and engineers in the Ruhr 
and yet opposing France's greater ambitions. British policy in the Ruhr was 
complicated further by the internal political events following the resignation of Bonar 
Law due to ill-health. If Curzon was shattered by his failure to become Prime Minister 
in May 1923, then it is likely that Crowe and his tendency became even more potent 
within the Foreign Office, particularly as the German economy deteriorated. When 
Curzon did express his policy preference in the summer of 1923, his words could 
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have been those of Crowe himself. He said that he was unhappy with France's policy 
of trying to grind Germany down because it was "far from being favourable to the 
recovery of the world. " There could be no European peace without an Entente, he 
believed. 130 The `Curzon Note' of 11 August actually was the work of Crowe and 
although the French were unimpressed, it was a significant moment in the crisis. It 
was welcomed by the new more dynamic German Chancellor, Stresemann, although 
it can be argued that it was not a direct cause of the end of passive resistance on 26 
September. 
The Foreign Office maintained its unsympathetic stance towards Germany 
during the next few chaotic weeks, a period of mounting economic and political 
upheaval. Even after receiving reports of food shortages, both the Foreign Office and 
the Treasury rejected intervention. The officials `on the spot' gave accurate and 
penetrating analyses of the events during and after the `Munich Beer-Hall Putsch, ' 
including descriptions of Hitler himself. During this period, not just in 1923, the 
Foreign Office diplomats, both in London and in Germany, consistently warned of the 
greater danger to the Weimar Republic of the German Right rather than that of the 
Left. There was no hint of `appeasement' during the Ruhr crisis as British foreign 
policy in 1923 opposed making any concessions to the Germans, following faithfully 
the line that Eyre Crowe had advocated in 1907. This occurred not least because 
Crowe himself played such an important role in policy formulation and execution. 
The strategy in the long-term though was to help Germany recover, for the sake of 
Britain's interests. "By refusing to join in the occupation of the Ruhr, the British 
130 Sharp and Jeffrey, `Apres la Guerre finit, Soldat anglais partit... ': in Goldstein and 
McKercher (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965, London, 2003, p. 125. 
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government demonstrated its belief that the economic restoration of Germany was the 
key to a general economic revival. ""' 
131 Williamson, British in Germany, p. 219. 
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Chapter 5 
1924, Ramsay MacDonald, the Foreign Office and the Dawes Plan 
On 22 January 1924, James Ramsay MacDonald, the son of a Scottish crofter, became 
the leader of the first-ever Labour government in Britain. He decided to serve in the 
dual role of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Labour held office with the 
support of the Liberals for nine months. This chapter will provide evidence that, 
despite initial mistrust on both sides, the working and personal relationship between 
Crowe and MacDonald was very positive and particularly so on German matters. It 
will demonstrate that Crowe's influence still pervaded the Foreign Office and this 
included the Prime Minister. 
The chapter begins with the establishment and Crowe's attitude to the 
Labour government and to MacDonald, in his dual role, as well as the latter's history 
of scepticism towards the Foreign Office. Then MacDonald's decision to assume the 
dual role of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary will be analysed. The chapter will 
then discuss the attitudes to Germany of Crowe and MacDonald in 1924, and will 
argue that they actually shared many views and formulated a common strategy, 
namely a united acceptance of the experts report. It will then analyse events prior to, 
and following, the publication of the Dawes Report in the spring of 1924. The next 
section will concentrate on the London Conference of 1924 that resulted in the 
general acceptance of the Dawes Plan and will show that, despite Crowe's frustration 
at the conference (similar in some ways to Versailles), again his influence was still 
prevalent. There will be a brief account of Crowe's part in the fall of the Labour 
government following the controversy of the Zinoviev Letter which will suggest that 
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he may have made an error, but was not to blame for it. The final section, the link to 
the next chapter, will explain Crowe's opposition to the Geneva Protocol and will 
show that it was in line with that of the 1907 Memorandum. 
The rapid rise to power of the Labour Party caused some concern, but 
more sceptical interest among the British Establishment. King George V wrote in his 
diary: "Today 23 years ago, dear Grandmama died. I wonder what she would have 
made of a Labour government? s1 Stanley Baldwin was confident that having 
allowed his opponents to suffer a brief, humiliatingly unsuccessful period in office, 
they would be consigned to political oblivion, after which `the natural party of 
government, ' the Conservatives, would return to the gratitude of the electorate and, 
probably, most Foreign Office mandarins. Indeed, there was a great deal of mutual 
suspicion between the Foreign Office and the parliamentary Labour Party. During the 
war, many in the latter had been pacifists or opponents of the war on either moral or 
political grounds, including the new Prime Minister. In 1918, MacDonald had lost his 
seat in Parliament as a result of his own opposition to the war. 2 
MacDonald was aware that in selecting suitable people to assume 
ministerial responsibility the Labour Party did not possess great talent in depth. Only 
his former rival, Arthur Henderson, had previous Cabinet experience, having been a 
member of Lloyd George's wartime administration. He chose to send a disciple of 
Gladstonian fiscal policy, Philip Snowden, to the Treasury to reassure the City that a 
Bolshevik revolution had not occurred, and on 23 January 1924 he took on the dual 
role of Prime Minis er and Foreign Secretary. He appointed, not without significance, 
Arthur Ponsonby, to be his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. Explaining why 
` D. Murphy (ed. ), Britain 1914-2000, London, 2000, p. 88. 
2 Pearce, Britain: Domestic Politics, p. 46. 
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he united the two offices, MacDonald said that he was very concerned that "the 
position of this country in Europe had become so unsatisfactory that I believed it 
would be a great advantage if, whoever was Prime Minister was also Foreign 
Secretary, in order to add the weight of office to any sort of policy that one might 
devise 
... I will 
do my best to carry on both, on the clear understanding that as soon as 
I feel that I can relieve myself of the one I shall do S0.90 . 
Taylor suggested that the Secretary of the Union of Democratic Control, 
E. D. Morel, was a central factor in this decision. The U. DIIC. was a group within the 
Labour Party that had opposed the war and demanded a radically different conduct of 
foreign policy, and was, therefore, highly critical and suspicious of the Foreign Office 
and the methods of `Old Diplomacy. ' On taking office, Ponsonby (and Attlee) 
resigned from the UDC. "Morel had expected to become foreign secretary. 
MacDonald told him that J. H. Thomas must have the office and had refused to take 
him as under-secretary; then MacDonald became foreign secretary himself. Morel 
was soon convinced that MacDonald i was the prisoner o his permanent officials, like 
Grey before him. s4 
O'Riordan believed that MacDonald chose to become his own Foreign 
Secretary because of his party-political objectives: "His primary objective was to 
prove that Labour was fit to govern. "5 Both nationally and internationally, Labour 
ministers had to be adjudged responsible and respectable. 6 There was no better 
vehicle than foreign affairs. Given the range of issues being fired at MacDonald from 
all directions, this decision could have proven a misjudgement. In May 1924, Sir 
3 Hansard, 169, column 767, HC Debates, speech by MacDonald, 12 February 1924. 
4 Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 168. 
S O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 145. 
6 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 312. 
180 
Kingsley Wood criticised him for never being in the House, a statement that he 
defended so vigorously that Wood was forced to apologise, claiming that he really 
meant that MacDonald's workload and responsibility were too much for one man. 7 
The mandarins of the Foreign Office had good cause to be suspicious of 
their new master. In the previous decade his comments about their work had been 
particularly negative. At the Labour Party Conference in 1916 he described himself as 
4 an opponent of secret diplomacy, not a friend of Germany. i8 In May 1919, 
criticising the appointment of Sir Eric Drummond as secretary-general of the League, 
he wrote in `Forward' that Drummond had been "brought up in the ways of the 
Foreign Office, trained in the methods of discredited diplomacy, with no Democratic 
vision and no conception of what World Democracy means... s9 In 1923 he wrote of 
the Labour Party's foreign policy aims as including the desire to "disestablish the old 
methods of diplomacy which on principle withheld information from the masses of 
the people. s 10 
If there was initial suspicion of the new minister within Foreign Office 
ranks in January 1924 much of it was soon dispelled by MacDonald's ability, but 
particularly his enormous charm, a characteristic clearly in sharp contrast to his 
predecessor: "The Foreign Office people appear delighted with their new Chief. He 
does not hustle them nearly so much as the Marquess; treats them with great courtesy, 
and is much inclined to fall in with their views. This impression may or may not be 
permanent, but for the moment they are gratified. "" Indeed, MacDonald soon 
protested against "what appears... to be the determination of France to ruin Germany 
UKNA, PREM 1, PRO/30/2,30 May 1924. 
Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 151. 
9 Ibid, p. 158. 
'o Ibid, p. 172. 
11 D'Abernon diary entry, 20 February 1924, Ambassador of Peace, 1, p. 55. 
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and to dominate the Continent without consideration for our reasonable interests and 
future consequences to European settlement. " 12 Crowe must have concurred with this 
opinion. The new government and Prime Minister also soon received praise from an 
unexpected quarter. "Within weeks even the normally unemotive President Coolidge 
expressed the ardent hope that the `reasonable hope of a Labour regime in Britain may 
point the way to a gradual adjustment of all the difficult European problems, both 
international and social. " 13 In order to accomplish this task, MacDonald knew that he 
had to improve what he called "the weather" 14 - relations with the other major 
powers, namely France, Germany and the United States. This matched the aims of 
Crowe and other Foreign Office mandarins. The great stumbling-block between the 
Foreign Office and the Labour government were their respective attitudes to 
Bolshevik Russia, 15 not Germany. 
If MacDonald appointed himself to the Foreign Office for reasons of 
maintaining unity within the Labour Party, there remains much evidence that the 
Treasury wished to remain a major influence on reparations policy. Within days of the 
new Chancellor of the Exchequer assuming office, Bradbury had sent Snowden a note 
highly critical of France's interpretation of Paragraph 18 of Annex II of Part VIII of 
the Treaty of Versailles, but also stating that the "essential conditions of peace in 
continental Europe are that the existing territories of France and Germany should be 
sacrosanct as against military invasion the one by the other, and that the other 
European nations should guarantee this condition subject only to an exception in the 
12 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 251. 
13 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. 198. 
14 O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 146. 
15 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, pp. 456-458. 
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event of Germany failing to discharge a tolerable reparation obligation. " 16 Bradbury 
also informed Snowden that, in its present constitution, the Reparation Commission 
was not an impartial body, Britain's voice being in a permanent minority, yet also not, 
apparently, having enough teeth. "The question of the proper interpretation of 
Paragraph 18 of Annex II of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles is prima facie one 
which can only be properly solved by a unanimous decision of the Reparation 
Commission. " 17 But, as Bradbury himself said, the Reparation Commission could 
not, on its own initiative, raise the question of the interpretation or pronounce on the 
legality or illegality of the Franco-Belgian action. Bradbury was actually revisiting the 
subject that had so angered the Foreign Office in December 1922. The question of the 
interpretation of this paragraph "was a question of vital importance for the peace of 
Europe, which could only be decided by a unanimous decision of the Commission. s1s 
In fact, Bradbury believed that the new Labour Government should not just acquiesce 
in the actions of the French and Belgian Governments, but should actually demand the 
suspension of the application of the offending paragraph. He may have understood the 
importance of allied unity, but seemed to believe that post-war treaties could be 
dodged or evaded. 
It would be a notable success of the MacDonald premiership that he did 
alter the ministerial rank order. Original documents often show that throughout the 
Labour administration of 1924 the Foreign Office received information before the 
Treasury, particularly during the month of April when the Dawes Report was 
published and complaints about Bradbury and the Reparation Commission decreased. 
16 UKNA, PRO 30/69/112,26 January 1924, p. 2. 
17 Ibid, p. 5. 
18 Minute No. 343,26 December 1922 reproduced in UKNA, PRO 30/69/112,26 
January 1924, p. 9. 
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One of MacDonald's most vociferous critics, though, was John Connell. 
He wrote that, in 1924, the Foreign Office maintained efficiency and continuity "by 
reason of MacDonald's ignorance, apathy and vanity, and because Sir Eyre Crowe ... 
had gathered under his leadership in the Service a number of men of outstanding 
calibre, who contrived - almost regardless of their titular head - to execute a policy 
which they believed to be right. s19 Therefore, Connell concluded that "... Ramsay 
MacDonald contrived to obtain a reputation for statesmanship in this field 
(international affairs) to which his claim was shadowy in the extreme. ' v20 
Yet, Maisel identified the great administrative change that took place 
within the Foreign Office in the winter of 1924. Quoting MacDonald's own diary, he 
explained that the Prime Minister, because of overload, did not participate in the early 
stages, allowed officials to formulate policy and instead "put a premium on rapid 
decision-making once a matter had been brought to his attention. ' 21 D'Abernon 
agreed with this judgement. 22 "MacDonald ran Cabinet meetings and international 
conferences with extreme competence. ' s23 Therefore, when historians analyse 
MacDonald's foreign policy, particularly towards Germany, they need to be aware 
that its creation was largely the work of Crowe and his colleagues. In 1924, the views 
of the two men on Germany coincided. 
19 Connell, The ' ice', p. 61. 
20 Ibid. Connell als noted that Curzon criticised MacDonald's methods and the 
increase in Crowe's power, ibid, p. 62. 
21 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 133. 
22 D'Abernon told Curzon that MacDonald "had a marked rapidity of judgement in 
foreign affairs. " Diary, London, 7 October 1924, in D'Abernon, An Ambassador of 
Peace, 3, p. 102. Stresemann was impressed with MacDonald's conduct of the 
London Conference, ibid, p. 98. 
23 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 133. 
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MacDonald had been a pacifist during the Great War and his attitude 
towards Germany after 1918 remained generally in favour of reconciliation and 
appeasement. In 1923, he had written that the British " have to see that the German 
people are not crushed, not enslaved, not turned into pariahs. ' 924 In the same year he 
said to Morel of Baldwin: "On all essentials his views coincide with ours ... Germany 
must be maintained as much in our interests as anything else. ' 3,25 On reparations, 
MacDonald did not have to convince his party. Many Labour members of the Cabinet 
"came to view reparations as a hangover of wartime passions perpetuated by 
precisely those forces in British national life that they molt abhorred. ' v26 Among 
those forces was, almost certainly, the Foreign Office. If so, then this was a 
misjudgement, as Crowe and many other diplomats believed, not in maintaining 
wartime hostility to Germany, but in the implementation of the terms of the peace 
treaty, including the possibility of its revision. This did not mean making concessions 
to Germany. Crowe opposed this in 1924, as he had done in 1906-1907, and as he had 
always done. Neither the Labour govFrnment nor the Fo eign Office were 
`Germanophobic. ' Both understood the potential advantages to Britain, especially 
economic, of improved relations with Germany. 
Personal relations between the Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary and 
Crowe "were always excellent, for MacDonald both liked, admired and also trusted 
him. s27 Therefore, far from a clash between the two men over Germany, there was, 
broadly speaking, harmony. Hankey was right to believe that MacDonald wanted a 
24 J. R. Macdonald, The Foreign Policy of the Labour Party, 1923, p. 22, quoted by 
Taylor, 'T'roublemakers, p. 168. 
25 Ibic4 p. 168. 
26 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. S. 
27 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 448. 
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big success in foreign policy. 28 Crowe's desire for a settlement of the reparations 
question and any agreement with a Germany that rejected militarism was completely 
consistent with the principles of the 1907 Memorandum. Much though hinged upon 
the reports of the experts committees. 
In January 1924, MacDonald was faced with the immediate challenge of 
resolving the Ruhr crisis, or at least avoiding a deterioration in Anglo-French 
relations. He chose to continue the previous policy of non-intervention and non- 
obstruction over the Ruhr. Lord Crewe, the British Ambassador in Paris, described 
MacDonald's strategy as "... to do nothing marked or conspicuous at any rate until 
the expert committees have issued their reports, and possibly not then. "29 His 
adoption of the policy of `wait and see' did have another practical and rational basis 
as in 1924 all the governments of the major powers faced the probability or certainty 
of elections. In Germany and France these would take place less than five weeks after 
the publication of the Dawes Report. 
In the first months of the Labour government, relations with France, 
Germany and Russia were apparently the priority, but MacDonald and Crowe both 
knew that the involvement of the United States in European affairs was imperative if 
there was to be a settlement of the German reparations question. Labour was fortunate 
that, since late 1923, the Dawes committees had been operating. America was 
participating, but "... France remained difficult to deal with... " Early contacts with 
the French were reasonably cordial, but MacDonald soon accepted the Foreign Office 
view about the undiplomatic behaviour of the French, especially Poincare and the 
French Ambassador in London, Saint-Aulaire. 30 Lord Crewe thought that the fall in 
28 Hankey Papers cited in O'Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 164. 
29 Crewe to Phipps cited in ibid, p. 146. 
3Q Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 448. 
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the franc caused many at the Quai and the nation as a whole to question the French 
policy towards Germany. 31 Poincare continued to tell the British government privately 
different things to those he told the French publicly. 32 According to his biographers, 
"Crowe's own view was that Poincare was anxious, for the purpose of the 
forthcoming elections in France, to be able to announce that `conversations' were 
actually in progress with England in order to impress French public opinion. "33 
The Dawes Report was published on 9 April 1924. It was signed 
unanimously by the experts who represented the United States, France, Italy, Belgium 
and the United Kingdom. On 28 April the Government of Japan informed the 
Reparation Commission that they accepted the report in principle. The plan, in brief, 
proposed that Germany should manage its own resources, stabilize the Rentenmark 
and pay a sliding scale of reparations in German currency. To implement this plan, the 
German Government would receive a foreign loan. 34 
The initial response of Foreign Office and Treasury experts was sceptical. 
They "remained unenthusiastic about the end product of the Dawes Committee's 
labors"(sic) for a number of reasons: the payments were too heavy; the transfer 
provisions were unworkable, and the prospect of penalties, should Germany 
voluntarily default, were a serious cause for concern. 33 The Foreign Of ice noted the 
report's absurd statement that military occupation must not hamper the economic 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, p. 449. 
34 UKNA, Annex 2 to the Dawes Report, p. 79. 
35 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. 194. 
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activity of Germany. 36 The Treasury, though, reluctantly told Snowden, that 
acceptance of the report was "the only constructive suggestion... s37 
Like the French, MacDonald wanted to pass on the `hot potato' (the Ruhr 
question) to the Reparation Commission, although not to keep the matter in 
Poincare's strait jacket. He supported the restoration of economic and fiscal authority 
of the German Government over all German territory, as well as the inclusion, in a 
single annuity, of all German financial liabilities under the Treaty of Versailles. 8 
Williamson believed that MacDonald "seized upon the report as the key to his plans 
for the pacification of Europe... s39 Therefore, on 10 April 1924 MacDonald 
communicated to Lord Crewe that although the Report was not without fault: 
H. M. G. attach so much importance to agreed recommendations which can be 
brought into immediate operation, that they for their part will be prepared to 
support the scheme in its entirety, provided that all the other parties concerned 
are willing to take the same course, agreeing to give the experiment a real 
chance and waiting to make modifications which may appear necessary after 
experience and by common agreement. 40 
Yet MacDonald would not waver from his determination to achieve 
general European settlement of the reparations question through the Dawes Plan. Not 
surprisingly, though, Poincare and the French, invoked procedure. Lord Crewe told 
MacDonald that they wanted to know why he needed to make an immediate statement 
in the House of Commons about the Report. The French Government would not do 
anything until the Reparation Commission had consulted with the German delegates 
on 17April. 41 MacDonald informed D'Abernon that he wanted the German 
36 UKNA, FO 371/9741, C 6676, FO Memorandum on the Dawes Plan, 23 April 
1924, p. 202. 
37 Williamson, British in Germany, p. 266. 
38 Ibid, p. 222. 
39 Williamson, British in Germany, p. 266. 
40 C 6020/70/18, Macdonald to Crewe, 10 April 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 619. 
41 C 6160/70/18, record by Miles Lampson of a conversation with the French 
Counsellor, 11 April 1924, ibid, pp. 625-626. 
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government "to accept the scheme without hesitation and without delay whilst there 
is the chance and not by haggling over detail. ' A2 
When the Dawes Report was published, the Foreign Office and the 
British Government needed to know quickly how the German Government and its 
opponents would react to it. Gustav Stresemann called it "an earnest and impartial 
study by a body of men who are anxious to solve the reparation problem. s43 If the 
British and French governments accepted the report equally sympathetically "it 
should mark a definite turn towards rehabilitation. "44 D'Abernon informed 
MacDonald that the German Government considered that the reports were "a 
practical basis for rapid solution of problem of reparations' A5 and would give an 
assurance of its collaboration. At the Wilhelmstrasse, Schubert wanted the Report to 
be "a binding official document ... to 
be submitted to the Reichstag for ratification in 
the same way as a treaty. i46 
Much hinged on the results of the General Election held on 3 May. It was 
expected that the continued Ruhr occupation would cause the Nationalist Party to 
make considerable gains. It did, but not to the extent predicted in the press. With 96 
seats it was the second largest party behind the Social Democrats (100 seats); the 
Centre Party with 65, the Communists 62, the Volks Partei 44 and several other 
groups a small number each. Dr Sthamer told MacDonald that "they were a 
demonstration against such things as the occupation of the Ruhr and the French 
support for the Separatist Movement. X47 It was a partial truth, but there was 
heightened concern\about the growth of support for nationalist groups within 
42 C 6062/70/18, MacDonald to D'Abernon, 14 April 1924, ibid, p. 628. 
43 UKNA, T 160/178, F6970/3, p. 42. 
44 New York Times, 11 April 1924, quoted in UKNA, T 160/178, F 6970/3, p. 42. 
45 C 6309/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 15 April 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 638. 
46 Ibid, p. 639. 
47 C 7426/70/18, Macdonald to Knox, 6 May 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 681. 
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mainstream German politics. Yet, MacDonald expressed his annoyance, 
"unofficially, " to Sthamer about the exploitation by Chancellor Marx of a rather 
careless statement he had made at York in April "that the worst form of German 
nationalism was the result of the way that Germany had been handled by the 
Allies... s48 a comment as pleasing to many German ears as it irritated French and 
Belgian ones. 
Observing the various coalition possibilities, Knox, acting as Charge 
d'Affaires in Berlin, told MacDonald that the situation wa§ very obscure and that 
there was the possibility, 
that if social democrats are strongest party in the government, German 
Nationals would vote solid against legislation arising out of the experts report 
... German Nationals who 
have definitely not commit themselves were in 
power it is not considered improbable they would accept report for which 
social democrats would in any case vote (sic). 49 
The Marx-Stresemann coalition wished the Nationalist D. N. V. P. to 
participate in government, in order for it to assume some responsibility for foreign 
policy, but it was divided over Dawe$. Many members r alised its advantages for the 
German business sector, but acceptance risked upsetting its core supporters in its 
agrarian heartlands. What therefore mattered immediately was that the Centre parties 
preferred to accept the report in its entirety. 
In Berlin, Knox discussed with Schubert the recent elections and their 
possible impact on the political situation. No progress had then been made in forming 
a government, but it was apparent that if the National Party were not in power they 
would be "ill-disposed towards the experts' report. sS° Knox told Schubert that he 
was "a little disturbed to gather the impression that even Dr Hergt's grudging and 
as Ibid, p. 681. 
49 C 7448/737/18, G. G. Knox to MacDonald, 6 May 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 679. 
$° C7787/737/18, Knox to MacDonald, 10 May 1924, UKNA, PRO 30/69/102, p. 1. 
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very qualified reconciliation with the experts report was by no means endorsed by the 
bulk of his party. "5' Schubert agreed and, with a confidence which would probably 
have been lacking from one of his Whitehall counterparts, added, "thumping the 
table, that he could give me his word that by hook or by crook, and whatever the 
German Nationals might do, Germany would accept the report. "S2 
In the event the Marx-Stresemann coalition remained in power. 
Stresemann soon informed Knox that he had discussed acceptance of Dawes with the 
Nationalists. Both sides wanted an assurance about evacuation and the release of 
prisoners. According to Knox, Stresemann wanted to be able to say to Herriot, the 
new French Prime Minister: "I will put my legislation through on June 15th, will you 
evacuate the Ruhr on July 15`h? "s3 
On the Ambassador's return, a more pessimistic message was delivered. 
D'Abernon said that he found "a considerable change in public opinion here 
regarding experts report. While political circles still favour acceptance there can be no 
doubt that popularity of experts scheme in government and financial circles has 
considerably diminished. As was inevitable the more closely it is read the more 
difficult does its execution appear and more disagreeable are various controls 
considered to be. 
I hold, therefore, that it would be rash not to obtain as rapidly as possible 
a formal acceptance of report from German government through a reciprocal over- 
head agreement ... " 
54 
MacDonald was very unhappy with the German Government over its 
demands for conditions prior to acceptance. He said that it was 
51 C 7787/737/18, Knox to MacDonald, 10 May 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 690. 
52 Ibid, p. 691. 
53 C 8388/737/18, Knox to MacDonald, 23 May1924, ibid, p. 704. 
54 C 8478/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 29 May 1924, ibid, pp. 709-710. 
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both useless and unwise for German Government to look for anything of the 
sort at this moment, and they should rest content with the knowledge ( which 
you can convey to them in form of an assurance from me if you think fit ) that 
as soon as a new French government have been constituted and are in the 
saddle, His Majesty's Government are determined to spare no effort to secure 
prompt execution of the experts scheme in its entirety (sic). " 
D'Abernon was forced to think again after Chancellor Marx's speech in the Reichstag 
on 4 June. "Experts report is most important factor in Germany's foreign policy and 
acceptance of it is the only way out of Germany's uncomfortable if not desperate 
economic situation. "56 
Much later in the year, two former Ministers of Finance, Dr Dernberg and 
Herr Raumer, gave a lecture in which they agreed that the scheme was incapable of 
execution, 57 delighting in citing the similar view held by Maynard Keynes. An 
extreme anti-French view was expressed in an article entitled `Death By Starvation; 
the New Way to Slavery' in the Munchener Neueste Nachrichten. "Poincare does not 
want money. He wants the Rhine. "58 Clive in Munich described the newspaper as 
`Independent Chauvinist. ' The headline-writers reflected an increasing sympathy 
inside Germany for extreme nationalist views. The Foreign Office `man on the spot' 
reported this trend faithfully. 59 
What the Dawes Plan had also achieved was to re-awaken the debate 
about German war-guilt. During a debate in the Reichstag on 26 July on Dawes and 
foreign policy there was a lengthy argument about the `responsibility lie. ' The Soviet 
Union had recently blamed Tsarist Russia and France. A Nationalist, Herr Berndt, 
ss Ibid, pp. 711-712. 
56 C 9059/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 5 June 1924, ibid, p. 714. 
s' UKNA, T 160/178, File 6970/01/7,12 November 1924, p. 45. 
58 Ibid, undated, p. 57. 
59 In March and April 1924, Clive sent reports back to the Foreign Of ice about 
Hitler's trial. See DBFP, 1, XXVI, pp. 1017-1022. 
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said that Germany was not even partly to blame. "The publication of German 
archives has proved our innocence. Russia, France and England had repeatedly 
decided for war in the years before 1914. Germany made every effort to localise the 
war and acquiesced in all the suggestions made by England to that end. 9s60 
The former Social Democratic Chancellor, Philip Scheidemann, the man 
who had proclaimed the Republic in 1918, disagreed and used the debate to launch a 
scathing attack on his old adversaries. The foreign press were full of accounts and 
pictures of parades taken by dismissed generals and ex-princes. He quoted the 
memoirs of Admiral Tirpitz. "When all is said and done, the play-acting of the Kaiser 
was responsible... After the war I will join the Socialists and look for lamp-posts, and 
lots of them, for a regular hydra has got to be done away with. ' v61 
Scheidemann was equally contemptuous of the former monarch. " Even 
some Conservatives have declared that the ex-Kaiser was obviously a lunatic. It was 
he who raised the whole world against Germany with his idiotic boasting and 
challenging speeches, and he was mainly responsible for the outbreak of war. " The 
German people were not to blame, he concluded, but were being made to pay for the 
sins of their former "lunatic ruler. s62 
In 1924, attitudes to reparations were still inextricably linked to the 
question of German war-guilt. It should have been a matter of great concern to the 
Foreign Office and, in particular, its Legal Department, led by Sir Cecil Hurst, and it 
was in their interest to be informed of the current atmosphere in Germany and to 
detect any revisionism. The Treasury was determined, as long as Bradbury remained 
in post, to remain involved in the settling of the reparations question. 
60 Ibid, 26 July 1924, p. 34. 
61 Ibid, p. 35. 
62 Ibid. 
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Much still hinged on the French. On 11 May 1924 the `Bloc National' 
was defeated at the polls and Poincare eventually resigned (on 1 June). Millerand, the 
ex-Socialist, resigned as President of the Third French Republic on 11 June 1924 and 
was succeeded by Doumergue two days later. Edouard Herriot did not become 
President of the Council (Prime Minister) until 11 June. The utter defeat of the 
Poincare government led The New York Times to observe that "a rag-tag and bobtail 
of defeatists and Reds have been raised to power by Frenchmen. "63 Other newspapers 
were more sympathetic to the Herriot government, although they could not agree on 
whether it would lead to the withdrawal from the Ruhr and the execution of the 
Dawes Plan. 
Three days after his electoral defeat, in an extraordinary act of 
arrogance, Poincare wrote to MacDonald telling him that France would not evacuate 
the Ruhr until Germany had accepted the Dawes Report in full and that, if Germany 
defaulted on its pledges, France must remain in a position to act. The power of the 
French press and his precarious parliamentary position was therefore likely to prevent 
Herriot adopting a radical evacuation policy. The new Prime Minister also was 
concerned, following a conversation with Millerand which he related to Eric Phipps, 
that the Belgians were apprehensive about him and his intentions. 64 Worse still for 
MacDonald when he heard reports that French military authorities in the Ruhr were 
taking more punitive and coercive action, though Crowe suggested that they may have 
been taken without he knowledge of the French Government. 65 Such events 
63 C 8353, UKNA, Chilton to Foreign Office, FO 371/9746,15 May 24, p. 37. 
64 C 9521/32/18, Crewe to MacDonald, 14 June1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 719. 
65 C 7591/1869/18, MacDonald to Crewe, 13 May 1924, ibid, p. 695. 
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threatened Macdonald's and Crowe's entire Dawes strategy of gaining united 
acceptance of the experts' report. 
The accession to power of Herriot was though welcomed not only by the 
Labour Government, but by sections of the Foreign Office as well (probably aware 
that, knowing the volatile nature of the Third Republic, his tenure would be brief, as 
indeed it was). Phipps told him "in British eyes... there was now a better chance than 
there ever had been of reaching a satisfactory settlement of the reparations question, 
provided Germany proved reasonable. ' 66 Time could not 
be 
wasted though. 
In June 1924, shortly after Herriot took office, he went to Chequers to 
meet Ramsay MacDonald. The informal meetings between the two Socialists were 
extremely cordial, as described in newspapers of the period and a book by the 
journalist, Georges Suarez, with Herriot's agreement. Schuker though said that the 
transcripts of the business meetings "convey a quite different impression. MacDonald 
and Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office had prepared 
their case meticulously and operated ýs a brilliant team. acDonald exerted his 
inimitable powers of obfuscation to avoid making any embarrassing commitments, 
while Crowe, with his mastery of detail and disciplined intelligence, pinned down the 
hapless French premier on point after point. , 67 
Early on, Crowe led the discussion in securing a specific date for the 
economic evacuation of the Ruhr. To avoid another Ruhr-type crisis, Crowe proposed 
that the Dawes Plan be seen as a "new treaty" requiring the voluntary signature of 
Germany. As it was separate from the Versailles Treaty, Crowe said that, under the 
new system, the Reparation Commission had no legal mandate to determine default. 68 
66 C 9521/32/18, Crewe to MacDonald, 14 June 1924, ibid, p. 719. 
67 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. 238. 
68 Ibid, p. 239. 
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The guile of the two Britons though had adverse consequences for the French Prime 
Minister. Following the Chequers meeting, Herriot came under great pressure from 
the French press, especially `Pertinax. ' MacDonald responded to Herriot's plea for a 
`rescue mission' by going to Paris on 8 July with Crowe. Crowe had already 
formulated an agenda for the London Conference, but in order to support Herriot, 
MacDonald agreed to French suggestions for its revision, more than Crowe believed 
to be wise. 69 
Although MacDonald's performance at the London Conference of July 
and August 1924 was praised by some contemporary commentators, it did not receive 
equal applause from Foreign Office experts. The conference had two main purposes. 
It was designed to secure the agreement of the main powers for the implementation in 
full of the proposals contained in the Dawes Report, and secondly, to reach agreement 
on the question of arbitration of disputes arising from implementation. The greatest 
obstacle to progress was the issue of the military evacuation of the Ruhr. The general 
German view and particularly that of the Right was that the Dawes protocol should 
only be signed if this was to commence immediately. Under pressure from the French 
press and parliament, this was unacceptable to Herriot who would only agree to a 
withdrawal that took place one year after the date of the agreement. 
On 24 July 1924, before the arrival of the German delegation in 
London, Macdonald sent a note to Herriot and Theunis, arguing that "the repeated 
declarations made by the French and Belgian Governments regarding the purpose of 
the occupation ... might gravely prejudice the application of the Dawes Plan. i70 On 9 
August after the arrival of the Germans, Macdonald sent another note to Herriot and 
69 Ibid, pp. 258-261. 
70 C 13734/11495/18, UKNA, MacDonald to Addison in Berlin, 2 September 1924, 
PRO 30/69/102, p. 1. 
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Theunis reminding them of "the deplorable effect that might be produced upon 
world opinion were the French and Belgian Governments, having occupied the Ruhr 
for one purpose, to remain there for an entirely different purpose. ' 971 After a week of 
lengthy, sometimes tortuous discussion, Macdonald achieved his aim. On 16 August, 
after an exchange of notes, the French and Belgian Governments while not 
renouncing their legal view of the occupation "agreed to proceed to the military 
evacuation of the Ruhr within the minimum delay of one year as from that date... "72 
During the concluding speeches, the American Ambassador, Frank 
Kellogg, called the Dawes Report "the greatest piece of constructive work of modern 
times"73and that the Conference was "the first step in the restoration of confidence in 
our civilisation... and puts into force a sound economic plan for uniting German 
industrial life. s74 The party and nation that had rejected Versailles and European 
involvement now hailed General Dawes's work: " ... this plan 
has had the hearty and 
loyal support of the President of the United States, and of the American people. "75 
The Dawes Protocol was signed in London on 16 August 1924 because 
all sides had the political will to move forward. To prevent an even greater mauling 
by the French press `die-hards, ' Herriot had to stand firm on the matter of military 
evacuation and achieved his `victory' and that of Belgium too. MacDonald had 
proven himself and a Labour government to be sufficiently competent, even 
progressive on diplomatic affairs. Germany would receive a substantial foreign loan, 
more than sufficient for its immediate purpose of paying reparation instalments, a 
'1 Ibid, p. 1. 
72 Ibid, p. 1. 
73 UKNA, PRO 30/69/103,25 August 1924, p. 6. 
'a Ibid, p. 7. 
75 Ibid, p. 6. 
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proposition so tempting to the German Right that it was divided as to whether or not 
to vote for acceptance in the Reichstag. 76 Finally, the Republican government of the 
United States satisfied the Wall Street investors by the decision to have an American 
leading the supervision of the collection of reparation payments. 
The praise showered on the report in 1924 was not later shared by 
Bruce Kent who attacked the politics of the reparations issue. "The Dawes Plan, like 
the Young Plan which was to follow in 1929, was a flimsy improvisation which 
depended for its survival on continuing financial and political fair weather within 
Germany and abroad. "77 It was only designed to be a temporary measure - enabling 
Germany to pay its reparations for precisely five years. But, even Kent conceded that 
Dawes gave "a substantial breathing-space"78 in which Germany had five years to 
gain the confidence of the international political as well as the financial community. 
Contemporary statesmen were wrong in describing the Dawes Plan, as many of them 
did, as having solved the reparations question. The catastrophic events that followed 
October 1929 have tended to make students and some historians ascribe faults and 
blame to the Dawes Plan which were really outside its control, notably the continued 
mismanagement of the German economy. Between 1924 and 1929 the plan achieved 
most of its key targets. 
Having been a major player at Chequers and in Paris, Crowe and the 
Foreign Office should have had significant roles at the London Conference. Maisel 
said that Bradbury, Crowe and Hankey did much of the organization prior to the 
conference. With MacDonald, Crowe discussed the composition of the British 
delegation, including that of the Foreign Office, and supervised Lampson's placement 
76 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 260. 
77 Ibid, p. 261. 
79 ibid. 
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of the different delegations in suitable lodgings. According to Maisel, Hankey was 
asked by the Foreign Office to again take responsibility for the daily management and 
co-ordination of the conference, despite their previous differences. 79 
For Crowe though, the London Conference was a painful reminder of 
the time wasting and his impotence at Versailles five years earlier. Crowe and Corp 
wrote that Crowe "does not seem to have taken any great part" in the discussions in 
July and August, but "after the arrival of the German delegates on 2"d August, Crowe 
played a major part in these negotiations... s8° as adviser and interpreter for 
MacDonald. This is a rather misleading judgement. In Crowe's letters to his wife 
there are echoes of his frustrations in Paris at the isolation of the Office and at the 
failure of politicians to move conferences forward at a gallop and to exploit his 
particular expertise: 
The conference still hangs fire and I am personally quite in the dark as to 
where things stand. We are back to the worst days of Lloyd George as regards 
secret ways. One sad fact stands out: there is not yet sufficient agreement to 
allow of (sic) summoning the Germans. In these circumstances it is clearly 
impossible for the conference to finish this week. 81 
Crowe made the same complaint the next day: 
The conference if it moves forwards at all, does so at a snail's pace. No sign 
yet of invitations going out. At this rate, unless there is a speedy and complete 
collapse, the thing may spin out endlessly, although the Prime Minister again 
this morning spoke of finishing before the end of next week. 82 
Crowe's letter of I August revealed that he was far from idle or satisfied 
with his political masters: 
I was kept ry busy yesterday; there were prolonged committee meetings. 
One sat till n arly 3 a. m., but not one of which I was a member. Instead 
79 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 142. 
80 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 454. 
81 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Crowe Papers, M S. Eng. d. 2907, Letter to Clema, 
Lady Crowe, 30 July 1924, p. 11. 
82 Ibid, 31 July 1924, p. 15. 
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worked at home ... 
full conference tomorrow, at which it is hoped to get a 
decision to send for the German delegation at once... The Prime Minister 
finally hopes that negotiations with Germany will not last longer than the 
week. I have not that robust faith, and you can imagine what are in 
consequence my feelings on the subject (sic). 
Matters did not improve when the Germans arrived. "There is to be a first 
business meeting between MacDonald and the principal German delegates tonight at 
9, when I must attend. s83 When the meeting with the Chancellor and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs finally took place (at the House of Commons the previous evening), 
i 
Crowe complained that it was "a tedious meeting because I had to translate the whole 
conversation on either side, as they proceeded. ' 994 However, Schmidt recounted that 
on 5 August, the day that the German delegation of Marx, Luther and Stresemann 
arrived in London, Stresemann 
wired von Schubert in Berlin... to describe a conversation with MacDonald 
and Crowe. When the German delegates had stressed the need for the 
evacuation of territory occupied in excess of Versailles provisions, Crowe had 
urged them not to overlook the fact that the French government had steadily 
viewed the Ruhr occupation as being completely'in accord with the Versailles 
Treaty and had declined English suggestions for Court of Arbitration. Crowe 
had also said that he favourer an attempt to brin the Germans, the bankers, 
and the Reparation Commission into association with each other. 85 
Crowe's version of the meeting on the evening of 5 August was again an 
angry one. Firstly, he had to go and collect the German delegates from their hotel and 
then take them to the House of Commons, via a private staircase, to see MacDonald in 
his room for the meeting in which he was reduced to the role of a bored translator. 
Things did change though. "No time for a letter today. Conferences and committees 
sitting continuously. s86 Four days later, he wrote: "There was a full meeting at 11 of 
83 Ibid, 5 August 1924, p. 21. 
84 Ibid, 6 August 1924, p. 25. Crowe and Corp put a more positive spin on this task. 
Ablest Public Servant, pp. 454-455. 
gs Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr, p. 172. 
16 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Crowe Papers, 7 August 1924, p. 28. 
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the Heads of Delegations. My own special committee's work was passed without 
criticism, in fact was highly commended. "87 
Crowe may not have believed that he had much influence over the 
MacDonald government during the London Conference, but at least King George V 
confided in him. He had an appointment at the Palace at 9.45 on 12 August: 
The King was very talkative afterwards and kept me for nearly an hour 
discussing conference, Bolsheviks, and MacDonald. The latter had told him he 
seriously thought of giving up as Foreign Secretary when Parliament meets 
again... But he had given no indication of whom he would choose as his 
Foreign Secretary. He will not find the choice easy. 88 
Crowe was however beginning to give grudging credit to the conference. 
"I write between two conferences ... Progress is slow, but, I fancy fairly assured. The 
one great difficulty remaining is the duration of the military occupation of the 
Ruhr. "89 
Despite his apparent marginalisation at the London Conference, the 
outcome, the acceptance by all the wartime allies and the German government of the 
Dawes Report, was a triumph for Crowe's principles. The Dawes Plan gave Germany 
the opportunity to recover economically, something that was in the interests of both 
the Weimar Republic and Britain. The basis for the success in London was the work 
done by Crowe and MacDonald at Chequers earlier that summer. 
An aspect of the Dawes Plan and the London Conference about which 
Crowe probably had mixed feelings was the return of the U. S. A. to an involvement 
in European politics. Having been in isolation from European events since 1920, 
American diplomacy in 1924, especially in the critical period before the completion 
and publication of the Dawes Report, was considered to be unwelcome and clumsy. 
Wi Ibid, 11 August 1924, p. 34. 
88 Ibid, 12 August 1924, p. 38. 
89 Ibid. 
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The British preferred to be secretive, in control and resented the use of American 
financial muscle in European diplomacy, though not when it suited them. "The less 
we allow the Americans to meddle the better. They do nothing but complicate and 
spoil matters. s90 The American aim was to position themselves in the middle ground 
between the French and the British, a tactic that Crowe felt made them 
"impossible. "91 The `transatlantic scepticism' occasionally shown by Crowe may 
have been irritation, but does question whether Cohrs's enthusiasm for a British Euro- 
Atlantic policy in 1924 may need to be revised, certainly from a Foreign Office point 
of view. 
The American Government was not officially represented on the 
committees of experts, although Charles Dawes and Owen Young were two leading 
members of them. On 18 April 1924 the Foreign Office sent a letter to Frank Kellogg, 
the U. S. Ambassador in London, asking, unofficially, about the American position on 
the Dawes reports. It wanted to know "whether your government would consider that 
some statement of its views, whilst in no way committing itself to action, might help 
European governments to take wise steps at the moment? "92 
On the following day the Foreign Office received a reply through Sir 
Esme Howard in Washington from Charles Hughes, the Secretary of State. The 
American Government were considering making a statement to this effect. As there 
was an increasingly favourable climate among the American press and public opinion, 
90 UKNA, FO 371/9813, C 5110/1288/18, minute on the Expert Committee by 
Crowe, 25 March 1924, p. 50. Crowe said that their colleagues on the reparation 
committees described the American experts as "impossible. " Ibid. 
91 Schuker, End of French Predominance in Europe, p. 194. 
92 UKNA, T 160/178,18 April 1924, File 6970/3, p. 21. 
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"there is therefore little danger, which there might have been before, of a government 
pronouncement being criticized for internal political reasons. ' 93 
On 22 April Howard reported an unusually long speech by the 
famously laconic President. Coolidge spoke about American involvement in the war 
and the peace conference and insisted that the rejection of participation should be 
regarded as final. He commented favourably on the Dawes Report, saying that " 
nothing of more importance to Europe has occurred since the Armistice' 994 and 
expressed satisfaction that it had been given a positive reception in Germany and 
elsewhere in Europe. In his more usual brief style, Coolidge hoped that Dawes would 
solve the reparations problem and that private American capital "would be willing to 
participate in advancing this loan... s95 
Although President Coolidge supported the Plan, as well as assistance 
on a purely financial level for Germany and Europe, he re-iterated his unwillingness 
to involve the U. S. A. in the "purely political controversies of Europe. ' 96 Coolidge 
was sufficiently impressed though by the success of General Dawes and his potential 
as a vote-winner that he offered him the Vice-Presidential ticket in 1924. In that role 
for four years from 1925, Dawes "continued to exercise a benevolent influence upon 
Coolidge's attitude towards reparations and war debts during the rest of his term. ' 97 
The frequent accusation made by the French against British foreign 
policy-makers that they failed to pursue a consistent line in relation to other powers 
could not be levelled against them over their attitude to the United States. There was 
93 Ibid, 19 April 1924, p. 22. 
94 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1924, Volume II, 22 
April 1924, p. 14. 
95 UKNA, T 160/178, File 6970/3, p. 30. 
96 UKNA, FO 371/9741, C6676, the Foreign Office Memorandum on the Dawes 
Plan,, 23 April 1924, p. 197. 
97 P. Hayes, The Twentieth Century, 1880-1939, London, 1978, p. 243. 
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no Churchillian `Special Relationship' in the 1920's. There may not have been hatred, 
but there was certainly irritation on both sides. In 1924, from the British perspective, 
irritation bordered on hostility. This frosty relationship was demonstrated in October 
1924 during a meeting between Crowe and Frank Kellogg, the American Ambassador 
in London. The U. S. A. made claims for the costs of the Army of Occupation, 
reparations and participation in German payments under the Dawes Plan. Snowden 
and Crowe had refuted this claim earlier in the month. Crowe said that the Reparation 
Commission had not included American claims when it had informed Germany of the 
total amount of allied claims "as we did not ratify the treaty or come into the 
adjustment and that therefore technically we could not make a separate treaty or make 
our claims preferred over those of the Allies... " Kellogg then told Crowe that he 
"did not think his position well taken ... the United States as a participant in the war 
was entitled on equitable grounds to reparations. " 98 It was fortunate that MacDonald 
was able to win the Americans over to Dawes. 99 
It was vital that the French response to the Dawes Report was equally 
favourable. Seydoux, Director of Commercial Affairs at the Qual D'OrsaY, believed , 
strangely, that the entry into power of the new Labour Government had coincided 
with a greater desire on the part of Poincare to settle the reparations question, 
98 Kellogg to the Secretary of State (Hughes), 467.00 R 29/31,28 October 1924, 
FRUS, 1924, Volume II, pp. 68-69. 
99 David Dilks believed that "MacDonald had a marked talent for diplomacy, and a 
special interest in everything which concerned relations with the United States. " See 
D. Dilks, `The British Foreign Office Between the Wars, ' in B. J. C. McKercher and 
D. J. Moss (eds. ), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939, 
Edmonton, 1984, p. 189. 
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"... despite the fact that nobody in France was under any delusion but that in many 
things the policy of the Labour Government was likely to be more widely separated 
from French desires than was the policy of Mr Baldwin. ' 100 
The Dawes Report though did not lessen Poincare's hostility to France's 
great enemy, Germany. He wanted to impose a decision upon its government, through 
the Reparation Commission (with its Franco-Belgian majority), rather than calling her 
into consultation. Poincare believed that Articles 234 and 241 of the Treaty of 
Versailles permitted the Reparation Commission to implerhent the Dawes 
recommendations "without any active participation by thq governments 
concerned. " °' The French sought a precise answer from the Reparation Commission 
as to the cost of the scheme's operation for the allied governments, Germany and the 
Reparation Commission itself. Poincare claimed that Dawes did not recommend 
Franco-Belgian departure from the Ruhr and the Rhineland until Germany had 
executed the plan. 
MacDonald did not under1estimate the neces ity of gaining Belgian 
acquiescence for Dawes. On 2 and 3 May 1924 he receivgd the Belgian Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, Theunis and Hymans, at Chequers and urged them 
strongly to do all in their power to persuade their ally, Poincare, not to reject "the last 
hope for a favourable and definite settlement of the reparations issue. " 102 During their 
conversation he emphasised the danger to Belgian and French security if Soviet- 
100 Crewe to MacDonald, 10 February 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, pp. 538-539. 
lot UKNA, FO 371/ 9741, C 6676, Crewe to MacDonald, 23 April 1924, p. 184. 
102 UKNA, FO 371/ 9743, C 7137/70/18, notes of conversations held at Chequers 
between Theunis, Hymans, MacDonald and Crowe, 2 May 1924, p. 104. Crowe 
played a full part in these discussions. 
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German `intimacy' was increased. '03 It was an argument that would be repeated in 
London that summer. 
In addition to the apparent `solution' of the reparations question, 
Macdonald had to turn his attention towards other affairs, particularly relations with 
Bolshevik Russia and the policy proposed at the League of Nations that would come 
to be known as the Geneva Protocol. The parliamentary position of the Labour 
government remained precarious, relying as it did on Liberal support and therefore the 
attitude of the Conservative government-in-waiting was of great interest to the 
Foreign Office experts. In a debate in the Commons in July 1924, Austen 
Chamberlain told members that "we should make the maintenance of the Entente 
with France the cardinal object of our policy. " 04 
MacDonald's honeymoon period with the Foreign Office could not and did not 
last. His charm could not permanently hide the considerable political differences 
between a Socialist and as elitist an institution as the Foreign Office. It was not 
though just Bolshevik Russia, but also diplomatic style that began to concern 
D'Abernon. He believed that 
the original impression created at the Foreign Office by the Prime Minister, 
which was one of great rejoicing, is gradually giving way to apprehension. 
They are alarmed at his views regarding Lenin, namely, that his death was a 
great loss to the world. Moreover, they find their new Chief extremely firm on 
essentials in his discussions with Poincare and with the French Ambassador. 
He has been particularly resolute regarding the Palatinate, demanding acts, not 
words - an attitude quite contrary to diplomatic tradition. " 
105 
Russia, not Germany, would be the cause of most of the Foreign Office anger 
directed against the Labour government. Crowe felt that 
103 Ibid. 
104 Hansard, 176, HC Debates, col 109, speech by Austen Chamberlain, 14 July 
1924. 
105 D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, 1, p. 59. 
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the Russian treaty is a farce and a disgrace to this office. However I have put it 
formally and repeatedly on record that I entirely disapprove and protest against 
the whole proceeding and that the Foreign Office as a Department is free from 
all responsibility - which rests entirely with Ponsonby (the Minister of State). In 
the end he will suffer for his idiotic performance. It may even bring the 
government down. But that depends on many considerations, party and other. 106 
Having been stunned in 1922 (as had everyone else though) by the Soviet- 
German Treaty of Rapallo, the Foreign Office had been embarrassed by Labour's 
almost immediate diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik government, but an Anglo- 
Russian trade treaty was too much for the conservative minds of Whitehall. Yet, his 
biographers seemed to suggest that Crowe and MacDonald had agreed to disagree 
about the matter. 107 
Crowe was not the only Foreign Office expert involved in London. In 
July, H. C. F. Finlayson, Financial Advisor at the British Embassy in Berlin, who had 
acted as secretary to Sir Robert Kindersley during the writing of the Dawes Report, 
was brought from Germany to attend the conference. It was due to Finlayson that the 
Foreign Office was kept well informed of the content of some of the private meetings 
of the political leaders in the middle of August. He sent despatches to Miles Lampson, 
Head of the Central Department, with responsibility for German affairs. Finlayson 
had long conversations with Dr Ritter, Commissioner for economic negotiations and 
reparations at the German Foreign Ministry. Ritter told him about discussions 
between the German Foreign Minister, Stresemann, and the French Prime Minister, 
Herriot. 
The most significant revelation from Finlayson was that the German 
government would sign the Protocol at the end of the conference, if it was given a 
date for the military evacuation of the Ruhr, or at least the major areas. Stresemann 
106 Bodleian Library, Crowe Papers, MS. Eng. d. 2907,8 August 1924, pp. 31-32. 107 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 457. 
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knew that Herriot had to save face and therefore a few French troops might have to be 
left in some small towns near the border between the occupied and unoccupied part of 
Germany. He would also have to agree to some French economic conditions. 
Macdonald himself confirmed that much hinged on the ongoing problem of the 
occupation. "Much to my regret, I see no prospects of getting the French out of the 
Ruhr short of a year, (and) I do not feel inclined to break the Conference on that point 
-the difference being only from 4 to 6 months. " 
log 
Not for the last time Britain's Ambassador in Germany also provoked 
problems. In September 1924, MacDonald received a despatch from D'Abernon that 
contained two memoranda from two of his subordinates in the Berlin Embassy, 
Finlayson, the Financial Advisor, and Joseph Addison, the Counsellor. It had been 
decided that a loan of 140 million (800 million Gold Marks) was to be given to 
Germany, of which Britain was to advance £10,000,000 (most of the subscription 
came from the United States), a payment agreed at the conference on August 16th. 
This had caused uproar in certain sections of the press, who believed that it would 
have very harmful effects on British trade. 
Finlayson and Addison observed that Britain expected "to receive in 
return as her share of the reparation payments of the First Reparation Year 22% (the 
Spa Percentage) of the total amount available (viz. 1,000 million Gold Marks or 
£50,000,000. The payment was to be made through the Reparation (Recovery) Act. 
The purpose was to enable Germany to pay its reparations `tribute' in the first year of 
the Dawes Plan (although it appeared that Great Britain was merely paying itself), 
los C 12939/11495/18, Finlayson to Lampson, 12 August 1924, Minute by 
MacDonald, 14 August 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 830. 
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"... it has been found necessary to give Germany a loan so as to put her in a position 
to pay such a tribute. "log 
Addison concurred. It had "two specific objects... maintaining the 
stability of her currency and enabling her to pay her reparations in kind to the Allies 
during the first year of the operation of the Dawes plan, because, in the estimation of 
the experts who prepared the plan, Germany will be unable to do so without this 
foreign assistance. "'10 It was a reconstruction rather than a development loan and 
therefore it was different. It was for repairs (he compared it to the loan to France after 
the war to repair the devastated regions or to Japan following the terrible earthquake 
of 1 September 1923) rather than to directly effect an increase in Germany's 
productive capacity, "' although that would happen. 
Addison's enclosure contains a strong attack on the whole policy of 
reparations and must have been supported by D'Abernon. It is apparent that the events 
of 1923 had been a turning-point inside the Foreign Office. In the aftermath of the war 
there had been little support for the Keynes-Nicolson critique on Versailles, but it now 
became possible to articulate a less strident attitude to Germany. Addison's attack was 
not however concerned with Germany's capacity to pay or a need to relieve her 
financial system. It could have solved its own problems two years earlier, as the 
Embassy had frequently pointed out. 
We harped on the point that Germany had eighteen months ago nearly 
£50,000,000 gold reserve, and this was ample both in order to convert a 
currency which only amounted to about £10,000,000 and to preserve stability 
of currency; but I presume that the political situation was such that this policy 
could not be followed. ' 2 
109 UKNA, PRO 30/69/102, C 14673/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 16 
September 1924, p. 3. 
110 Ibid, p. 4. 
111 Ibid. 
It2 ibid. 
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Addison stated that the press criticism, though confused, did wake 
people up to the realisation that, as the Embassy had often said, "it is not to the 
ultimate interest of the British Empire that any reparation be paid at all, that we lose 
more than we gain... " He then repeated his remarks in the margin of a Foreign Office 
document not preserved in the archives: "Reparations are bad, especially for us who 
are attempting to maintain for as long as possible the position won from 1849 to 1890 
of being the workshop of the world. , 113 Addison was a close friend of Crowe and it 
is unsurprising to discover him repeating the importance of Britain's national interests 
within the 1907 Memorandum. ' 14 
What was even worse, though, was the economic collapse of Germany, 
affecting all of Central Europe. Given the political situation, a compromise had to be 
reached on the principle that half a loaf was better than no bread. The Dawes Plan had 
obvious disadvantages, but its inevitable consequences were unavoidable and Britain 
had therefore chosen the lesser of two evils: "In short, what might have been 
attacked, but what is now too late to discuss, is the whole policy of reparations. But it 
is idle, and also incorrect, to attack merely one side of it, namely a loan made in order 
to enable this policy to be carried out, on grounds which do not bear examination. "' 15 
Following the success of the London Conference, MacDonald's attention 
was diverted away from reparations. In September 1924, the League of Nations in 
Geneva proposed `The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. ' 
It was a rather convoluted plan. In essence, in the event of an international dispute, the 
113 C 14673/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, Minute by Addison, 16 September 
1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 888. 
114 Friends of Europe, p. 28 
115 UKNA, PRO 30/69/18, C 14673/70/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 16 September 
1924, p. 5. 
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League would settle the matter by arbitration. The Council of the League of Nations 
would ask all the signatory states to apply sanctions against the aggressors. Herriot 
was immediately enthusiastic and hoped that his fellow socialist, MacDonald, would 
be equally willing to sign. MacDonald hesitated, partly because of his government's 
precarious situation. The Foreign Office had no doubts. It was a bad idea for Britain 
and its empire. Sibyl Crowe said that the Foreign Office objected to the provision 
about compulsory arbitration and also because of "its extended rules for the 
application of sanctions and the definition of aggression. s116 It would have meant that 
Britain would be participating in a world security agreement. British imperial 
entanglements were paramount and certain foreign entanglements were to be avoided. 
The issue though did not fester because before the end of the year Labour and 
MacDonald were out of office. Sibyl Crowe argued that even before October 1924, 
Labour had had a change of heart and had no intention of proceeding further with 
it.,, 117 Both MacDonald and Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had 
become hostile to it 
In the autumn of 1924, following the controversy over `the Campbell 
case, ' the Conservatives and the Liberals combined to defeat the government in the 
Commons. In the General Election of October, Labour won only 151 seats to the 
Conservatives 419. On 4 November Baldwin again became Prime Minister. The role 
of leading Foreign Office officials, and Crowe in particular, in the events leading to 
Labour's defeat has had a lasting effect upon relations between the party and the Civil 
Service. During the campaign, the Labour Party was smeared by the publication of the 
infamous (and probably fake) `Zinoviev Letter. ' After the Foreign Office received a 
copy of the letter from the Secret Service (who, of course, believed it to be authentic) 
116 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 51 
117 Ibid. 
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in the second week of October, Crowe advised MacDonald to send a strong protest to 
the Soviet Government through its Embassy in London. After the delivery of the note, 
they agreed that it should be immediately published. Crowe sent a draft of the note to 
MacDonald, then in the middle of an election campaign in South Wales. Having made 
a number of amendments, MacDonald sent it back to Crowe on 24 October. On the 
same afternoon, Crowe was told that The Daily Mail had obtained a copy of the 
`Zinoviev Letter' and was going to publish it the following morning. It is a matter for 
debate whether historians accept the argument that Crowe sincerely believed that he 
had MacDonald's authority to tell his Department to send the amended Note and to 
immediately publish it. MacDonald was certainly horrified to see it appear in the press 
because he had informed Crowe that he had expected to see it again before its 
publication. 
Crowe was apparently mortified and it has been suggested that the 
furore surrounding the controversy contributed to his early -death several months later. 
It has been suggested by a number of historians of the Left that it was neither an 
innocent mistake on Crowe's part nor a failure by Macdonald to communicate his 
instructions clearly, but a deliberate conspiracy by Foreign Office personnel, and Eyre 
Crowe in particular, to embarrass the Labour Government and Party before a General 
Election. Crowe was certainly a Conservative, as were most of the senior members of 
the Foreign Office, and he had expressed great criticism of Macdonald's appeasement 
policy towards the Soviet Government. But it seems to be a conspiracy theory too far. 
Crowe surely would have baulked at any action that would have compromised his 
professional integrity and that of his Department. With or without the `Zinoviev 
Letter' the Labour Government were not going to win the forthcoming election, 
although the Labour Party would certainly have done much better without it. What 
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may be totally discounted is the notion that Crowe, being a mere public servant, could 
not have appreciated the political sensitivity of the `Letter. ' Similarly, Macdonald did 
not deliberately engineer the defeat of the Labour Party, having proven that it was 
capable of being a party of government. Despite the spirited and understandable 
defence of her father, historians cannot accept Sibyl Crowe's argument that her father 
was entirely blameless and it is probable that neither would he. 
To Morel of the U. D. C., the affair demonstrated "the powerlessness of 
a Labour Government to control the permanent officials of the Foreign Office and to 
protect itself against their incapacity or worse. s1t8 Ever since 1924, conspiracy 
theorists on the Left have been presented with a `free hit' by the `Zinoviev Letter. ' 
They may have exaggerated their case, but the relationship between the Foreign 
Office and Labour Governments have and perhaps always will be tainted by its 
memory. 
After electoral victory, the first priority of the new Conservative 
government was to respond to French demands for British signature of the Geneva 
Protocol. They refused to sign, but a debate soon began as to the immediate future of 
European security. It would lead to Locarno. It was widely assumed that the decision 
would be that of a Foreign Office again under Lord Curzon. Having done nothing 
wrong during the months of the Macdonald government, Curzon presumed that 
Baldwin would restore him to the Foreign Secretaryship, but heard rumours though 
that the Office was going to someone else and went to see Baldwin. Again he cracked, 
complaining emotionally that 
I cannot believe that you would propose to put such a terrible slur on my 
administration which was conducted amid extreme difficulties but not without 
success in the closest and pleasantest co-operation with yourself and your 
118 Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 168. 
213 
predecessor, and I have always been led to think, with youriust approval. It 
would be too much to expect me to accept such a situation. l9 
His fears proved to be justified. He was offered the Lord Presidency of the 
Council and the leadership of the House of Lords, a post he only accepted to please 
Grace, Lady Curzon, who believed that George "would be intolerable at home" with 
nothing to do. 120 
In nine months Labour had demonstrated to many sceptics not only that it 
could govern, but that as a political force they were not going to go away, as some 
like Stanley Baldwin had hoped. John Wheatley made an impact on the Ministry of 
Health and Housing, Philip Snowden proved a competent Chancellor in the 
Gladstonian mould, but it is beyond doubt that, as both Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, Ramsay MacDonald was the star performer. "The government's greatest 
success was in foreign policy, where the success was personal to Macdonald. Policy 
was conducted by him and Ponsonby, with the machinery of the Foreign Office, in 
more or less complete detachment from the Cabinet. " 12' The manner in which 
MacDonald handled the London Conference drew praise even from Stanley Baldwin 
in the autumn of 1924,122 raising the question of how much experience of 
international negotiations and diplomacy a statesman needs to have had prior to 
having greatness thrust upon them. Certainly, Ernest Bevin proved a generation later 
(Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951) that a senior Labour politician with a history of trade 
union work and internal party wrangling was in possession of many of the skills 
required. 
119 Curzon to Baldwin, 31 October 1924 cited in Gilmour, Curzon, p. 595. 
120 Clark, The Tories, p. 50. 
121 M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour, Cambridge, 1971, p. 37. 
122 Baldwin went up to MacDonald after Labour was defeated in the Commons and 
told him: "You have done at least one good thing - the London Conference. " See 
Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 447. 
214 
Admiration for MacDonald's diplomatic skills was not universal though. 
St. Aulaire, the "arch-conservative and snobbish French Ambassador" 123 thought that 
he was "too cordial to be honest and especially too conciliatory to be sincere. s124 
This cordiality certainly won over his fellow socialist, Herriot, who felt that they 
shared "a social and humane mystique... Even in later years he recalled their 
friendship with emotion; if it failed to bear fruit at subsequent conferences, the 
`trickeries of expert appraisals and the ambushes of diplomats' were largely to 
blame. ' 1125 
In Berlin, D'Abernon did not share MacDonald's views. The openly pro- 
American Foreign Secretary was delighted with the Dawes Plan and American 
`involvement' in Europe. In 1924, D'Abernon still believed that Britain should take 
the leading role in European diplomatic and financial affairs. 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, later Permanent Under-Secretary at the time of the 
Suez crisis, but whose Foreign Office career began on leaving the army in 1919, 
believed that MacDonald took on too much responsibility in 1924. He thought that 
the experiment of combining the two offices was not a success. In my 
experience no minister has any idea of the burden imposed by the Foreign 
Office until he has to tackle the job. MacDonald thought, for example, that he 
could delegate to Ponsonby and the Permanent Under-Secretary (Crowe) the 
duty of receiving the heads of foreign missions. But the ambassadors did not 
wish to be ignored and insisted on exercising their right of access to the 
Foreign Secretary. 126 
Kirkpatrick too believed that MacDonald learned from his mistake in 
1929, when Arthur Henderson filled the post. Historians though should treat with 
scepticism the criticism that MacDonald was wrong to assume the `dual role. ' 
123 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. 199. 
124 Ibia p. 199. 
125 Mitt p. 237. 
126 Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, p. 37. 
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Stresemann had done this for several months in 1923 and Briand, Poincare, Laval, 
Tardieu and Herriot (the last three in 1932) all held the offices of President du Conseil 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs simultaneously. Between 1933 and 1939 (when 
Daladier did both until 1940) the roles were divided, with no obvious advantage to the 
conduct of French foreign policy. Sharing the responsibilities would have had dubious 
benefits for the Labour Party and may have deprived the country of a very successful 
Foreign Secretary in a critical year. 
Some favourable winds did blow for Macdonald during 1924. In June 
D'Abernon reminded him that "the last few months" had seen "the removal from the 
path of international peace and understanding of three such obstacles as Stinnes, 
Helfferich and Poincare. s127 Stinnes, the great German industrial magnate whose rant 
at Spa almost sabotaged the conference, died on 10 April. Helfferich, a leading 
Nationalist in the Reichstag, was killed in a train crash in Switzerland on 23 April. 
Poincare was defeated at the polls in May and was replaced by a fellow Socialist. 
Germany's economy and political condition was far more stable than it had been in 
the previous year. The Marx-Stresemann coalition remained in power after the 
election in May. 
Stephen Schuker believed that the 1924 financial crisis caused France, 
despite the short-term `success' of the Ruhr occupation, "to give up any attempt at 
meaningful enforcement of the reparation clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. s128 
Certainly, French governments never again attempted to use direct action in order to 
force Germany to fulfil its reparations obligations, but, even in 1932, there was a great 
reluctance to let Germany avoid submitting a final payment. It was not though a 
127 C 9765/737/18, D'Abernon to MacDonald, 16 June 1924, DBFP, 1, XXVI, p. 
724. 
128 Schuker, End of French Predominance, p. 3. 
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perception of the failure of the Ruhr invasion that led to a moderation of French 
policy, it was the benefits to France of the Dawes Plan which Poincare himself 
confessed had "functioned marvellously. " 129 
The accession to power of Herriot was a great stroke of good fortune. 
Relations with France improved, although Franco-Belgian troops were still in the 
Ruhr in October 1924 and would remain so until the summer of 1925, Herriot was 
also deeply disappointed at the opposition in Britain to the Geneva Protocol and was 
grateful for MacDonald's support, despite its eventual failure. 
Yet, perhaps the greatest example of good fortune was that the leader of 
the first Labour government became Foreign Secretary and was so knowledgeable 
diplomatically. This was not just a relief, but a great stimulus to Crowe and his 
colleagues. Despite past differences on German affairs, in 1924 the two men shared 
many of the same opinions and although the British Ambassador in Berlin favoured a 
general policy of appeasement, the Foreign Office view of Germany, as expounded in 
the 1907 Memorandum still held sway. 
1924 was therefore a far more successful year for the Foreign Office than 
any since the Great War, despite the controversy over the `Zinoviev Letter. ' It had 
regained much of the influence that it had possessed before December 1916, 
particularly because Crowe and his staff were able to establish quickly an excellent 
businesslike relationship with Labour, especially with MacDonald. If Crowe's great 
talents were again wasted at an international conference, others worked hard to keep 
other senior official informed about negotiations behind the scenes in London. 
Furthermore, recently, there has been a re-evaluation of the achievements of the 
129 Bonnet, Quai d'Orsay, p. 88. 
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foreign policy of the first Labour government. This required a review of the respective 
roles of MacDonald and Crowe. Maisel showed, using the evidence of MacDonald's 
own diary, that Crowe and the Foreign Office had primary roles in policy formulation. 
In fact, other inexperienced Labour ministers allowed civil servants greater roles in 
similar ways, possibly because they wished to `learn the ropes. ' After only two 
months in office, MacDonald wrote that "officials dominate ministers. Details are 
overwhelming and ministers have no time to work out policy with officials as 
servants; they are immersed in pressing business with officials as masters. s13° In 
1924, there was no official more likely to dominate even 4 Prime Minister than Sir 
Eyre Crowe. 
Philip Bell wrote that, in 1924, Crowe "set himself to argue the case for 
bringing Germany into negotiations as an equal partner. So for a time MacDonald's 
vague idealism chimed in with Foreign Office concepts of power Politics. "131 In fact, 
Cohrs argued that MacDonald's policy towards Germany was thoroughly designed. 
"His core aim remained to draw Weinar Germany into reformed Euro-Atlantic 
`society' of democratic nations. s132 Ifthis is so, then it was MacDonald, not the 
privately transatlantic- sceptical Crowe, who must have formulated this policy. After 
the commencement of work by the experts in December 1923, the United States 
returned to its policy of neutrality, refusing to dictate a reparations settlement, and 
therefore it fell to MacDonald "not merely to bring Paris and Berlin in line behind the 
Dawes report of 9 April 1924, but to prepare the political ground for a sustainable 
reparations settlement. s133 
130 Pearce, Britain: Domestic Politics, p. 47. 
131 Bell, France and Britain, p. 146. 
132 Cohrs, `The first "real" peace', p. 12. 
13 ibid. 
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Crowe's triumph was to be in the vanguard of British policy towards 
Germany in 1924. It was extraordinary that MacDonald, who had been an opponent of 
the 1919 treaty, should have supported the continuation of reparations, albeit through 
the Dawes Plan. For this, Crowe must take much credit for influencing MacDonald to 
change his mind. On German matters, MacDonald quickly accepted Crowe's 
policies. These had been formulated almost twenty years earlier, but still had 
relevance in 1924. Crowe had consistently maintained that he would welcome a 
Germany that rejected militarism. Although he was not a creator of the Treaty of 
Versailles, he supported its compliance and, in the case of the Dawes Plan, occasional 
sensible revision. Crowe did not want the economic destruction of Germany as it was 
in Britain's interests for it to recover, not collapse. This also was the objective of both 
the Dawes Report and MacDonald. The great obstacle was the French government 
and it was MacDonald's achievement that he more than Crowe understood the 
necessity of American participation. At London in August, Crowe privately 
demonstrated that he held an outdated belief that Britain could do without the 
diplomatic interference of the U. S. A but again such views were widely held within 
the Foreign Office. Although Crowe was relegated to a minor role at the London 
Conference (as had happened to him at Versailles in 1919), this was primarily due to 
MacDonald's desire to demonstrate that a Labour leader and Foreign Secretary could 
function independently of an eminence Brise. Yet when it came to the policy adopted 
by MacDonald, Crowe's views on Germany triumphed in London. To secure the 
agreement of all sides to the eventual evacuation of the Ruhr was a remarkable 
achievement. The inter-allied loans to Germany, particularly from the United States, 
did help facilitate its economic recovery. The Dawes protocol was a vindication of not 
219 
just Crowe's work in 1924, but was in harmony with his long-term philosophy on 
how best to deal with Germany in the re-shaped Europe after the First World War. 
220 
Chapter 6 
The Foreign Office and Locarno 
In the autumn of 1925, the Locarno Treaty was signed. This chapter will analyse the 
highly significant role of Sir Eyre Crowe and the Foreign Office prior to this event. It 
will show the considerable influence that Crowe continued to have on perceptions of 
Germany within the Foreign Office, even after his death in April 1925. The chapter 
will be divided into a number of sections. Firstly, the relationship between Crowe and 
the new Conservative government and particularly his influence on the Foreign 
Secretary, Austen Chamberlain will be discussed. Secondly, it will discuss the 
influence of the `Crowe-Nicolson' Memorandum of January-February 1925, followed 
by the part played by Crowe weeks before his death in April 1925 in enlisting the 
support of the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin for a western European security pact 
that included Germany. The final section will analyse the events leading to the signing 
of the Locarno Pact and will demonstrate that Crowe's influence inside the Foreign 
Office barely diminished up to that point. 
The comfortable victory of the Conservative party in the general election 
of October 1924 enabled Stanley Baldwin to have greater freedom to choose his 
senior ministers. His choice of Winston Churchill, until recently a Liberal, to be 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a surprising one. Many observers expected Curzon 
to return to the Foreign Office, but instead Austen Chamberlain, the former party 
leader and Chancellor, was chosen after a campaign by some Tories to block Curzon's 
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restoration because of his poor relations with the French in the past. ' Austen 
Chamberlain was a very different Foreign Secretary to Curzon. In his own estimation, 
he was "as true and warm a friend of France as any Englishman can best and 
claimed to "love France like a woman. i3 It was to his great advantage that he had 
many old friends in Whitehall and around Europe. Horace Rumbold, then in Madrid, 
sent a telegram of congratulation to him saying "how pleased I am to think that you 
are going to be my Chief s24 It seems that the new Government also had admirers. 
Graham in Rome claimed that " There is real delight in Government circles here over 
the Conservative victory and you will find a very friendly disposition and desire to co- 
operate on the part of Mussolini... "5 Crowe told Chamberlain that the Diplomatic 
Corps "like your frankness. s6 He was said to have been not only admired, but liked 
within the Foreign Off ice, being described as a gentleman with "with more modesty 
than is usual on high. "7 Maisel said that "Foreign Office members viewed with 
appreciation Chamberlain's intellectual abilities and the manner in which he 
represented their views in Cabinet. s8 
Crowe and MacDonald had generally had a successful working 
relationship and it is rather surprising that Goldstein said that the appointment of 
Austen Chamberlain "gave Crowe the opportunity he had been waiting for, a foreign 
' Grayson wondered why Chamberlain was appointed Foreign Secretary. Until his 
pro-French speech of July 1923, he had not made a great impact on foreign affairs. 
Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and Commitment to Europe, pp. 8-9. 
2 Dutton, Austen C amberlain, p. 235 
3 C. Petrie, The Life and Letters of the RI. Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, London, 
1939-1940, II, p. 30 
4 UKNA, Chamberlain Papers, FO 800/256, p. 3. 
S Ibid, p. 6. 
6 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 155. 
7 `Locarno 1925 - The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite', Historical Branch of the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Library & Records Department, No. 3, October 
1991, p. 9. 
8 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 155. 
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secretary he could collaborate with. The synergy Chamberlain and Crowe produced 
would become a powerful, if short-lived force in foreign policy. "9 The Locarno Pact 
would eventually be the result of this collaboration, although Crowe himself did not 
live to see it signed. In many respects, Austen Chamberlain was, like Crowe, a man of 
the late Victorian and Edwardian period. In November 1924, Chamberlain may have 
believed that Crowe's attitudes to Germany and France were similar to his own. Yet, 
they were not romantic or emotional, as his seemed to be, but were based upon a 
rigorous, at times cold analysis of contemporary diplomatic realities. Chamberlain 
was also aware of the limitations of his knowledge of foreign affairs and had little 
objection to the Foreign office `experts' shouldering much of his burden, but not that 
it should share the credit for his achievements. 
For many years, the role of Sir Eyre Crowe in the genesis of, and 
philosophy behind, the Locarno Treaty (or Locarno Pact) of 1925 was largely 
unknown to historians. Credit has been given to various statesmen - Chamberlain, 
Briand and Stresemann - even to D'A1ernon. Crowe's da hter stated that her 
father's role in the treaty's early stages was only partly tol and it took the release of 
the official archives to fill in the many gaps. 10 It is now clear that Chamberlain's 
Locarno policy was formulated in consultation with Crowe and other Foreign Office 
experts. 
Erik Goldstein analysed the early months of the new Conservative 
government, prior to the death of Sir Eyre Crowe and also concluded that the Locarno 
Pact of 1925 was 
the result of the convergence of several factors occurring simultaneously 
between November 1924 and March 1925, events which made Britain the 
diplomatic pivot of Europe. The period coincided with the beginning of 
9 Goldstein, `The evolution of British diplomatic strategy', p. 127. 
10 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 50. 
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Austen Chamberlain's tenure as foreign secretary, as well as the last months of 
Eyre Crowe's career as the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office. " 
The role played by the diplomats in the successful conclusion of the 
Locarno Pact had more positive results for the ministry. Goldstein felt that "these 
events acted as a catalyst for a resurgence in Foreign Office influence, after more than 
a decade in the doldrums. " 12 Austen Chamberlain, often adjudged to have been a 
statesman of less than the highest merit, 13 has also been praised for his work in 1924 
and 1925. McKercher said that "... within five months of taking office, he forced the 
Cabinet to accept a Foreign Office strategy designed to end the continuing crisis on 
the continent. s14 He did not, though, plough a lonely furrow. "Supported by Crowe 
and Foreign Office experts like Harold Nicolson, he sought in his own words to be 
`the honest broker' in continental affairs. " 15 
In October 1924, when Stanley Baldwin formed his second ministry, 
British foreign policy in Eastern Europe, and particularly towards Germany and 
France, was still in transition. There was still much post-war antipathy towards 
Germany, but French and Belgian troops were still in the Ruhr. The Dawes Plan had 
been adopted at the London Conference of 1924, but many people in Britain felt that 
the future peace of the world had, by no means, been secured. Many diplomats 
believed that a resurgent Germany was a serious threat to European peace. 16 As we 
have already seen, against the wishes of many in the Foreign Office, and especially 
Crowe, the Coalition government of Lloyd George, including Curzon, had rejected the 
idea of an Anglo-French alliance in 1921. Some, including leading members of the 
11 Goldstien, `The evolution of British diplomatic strategy', p. 115. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 254; Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, pp. 31-33. 
14 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 96. 
is Ibid. 
16 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 55. 
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recently departed Labour government, favoured a strategy in which the League of 
Nations acted as the guarantor of security. This required Britain to agree to a protocol 
that could have required British forces to be sent to any part of the world to serve 
under a foreign command. Crowe and many in the Foreign Office were vehement in 
their opposition to the protocol. '? 
What the Foreign Office ultimately proposed was a pact that guaranteed 
both France's western frontiers from attack (presumably by Germany) and yet 
embraced Germany as a partner in the maintenance of peace in Western Europe. 
However, there were a number of members of the new government that were strongly 
opposed to an agreement with not just the German government so soon after the end 
of the war, but also the highly unpopular French. To gain Cabinet support for this new 
strategy was a considerable achievement and "in all of this, Crowe played a central 
role, as much to force the Foreign Office vision of foreign policy on recalcitrant 
politicians as to revitalise `the brotherhood'. Although he died in April 1925, his 
successors - and Chamberlain's - built on these accomplishments for the next dozen 
years. s18 McKercher agrees with Goldstein's view that Locarno enabled the 
diplomats to gain much prestige, so much that McKercher said that the remaining 
years of the 1920s "were the salad days of the interwar Foreign Ofice. s19 Goldstein 
also believed, like McKercher, that "the move to develop a focused and coherent 
foreign policy was driven by the combined forces of the new foreign secretary, 
Austen Chamberlain, and his dying permanent under-secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe. s20 
17 See R. Henig, `Britain, France and the League of Nations in the 1920s', in Sharp 
and Stone (eds. ), Anglo-French Relations, p. 151. 
18 McKercher, `Old diplomacy and new', p. 97. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Goldstein, `The evolution of British diplomatic strategy', p. 116. 
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Crowe's daughter believed that the origins of the Locarno Pact "must be 
sought in the decision of the conservative government, after it had come to power in 
1924, to reject the Geneva Protocol, and the need therefore felt to put something in its 
place, to satisfy the French demand for security. s21 
The year 1925 was a turning-point in the history of the Foreign Office and 
the German question. The acceptance of the Dawes Report at the London Conference 
of 1924 had led to an improvement in relations between the German government and 
the victorious allies. The military occupation of the Ruhr was expected to end at some 
time during the year and the popular clamour to exact every penny in reparations from 
Germany had considerably diminished both in Britain and France. The issue had not 
been solved, though, because the matter of inter-allied debts remained. The 
Conservative government that replaced Labour before the end of 1924 did, however, 
have a much calmer international situation to face than did the Bonar Law 
administration before the end of 1922. 
The Dawes Plan was a temporary measure (for just five years) and the 
`experts' in the Foreign Office were fully aware of this. The new Conservative 
Foreign Secretary gave his opinion that he was broadly "optimistic and believe that 
the Dawes Report can be carried out. s22 But, in 1925, Austen Chamberlain needed 
the reparations issue to be relegated to the background of international diplomacy. It 
was an extremely sensitive issue for both him and the Foreign Office. It could very 
easily have been a barrier to diplomatic progress. Yet, neither the Foreign Office nor 
the Treasury tried to use it as one. In fact, in 1925, members of the Foreign Office, 
21 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 51. 
22 UKNA, Austen Chamberlain Papers, FO 800/256, p. 11. 
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such as Crowe, Harold Nicolson and Lord D'Abernon were in the vanguard of the 
tendency towards reconciliation with Germany. 
However, the interpersonal and interdepartmental rivalry in the senior 
ranks of the government became a major factor in the unfolding of events. The new 
Conservative Cabinet has intrigued historians as much as it must have surprised the 
Tory Party in November 1924. Stanley Baldwin was not in the front rank of Prime 
Ministers in terms of intellect, but he was one of the most astute of all party managers. 
Baldwin gave the two most senior offices of state to two of the leading supporters of 
the Lloyd George coalition. Austen Chamberlain went to the Foreign Office while 
Winston Churchill, twenty years in the Liberal Party and not yet even a Conservative 
M. P., accepted an invitation to go to the Treasury, the post having been declined by 
Joseph Chamberlain's other son, Neville, who preferred to return to the Health 
Ministry. The selection of Austen was in no small measure due to his undoubted 
Francoplilia; the memory of Curzon had to be erased quickly from diplomatic minds. 
Churchill, the master showman, could put the case for the government in the 
Commons with the rhetorical gifts and exuberant verbosity his rivals lacked. 
Historians and contemporaries have not been generous to Austen 
Chamberlain, "a financier-politician who knew little of Europe and a sentimentalist 
much devoted to the empire. ' 923 Churchill said that "he always played the game and 
always lost it. 9924 Unlike Balfour and Curzon under Lloyd George, his Prime Minister, 
who was "not much interested in foreign affairs, "25 gave Chamberlain considerable 
latitude. Therefore " hamberlain was able to conduct his policies without 
interference from Baldwin, with whom his prickly temper had led him to have several 
23 M. R. D. Foot, British Foreign Policy Since 1898, London, 1956, p. 97. 
24 `Locarno 1925 - The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite', p. 9. 25 Ibid. 
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quarrels before he went to the Foreign Office; though his own health broke down 
under pressure of work; and for much of 1928 he was away ill, leaving the office to 
Cushenden, a dogged Ulster Tory, his parliamentary under-secretary. , 26 if 
Chamberlain loved France and, by implication, the French, his attitude to Germany 
and the Germans was a different matter: "They cringe or they bully; they speak like 
master or servant and seem incapable of behaving as equals,, simply and naturally, or 
of believing that are not again top dog ... s27 Believing, like many of his Foreign 
Office mandarins, them to be politically hopeless, he told a German diplomat that 
they were "a nation of Poincares. s28 He was able though tc sustain a good enough 
working relationship with Stresemann for him to have been genuinely moved by the 
Foreign Minister's premature death in October 1929. The machinations of the A. A. 
(the German Foreign Ministry) and the Reichstag left Chamberlain as infuriated as 
most of his diplomats. It did not take long, therefore, for rumours to circulate in 
London that there might soon be an Anglo-French alliance. 29 Lampson minuted, on 5 
November 1924, that a guarantee pact with France, simila to that of 1919, could 
3° replace the Geneva Protocol. Later, Crowe himself, on 14 January 1925, minuted his 
support for such a pact. 
On 16 December 1924, the Committee of Imperial Defence met and heard 
the views of the governments of France, Belgium, Italy and Czechoslovakia on the 
Protocol. France and Belgium wanted a tripartite security pact with Great Britain. 
Chamberlain agreed, saying that "... it would give far more effective security than 
26 Foot, British Foreign Policy, p. 101. 
27 UKNA, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 4/1/1269, Chamberlain to Mary 
Carnegie, 25 April 1926. 
29 AC 53/569, Chamberlain to Tyrrell, 9 December 1926. 
29 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 389. 
30 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 164. 
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the Protocol could ever do. ' v31 Curzon suggested that Crowe, "with his great 
authority, " should be the chairman of a sub-committee of the C. I. D. Chamberlain, not 
wanting to overload Crowe, opposed this and so Hankey was given the job. 
In Berlin, on 29 December 1924, having recently returned from a visit to 
London, D'Abernon suggested to Carl von Schubert, State Secretary at the German 
Foreign Office, that the German government revive the Cuno offer of December 
1922. Stresemann believed that D'Abernon must have been acting with his 
government's backing and on 20 January 1925, through D'Abernon, the German 
government proposed a multilateral pact also involving Britain, France and Italy, with 
the United States acting as trustee, ensuring that no party waged war "for a lengthy 
period (to be eventually defined more specifically)... s32 Although the reaction of the 
experts in London was `cool, ' Crowe and his colleagues believed that the proposals 
could complement the initiatives then being proposed by the Foreign Office. In fact, 33 
on 19 December, Crowe had said that a declaration could be framed that both France 
and Germany could sign, although there were problems with the issue of the defence 
of Germany's eastern frontier. 34 
Austen Chamberlain, the Conservative Party and the Foreign Office had 
strongly opposed the Geneva Protocol, 35 but did want to reduce tension in Europe, 
partly by allaying many of France's security concerns. He "saw Franco-German 
tensions as the crux of the continent's problems. He believed that the only way to 
31 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 52. 
32 C 980/459/18, memorandum from the German Foreign Office, enclosed in a 
telegraph from D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 20 January 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 
283. 
33 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 168. 
34 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 54. 
33 W 362/9/98, minute by Chamberlain, 4 January 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 255. 
See also Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 163. 
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promote conciliation was to reduce France's fears of a resurgent Germany. "36 To this 
end, on 4 January 1925, Chamberlain sent a memorandum around the Foreign Office 
seeking the experts' wisdom on the matter. The papers that he received reveal much 
about their attitude to Germany just over six years after the end of the war. Ronald 
McNeill, Chamberlain's Parliamentary Under-Secretary, wrote that Germany 
"always has dishonoured her signature when it suited her. , 37 However, the historian 
of the Foreign Office, Headlam-Morley, minuted to Eyre Crowe that "a statement of 
this nature should not be accepted and should not be made the basis of our policy 
without a fuller statement of the facts on which it is based. ' '38 Historically, as far back 
as Bismarck, was Germany any worse than any other State, he asked? 
McNeill then analysed the options open to Great Britain and of the 
possible future European situation. Britain must either keep Germany effectively 
disarmed, or, must maintain superior defensive forces which will succeed in "making 
Germany dangerous to herself. " The traditional policy of preventing the dominance 
of any one power on the continent must be maintained and therefore Britain could not 
"allow the low countries to fall into the hands of a great military Power. " In an age 
of submarine and aerial warfare this policy was more, not less necessary. McNeill 
asked if an order to reduce the danger of a repetition of a German invasion of France 
and Belgium "what are the advantages in, and the objections to, proclaiming that 
intention in advance? " He believed that " if we had been definitely committed 
beforehand to support France in 1914, there would have been no war. " He recognised 
though what would be the possible objections to this announcement of British foreign 
policy - "our traditional dislike of putting our signature to any document that may 
36 Steiner, Lights That failed, p. 388. 
37 W686/9/98, note by R. McNeill, 16 January 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 269. 
39 W68619/98, minute by Sir James Headlam-Morley, 16 January 1925, ibid. 
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commit us to engage in a future war; and the opposition to which this dislike would 
give rise in the press and in Parliament. Also, perhaps, the difficulty of obtaining 
consent of dominions. s39 
Unfortunately, there are no minutes of the conference that took place 
within the Foreign Office on 18 January 1925, but we do know its conclusions 
because they were summarised in a paper written by Harold Nicolson on 23 January. 
Geographical and demographic factors meant that Britain would never be able to 
extinguish French fears of Germany. Britain must either have no foreign policy at all 
(still a popular option inside the ministry) or have some kind of security agreement 
that included France. Chamberlain himself though "was much struck with one 
observation made by Mr Headlam-Morley at our conference... that the first thought of 
Castlereagh after 1815 was to restore the Concert of Europe, and that the more 
ambitious peacemakers of Versailles, when they framed the Covenant, still left a gap 
which only a new Concert of Europe can fill. "40 Grayson claimed that the idea of a 
new Concert of Europe "became a hallmark of Chamberlain's policy, s41 including 
the League of Nations. 
Salzmann totally disagreed that Chamberlain had such an aim and even 
believed that Grayson misunderstood the term, `Concert of Europe. '42 What is 
undeniable is that the aims of the senior officials of the Foreign Office were in 
complete accord with Chamberlain's aims. They had moved easily away from the 
post-Versailles hard line on reparations fulfilment, through Lloyd George's and 
39 W 686/9/98, Note by Mr Mc Neill, 16 January 1925, ibia pp. 269-27 1. 
ao FO 371/11065, W 1252/9/98, minute by Chamberlain, 21 February 1925 cited in 
Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and Commitment to Europe, p. 39. 
41 Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and Commitment to Europe, p. 38. 
42 Salzmann, Rapallo and After, 1922-1934, p. 56. 
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Curzon's difficulties with Poincare, MacDonalds's determination to gain acceptance 
of the Dawes Report and on now to Chamberlain's vision of international `bonhomie. ' 
At the end of January 1925, the sub-committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence submitted its report, rejecting nine of the sixteen articles of the 
Geneva Protocol. It also submitted a declaration, written by Crowe, to be signed by 
Britain, France and Belgium and which assumed that Britain would be prepared to 
fight if the Channel ports of France and Belgium were in danger of being invaded by 
another nation. 43 It was a declaration that was certainly in the spirit of the 1907 
Memorandum. 
When the French government revealed on 9 February 1925 that it was 
willing to discuss the German offer, Chamberlain concurred. He was "strongly 
backed by Crowe, who was quick to welcome the German offer, declaring that it was 
`a move in the right direction and ought to be encouraged'. "44But, on 19 February, in 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Foreign Secretary was attacked by a group of 
Cabinet colleagues including Churchill, Birkenhead and Curzon. Desperately, 
Chamberlain requested that 
if any member of the committee has any doubt about the extreme difficulty of 
conducting foreign policy when in fact you have no foreign policy, or of the 
dangers which assist us in Europe if we do not come to an early decision, I 
would beg them to hear my chief of staff, Sir Eyre Crowe, who has not only 
studied but handled foreign affairs for forty years. He will speak with an 
experience which gives him more authority than I have in my official 
capacity. 45 
Chamberlain's "passionate view that you cannot conduct the foreign 
policy of this country unless you give France some feeling of security"46 temporarily 
43 See S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', pp. 53-54. 
44 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 476. 
4S S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 62. 
46 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 478. 
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convinced Balfour to reluctantly support him. Curzon, unsurprisingly, "hedged... and 
refused to come to any decision. 947 The question was then referred to the whole 
Cabinet for further discussion. One thing was not in doubt - the dependence of the 
Foreign Secretary on his Permanent Under-Secretary in matters related to Germany 
and western Europe. This was soon proven even more. 
Following Austen Chamberlain's departmental conference, Harold 
Nicolson, under the supervision of Sir Eyre Crowe, 48 drew up a memorandum that 
analysed the current situation in Europe. On 20 February, Chamberlain minuted that 
"it represents not only the personal opinion of the Secretary; of State, but the 
considered view of the Foreign Office as a whole. ' s49 Crowe and Nicolson identified 
the lingering anger of the Central Powers at the loss of territory in 1919, the fear of 
Great Britain's former allies of losing what they had won and the isolation of Russia 
from the Concert of Europe. 
The primary concern of the British government, though, remained 
Germany, which although currently impotent "will sooner or later again become a 
powerful military factor. sS° Yet, few Germans wanted another war against the British 
Empire and it was doubtful that most wanted a war of revenge against France. To all 
Germans the two most objectionable provisions of the Peace Settlement were "the 
Polish corridor and the partition of Silesia. "5' 
In Nicolson's opinion, "Germany will sooner or later recover. She will 
certainly desire to revise the Polish clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. If France were 
isolated, and British neutrality to be assured, she might also endeavour to attack 
47 Ibid. 
48 C 2201/459/18, memorandum by Nicolson and minute by Chamberlain, 20 
February 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 311. 
49 Ibid 
so Ibid, p. 312. 
" Ibid. 
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France. 52 He also believed that "unless France can be secured against their menace, 
she will be driven to expedients which in the end will only provoke the German 
revenge of which she stands in terror. ' v53 Nicolson stressed that in a situation "of 
such incertitude, the only sound line of British policy is the path of British interests. 
The road is too dark for any altruism or digression; it is our own security which must 
remain the sole consideration. " The policy of `splendid isolation' was not practicable 
any longer. "Geography and aeronautics show that isolation is not in our case a 
scientific fact. ' 04 Britain had to defend her imperial dominions, the sea 
communications between herself and those dominions and, of course, Britain itself. 
The defence of Britain required that no continental Power could be allowed to 
dominate the ports of the Channel and the North Sea and that the hostility of any of 
the countries that possessed these ports to Britain was to be prevented. Any country 
that invaded France or Belgium threatened Britain both via the Channel and aerial 
invasion. It was therefore imperative that Britain reached some understanding with 
France and Belgium, perhaps a guarantee, that no other Power would be permitted to 
control these ports. A guarantee to France and Belgium would make "a very 
important contribution to European security. "55 The smaller nations would be given 
greater security and be encouraged to make peace. As McNeill had written, Germany 
would not have risked war in 1914 had she known that Britain would assist France. 56 
Nicolson saw no reason "to prevent the eventual inclusion of Germany 
within the guarantees of security thus established. "57 As far as the French were 
concerned, they would know that their "ultimate security is regarded as of direct 
$2 Ibid, p. 315. 
53 Ibid, p. 316. 
sa Ibid. 
ss Ibic, p. 317. 
56 W 686/9/98, notes by Mr R. McNeill, 
57 Ibid p. 317. 
16 January 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 271. 
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interest to the British Empire. The provocative policy inspired by her present 
uncertainty will tend to diminish; she will contemplate with less alarm the impending 
evacuation of the Rhineland; she will be less inclined to contemplate the Little 
Entente as an armed camp to the east of Germany; she will be able to settle down to 
financial stabilisation and to policy of debt-repayment. "58 
Nicolson's (and Crowe's) conclusion was unequivocal: "... until we can 
quieten France, no concert of Europe is possible, and we can only quieten France if 
we are in the position to speak to her with the authority of an Ally. 
"The essential interests of Imperial Defence are thus closely related to a 
policy of European security. The first hope of stability in Europe lies in a new entente 
between the British Empire and France. sS9 
The memorandum was sent to the Cabinet, but was forcefully opposed by 
a "powerful coalition of Curzon, Balfour, Amery, Churchill and Birkenhead, all of 
whom wanted no continental commitments. t260 They may have believed that the 
memorandum would affect the solidity of Germany's pact with Russia made at 
Rapallo. 61 It was a powerful argument, as no member of the British government 
wanted a powerful union of Germany with Bolshevik Russia, although D'Abernon 
argued that such a bloc posed no military threat to Europe. 62 Churchill though, wrote a 
long letter to Chamberlain in which, in effect, he argued against the Crowe 
Memorandum. "It should never be admitted ... that Britain cannot, if the worst comes 
to the worst, stand alone. ' 63 When France made a real peace with Germany, he said, 
sA Ibid. 
59 Ibid p. 318. 
60 Goldstein, `The evolution of British strategy', p. 132. 
61 Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 249. 
62 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 164. 
63 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 63. 
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then Britain "will seal the bond with all our strength. ' 64 Chamberlain replied, 
repeating his (and Crowe's) earlier arguments and so stormy Cabinet meetings soon 
followed. 
At a Cabinet meeting on 4 March, at which the Prime Minister, 
Baldwin was absent because he was visiting his critically ill mother, Chamberlain was 
only permitted "to tell Herriot that he attached the highest importance to Germany's 
overture for a quadrilateral agreement of mutual security, hoped that the proposal 
would be most carefully considered, and would like to know whether the French 
shared the British government's views. ' v65 If they wished the British government to 
participate, it would not obstruct any such project, but Chamberlain had to say that he 
could not agree to any specific plan or promise the support of the Dominions. "These 
half-hearted overtures caused dismay... s66 not just to Herriot, but to Chamberlain and 
Crowe. 
But, on 4 March, the former Liberal Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey of 
Falloden, still a figure of great authority in diplomatic circles, made a powerful 
speech in Parliament in which he advocated the British Empire's participation in a 
regional security agreement. 67 On the following day, Chamberlain admitted that the 
German government had made a proposal and said that the government were 
considering such an agreement. Chamberlain then travelled to Geneva to attend the 
Council of the League of Nations. In Paris, on 7 March, en route to Geneva, 
Chamberlain held a critical meeting with Herriot. He told him that not only was Great 
Britain unwilling to make a security pact with France, nor an Anglo-Franco-Belgian 
64 Ibid. 
65 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 479. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Northedge, 'T'roubled Giant, p. 250. 
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one, but it was also not going to sign the Geneva Protocol. 68 "On the other hand, the 
German proposals seemed to us to offer a hope of a solution in which we might co- 
operate. ' '69 Herriot could not hide his disappointment. Herriot suspected that Dr 
Luther, the German Chancellor, "up to a point an honest man, ' 70 was really playing 
to his domestic political audience. Herriot was bitter that France had been forced to 
subscribe to the German loan in 1924 by the United States while being unable to 
repair her own devastated regions. Germany was now spending large sums on re- 
development and was therefore rapidly recovering. Herriot was profoundly worried: 
"From my heart I tell you that I look forward with terror to her making war upon us 
s71 again in ten years. 
For one British diplomat, this was too much. From Geneva, 
Chamberlain questioned Crowe about the opinions of the British Ambassador in 
Berlin: 
Lord D'Abernon's telegrams seem to indicate that he thinks that Germany has 
offered everything that could be asked and it would be fatal to demand more. 
If this is the real attitude of German government nothing can come of their 
memorandum... Is there not a danger that Lord D'Abernon misunderstands 
real situation.. . If Germany does not advance with every step we take, still 
more if she retreats as we advance, our effort is doomed to failure and must be 
abandoned at once; does Lord D'Abernon see this and does he hold suitable 
language to German government? Unless we press Germany at least as much 
as France our whole effort will fail? Does not Lord D'Abernon need full 
confidential instructions for his guidance, lest in atmosphere of Berlin he 
should wholly misconceive situation? 72 
Chamberlain believed that Germany foresaw too many difficulties about 
joining the League of Nations and questioned the Ambassador's resolution. He asked, 
68 C 3367/459/18, Chamberlain to Crowe, 7 March 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 344. 
69 Ibica p. 344. 
70 Ib14 p. 345. 
71 Ibid p. 346. 
72 C 3376/459/18, Chamberlain to Crowe, 9 March 1925, ibid, p. 356. 
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"Does Lord D'Abernon realise that unless they join League on the same footing as 
other Great Powers nothing can come of their proposals? ' 973 
The Foreign Secretary's main difficulty, though, remained convincing his 
sceptical Cabinet colleagues. In Geneva, Chamberlain wished to tell the disappointed 
and worried Herriot that the British government agreed to become part of a western 
European security agreement and he telegraphed Baldwin seeking the authority to do 
so. On 11 March, the day before Chamberlain announced that Britain would not sign 
the Geneva Protocol, Crowe was present at an informal Cabinet meeting in which 
strong objections were given by Amery, Churchill and Birkenhead. Chamberlain's 
hope of a four-power pact seemed forlorn. Crowe wrote angrily to him in Geneva: "I 
cannot describe to you the despicable impression made upon me by this discussion, 
nor the feeling, I may frankly say, of indignation in which I left it. s74 Churchill had 
said that France "could be left to stew in her own juice... all we had to do was to go 
our own way and in a few years time we should see France on her knees begging for 
assistance and allowing us to impose anything whatsoever on her. "75 Amery thought 
that the Dominions would oppose it and that the government should just "avoid the 
danger of any entanglements and to restrict ourselves to developing moral 
atmospheres by pacific methods, to the exclusion of anything to do with war. ' %76 
Crowe told Chamberlain that he had never heard "even Ramsay MacDonald, in his 
most woolly-headed pronouncements, talk such utter rubbish as Mr Amery poured 
forth. "77 Only Lord Robert Cecil said anything sensible. 78 After hearing other 
ministers expressing 'heir doubts, Crowe was given a final chance to speak. "This he 
73 Ibia p. 357. 
74 Dutton, A Gentleman in Politics, p. 244. 
75 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 481. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Dutton, A Gentleman in Politics, p. 244. 
79 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 173. 
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did without mincing his words. s79 Churchill was wrong. A quarrel with France would 
lead to a break in the Entente, with serious consequences for Europe. The statements 
of some ministers would, in effect, make it appear that the British Foreign Secretary 
had "grossly misled the French Prime Minister. s80 Baldwin, who had remained silent 
throughout, thanked Crowe and asked him to leave the room whilst the Cabinet 
discussed the policy privately. Crowe told Chamberlain that he was left with the 
impression that the Cabinet group was not judging the issue on its merits, but 
deliberately placing the Foreign Secretary in an untenable position. 81 Chamberlain 
had to consider his response. 
On 18 March 1925, the Cabinet majority, led by Churchill, rejected the 
proposed pact again. Northedge observed, but did not explain why, only six days 
later, Chamberlain stood up in the House of Commons and made a speech in which he 
was able to sum up the German offer, with some amendments favourable to the 
British government. 82 Days earlier, Chamberlain had considered resignation. He could 
no longer tolerate the interference of his colleagues in the management of his 
ministry. 83 On 15 March, he directed Crowe to speak on his behalf to the Prime 
Minister, informing him that, were it not for the serious consequences, he would have 
cancelled his meeting with Herriot and returned immediately to London in order to 
resign. Crowe and Corp argued that 
this threat had a dramatic effect when conveyed personally by Crowe to 
Baldwin over the weekend. Baldwin at once told him to reassure Chamberlain 
`that there is no question of his not having his full confidence. What was said 
79 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 482. 
so Ibid. 
81 Dutton, A Gentleman in Politics, p. 244. 
82 Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 250. See also, Hansard, 182, column 316, speech by 
Austen Chamberlain, 24 March 1925. 
83 See Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and Commitment to Europe, pp. 51-55 on the 
question of the evacuation of Cologne, Chamberlain's threat to resign and Crowe's 
role. 
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at the informal meeting by individual ministers must not be taken as 
constituting a decision of the Cabinet. '84 
On 19 March, Chamberlain returned to London and quickly met Baldwin. 
The next day, Chamberlain attended a Cabinet plenary that accepted that the German 
proposals were the best way forward as a basis for European security. But, Maisel 
said that "Crowe's words in the conference of Ministers of 11 March had had a 
decisive effect. s85 After he had left the room that day, the Cabinet had decided "to 
continue the policy of refusing any pact with France... unless a quadrilateral 
arrangement could also be made to include Germany. s86 However, Steiner agreed 
with Crowe's biographers that 
it would take Chamberlain's threat of resignation and further arguments in the 
cabinet in his absence (with Eyre Crowe... playing a vital part) before 
Baldwin authorized the specific offer of British participation in future talks for 
a quadrilateral pact. 87 
When Chamberlain spoke in the Commons on 24 March he first 
announced that the British government was unable to sign the Geneva Protocol88 and 
then informed the House, officially, of the German proposals: 
If I understand them rightly, they amount to this: that Germany is prepared to 
guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has prepared accepted under the 
compulsion of the Treaty, that is, the status quo in the West; that she is 
prepared to eliminate, not merely from the West, but from the East, war as an 
engine by which any alteration in the Treaty position is to be obtained... In 
regard to the West she is prepared to renounce all desire of change, and to 
enter into a mutual Pact to guarantee the existing situation. In suggesting 
arbitration in the East, she does not propose or suggest that her Eastern 
frontiers should become subject to such treaties of arbitration. She is prepared 
to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in 
the East. 89 
84 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 483. 
" Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 175. 
86 Ibid 
87 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 391. 
88 Hansard, 182, column 314, speech by Austen Chamberlain, 24 March 1925. 
x' Ibid, column 318. Chamberlain also favoured Germany's membership of the 
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Therefore, this was what Crowe had sought in the 1907 Memorandum -a 
peaceful Germany. From the perspective of the British government, it was a very 
significant development. Crowe did not live to witness the signing of the Locarno 
Pact. On 28 April 1925 he died of kidney failure. He had been ill for some time and 
had belatedly agreed to go on an extended sick leave. Crowe then became seriously ill 
and within a few days was dead. Austen Chamberlain was deeply affected: "He was a 
great public Servant, devoted to duty, delightful to work with, of immense knowledge 
and experience and proved judgement ... I 
did not think that I would have felt so 
much for a man whom I have only known intimately for a few months. s90 The 
Foreign Office was "plunged into gloom". 91 The respect with which Crowe was held 
by many of his contemporaries was undeniable, from Clemenceau in Paris in 1919 
("Crowe, c'est un homme ä part") to young members of the Foreign Office such as 
Ivonne Kirkpatrick and their seniors (Vansittart, etc. ). Ramsay Macdonald was surely 
not being insincere when he told Lady Crowe in 1931 that "even after all these years 
it is impossible to speak of Crowe without tears in one's eyes. ' v92 
Some historians though have mistakenly accused Crowe of being `anti- 
German. '93 His biographers rightly denied this. He believed, they said, in a strong 
Germany that could be a positive advantage for the world, but if it turned to 
militarism and tried to dominate Europe, Britain had to oppose it. Many very 
important members of the Foreign Office, Hardinge, Tyrrell, Rumbold, Vansittart, 
Wellesley and Sargent, for example, shared Crowe's view. This firm attitude to 
9° Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 176. 
91 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 489. 
92 Ibid, p. 490. 
93 Ibid, pp. 134-135, Note 64. Several authors, for example G. P. Gooch, believed that 
Crowe suffered from a `violent Germanophobia. ' Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, p. 9. 
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Germany was generally, but not entirely in opposition to any policy of appeasement. 
They did not support the French and the Belgians in the Ruhr, did not oppose the 
Dawes Plan or the early evacuation of the Rhineland, but they observed the frequent 
breaches by the Germans of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty and retained 
a suspicion of German governments and politicians throughout this period. 
It was no surprise that Sir William Tyrrell was quickly chosen to 
replace Crowe. Despite a history of drink problems, particularly following the loss of 
a son during the war, he was the natural successor. Tyrrell had an unrivalled 
curriculum vitae. From 1907 he had been Grey's Private Secretary and had worked 
closely with his two predecessors at the Foreign Office. He had much in common 
with Crowe in particular. Tyrrell had been educated in Germany, spoke the language 
fluently, was profoundly suspicious of German militarism and favoured an Anglo- 
French alliance to contain Germany. In August 1916 he and Ralph Paget had 
proposed that Germany should be checked in Eastern Europe by the creation of buffer 
states such as Poland and Yugoslavia. Unlike Crowe, Tyrrell believed that Germany 
was actually planning a war of revenge in Europe. 94 Tyrrell believed that Germany 
had few arguments, only excuses, for not paying reparations and was deliberately 
weakening her own economy in order to avoid fulfilling her obligations. He disagreed 
with the view held by many Frenchmen that by destroying Germany's economic base 
her military threat would best be diminished. Tyrrell supported an alliance with 
France because it would either guarantee her security against German aggression or 
would effect a greater degree of moderation in her views. 
There were other new men in 1925 who had some influence in the 
events that unfolded. On 15 January 1925, in Germany, Dr Hans Luther formed a 
94 FO 371/6880, N 13814/105/38, Minute by Tyrrell, 19 November 1921 cited in 
Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 55. 
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minority cabinet consisting of two Liberal and two Catholic parties. The new 
Chancellor was not affiliated to any political party, but did have a recent record of 
achievement. From 1918 to 1922 he had been Mayor of Essen, followed by a year as 
Minister of Agriculture. Between 1923 and January 1925 he had been Minister of 
Finance under Stresemann and Marx, during which time he had been responsible for 
currency reform and the acceptance and execution of the Dawes Plan. D'Abernon said 
that he had "none of the minor graces, but a sturdy presence not unlike a Thames 
tug. "95 
The most significant feature of the new coalition was the continued 
presence of Stresemann as Foreign Minister. The foreign policy of Germany between 
1923 and 1929 was the foreign policy of Gustav Stresemann. He had been a German 
Nationalist during the First World War. The Foreign Office was aware of this. In the 
chaos of party politics in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Stresemann became 
the most significant figure in the German National People's Party (the D. N. V. P. ), a 
right-wing political group that favoured the return of the monarchy, but not the violent 
overthrow of the Weimar Republic. 
Stresemann though, due in part to his mishandling of the election, 96 was 
partly responsible for the new German Head of State. Following the death on 9 
February of Ebert, Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg was elected President of the 
Weimar Republic on 26 April 1925. Ambassador Sthamer tried to reassure Austen 
Chamberlain that the hero of Tannenburg was no threat, telling him that the Marshal 
was an hones man, a soldier who had seen too much of the horrors of war to 
desire a repeti ion of them, and who knew too well Germany's incapacity to 
wage a war to think of provoking it. He was a man who would keep his oath, 
and his assumption of the Presidency threatened no monarchical restoration. 
95 `Locarno 1925 - The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite', p. 9. 96 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 392. 
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He would observe and defend the Constitution, and behind him were gathered 
all the sober and strong elements of the German people. 97 
Chamberlain was impressed. He told Sthamer that it "would be idle to 
pretend that the election ... 
had not produced a very unfavourable impression upon 
public opinion in this country as well as in France ( but) ... I myself 
did not take this 
view. " Having read the Chancellor's recent speech and of the President's approval of 
it, "in these circumstances, I saw no reason to change my pqlicy. "98 Thirty years 
later, Vansittart wrote a far more damning criticism of Hindenburg and the 
Germans. 99 
In April 1925, the Foreign Office was eager to 
circulate American 
concern. In Paris, Seydoux informed Phipps that he had had a conversation with 
Winston, an American official about the matter. Winston "seemed to be in absolute 
despair over Hindenburg's election" 00 and asked what could be done to satisfy 
France's security requirements. Seydoux told him that the only answer was "a close 
understanding between France, the United States and Great Britain. " 101 Phipps was 
certainly articulating the feeling of the British Government' when he told Seydoux that 
he hoped that the conversations then taking place with the 3ermans would not be 
affected by the result of the election. Seydoux agreed that they must continue, 
although perhaps with less speed than previously. It could not be disputed that 
fourteen million Germans had voted for Hindenburg. Yet, not for the only time, 
Phipps praised Seydoux who "seemed very frightened, but only too anxious - as 
97 C 5852/459/18, Chamberlain to Addison, 30 April1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 469. 98 Ibid p. 471. 
99 « .. he too fitted his people, for like them he had no political mind. " Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 23 8. 
'oo C 6047/459/18, Phipps to Tyrrell, 29 April 1925, DBFP, 1, XXVII, p. 464. ßo1 Ibid. 
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indeed he always is - to find some peaceful issue to all our terrible problems. " 
102 
Phipps though was less impressed with the return to high office of Philippe Berthelot, 
who following the amnesty given by Herriot's government, had regained his old 
position of Secretary-General at the Quai d'Orsay in April 1925. Berthelot was 
believed to be opposed to the talks with the German Government and Phipps hoped 
that he would not be able to influence Briand to adopt that view. 
In Berlin, Stresemann told D'Abernon that he feared that the extreme 
Right would exploit Hindenburg's elevation to challenge his policy of conciliation, 
although he admitted that a security pact signed by the Field-Marshal would have 
more weight than one signed by a socialist president. 103 Stresemann told D'Abernon 
that Hindenburg was initially reluctant to stand, but had been persuaded by Tirpitz. 
Stresemann assessed "the slyness and duplicity of Tirpitz (as) extremely high' 9104 
and "with every good reason. "' 0' D'Abernon was apparently less nervous. He told 
Chamberlain that, according to Hindenburg's friends, the ageing President was 
particularly "not to be troubled and to get to bed at 9. "106 
1925 also saw changes of government in France. On 17 April, the Herriot 
government fell. Paul Painleve became President of the Council, but of far greater 
importance was the return of Aristide Briand as Foreign Secretary. Other changes, 
more remarkable, also occurred. Le Matin sent its notoriously Germanophobic 
commentator, Jules Sauerwein, to Berlin for the presidential elections. Confirming 
both Sthamer's and D'Abernon's opinion given to the Foreign Office, he told his 
readers that the Field-Marshal was very honest, but was "not likely to take a very 
102 Ibis, p. 465. 
103 C 5969/459/18, D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 3 May 1925, ibid, p. 476. 
104 C 6250/35/18, D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 3 May 1925, ibid, p. 477. 
105 Ibid minute by Tyrrell. 
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close interest in politics or diplomacy. " 107 Most significantly, Sauerwein reported that 
many Germans now favoured a rapprochement with France. The new government 
must now reply quickly to the German offer of a pact. Stresemann told him that if no 
reply was received in the next week, then he would have to announce in the Reichstag 
that the allies had failed to respond to an offer made by Germany because of their 
continued suspicion of her and their own internal divisions. 1° On 12 May 1925, the 
French Government gave its response to the German offer to the British 
Government. 109 The change of administration was not the main reason for the delay. 
France would not respond until they and the British agreed on military control. France 
refused to separate disarmament from the evacuation of the Cologne zone and the 
question of general security. 
In the Prime Minister's room in the House of Commons on 26 May 
1925, Chamberlain gave his comments on the French reply to the Cabinet. '10 
Briand had replied in a "general tone ... 
(that) was all that could be desired and more 
than could have been expected. "11' Briand had two main principles and Chamberlain 
assented to them both: firstly, that any pact should supplement and not contravene the 
Versailles Treaty, and secondly, "to avoid all possibility of war by providing for a 
peaceful solution of all conflicts. " 12 But, Chamberlain reminded the Cabinet that in 
February 1921 France had made a treaty with Poland and that any western security 
pact might weaken this. France again wished the British Government to "extend their 
107 C 6056/459/18, Crewe to Chamberlain, 5 May 1925, ibia p. 480. 
los Ibid, p. 480. 
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obligations. s113 The French proposals "sought to link up the western with the eastern 
settlement ... 
(and therefore) it was necessary for His Majesty's Government to guard 
themselves. s 114 
At 5 p. m. on 20 July 1925, Dr Sthamer delivered the German reply to the 
French note to the Foreign Office. '15 In the Reichstag, Stresemann welcomed the 
honouring of the commitment made at the London Conference in August 1924 that 
the Ruhr would be evacuated twelve months hence and was confident that the three 
towns in the Cologne zone would also be evacuated. 
In 1925, the Foreign Office diplomats generally agreed about the nature of 
German foreign policy. There were though dissenting voices. From Warsaw, the 
Minister Plenipotentiary, Sir William Max Muller, wrote a private letter to Miles 
Lampson, in which expressed his doubt about Germany's renunciation of the use of 
force and its guarantee of the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium: "do you really 
maintain that, after our experience in 1914, we are justified in considering that future 
generations in Germany would hold themselves bound by any such declaration? ", 16 
Muller believed that Germany was untrustworthy and through the proposed pact that 
it was distinguishing between its eastern and western frontiers. Muller felt that "the 
real object of the proposals is to pave for a revision of the Eastern frontiers. "t 17 
Months earlier, the German minister in Warsaw, had told him that the Germans 
"would never accept the Polish Corridor" and Muller admitted that he could 
113 Ibid. 
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understand their "natural and even inevitable" position. 118 Carsten pointed out that 
regaining the Polish Corridor was one of Stresemann's main foreign policy aims. He 
accepted the western boundaries as imposed by the Treaty of Versailles as final, but 
that those in the east should be revised. Carsten said that these opinions were also held 
by nearly all the other German political parties. s119 Therefore, was Sybil Crowe being 
naive when she suggested that had Eyre Crowe lived, he would have completed the 
`other half of the Locarno Pact by gaining Germany's agreement to its eastern 
frontiers? 120 This would definitely have been far more difficult to seal than just the 
proposed western pact. 
On 7 September 1925, Stresemann sent a confidential letter to ex-Crown 
Prince Wilhelm in which he explained the real German foreign policy aims on the eve 
of the Locarno Conference: "In my opinion there are three great tasks that confront 
German foreign policy in the more immediate future. 
"In the first place the solution of the Reparation question in a sense 
tolerable for Germany, and the assurance of peace, which is an essential premise for 
the recovery of our strength. 
"Secondly, the protection of Germans abroad, those 10 to 12 millions 
of our kindred who now live under a foreign yoke in foreign lands. 
"The third task is the readjustment of our eastern frontiers; the 
recovery of Danzig, the Polish corridor, and a correction of the frontier in Upper 
Silesia. 
118 Ibid. 
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"In the background stands the union with German Austria, although I 
am quite clear that this not merely brings no advantages to Germany, but seriously 
complicates the problem of the German Reich. "121 
It should be repeated that Stresemann was a fervent Nationalist during the 
First World War. Unlike many other nationalists though, he was a realist. He did not 
believe that the return of the monarchy was a possibility in the near future. The allies 
would not permit it. Nor would they accept wholesale treaty revision, but with a 
subtle diplomatic approach, Stresemann believed that gainsIcould be made, satisfying 
German demands for greater national prestige by the restoration of some of the losses 
suffered in Paris in 1919, eventually even the removal of the hated war-guilt clause 
and an end to the payment of reparations. An international conference was therefore a 
critical vehicle for him to move Germany forwards in this direction. 
If Paris was completely the wrong venue for the post-war peace 
conference with Germany in1919, then the little lakeside Swiss town of Locarno was 
an inspired choice. More importantly, though, was that members of the German 
delegation were treated as equals, not as pariahs. During te conference, Briand was 
able to exploit the beauty of Lake Maggiore to further the cause of diplomacy. On 10 
October 1925, he hired a small launch, the Orange Blossom, and invited the leading 
players, especially Chamberlain, Luther and Stresemann to celebrate Mrs 
Chamberlain's birthday. The future Lady Chamberlain must have been disappointed 
as the statesmen used their brief separation from press and technical experts to discuss 
121 Stephen J. Lee, The Weimar Republic, p. 87. 
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a compromise on the awkward question of Germany's future participation in League 
of Nations sanctions. 
The statesmen present at Locarno on 16 October 1925 initialled the 
following eight documents: - 
1. A Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great 
Britain and Italy. 
2. An Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium. 
3. An Arbitration Convention between Germany and France. 
4. An Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 
5. An Arbitration Treaty Between Germany and Poland. 
6. A Note to Germany regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. 
7. A Treaty between France and Poland. 
8. A Treaty between France and Czechoslovakia. 
"The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee confirmed Germany's frontiers with 
Belgium and France as agreed at Versailles, stipulated that Germany, Belgium and 
France would not attack one another or resort to war except in legitimate self-defence 
or in consequence of a League of Nations obligation, and that they would settle their 
disputes by pacific means. The Treaty was underpinned by the Arbitration Treaties 
Agreement to sign Treaties of Guarantee with Poland and Czechoslovakia. " 122 
The Locarno Treaty, initialled at Locarno on 16 October 1925, was 
formally signed at the Foreign Office on 1 December 1925. King George V said, 
122 `Locarno 1925 - The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite', p. 4. 
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" This morning the Locarno Pact was signed at the Foreign Office. I pray this may 
mean peace for many years. Why not for ever? " 123 Berthelot and Schubert 
represented their foreign offices, while Tyrrell, D'Abernon, Crewe, Grahame, 
Lampson, Selby, Bennett, Cavendish-Bentinck and the international lawyer, Sir Cecil 
Hurst, who had written parts of the treaty, represented the British equivalent. 124 
It was an extraordinary occasion in the magnificent setting of the great, 
barrel-vaulted Reception Room (later re-named the Locarno Room). The venue was 
crowded. "Behind a barrier journalists from half the world were wedged in tiers, and 
photographers and cinematographers were perched high up in nooks above the 
windows. It was very modern and really extremely simple. """ The B. B. C., founded 
in 1922, had wanted to broadcast the event, but the Foreign Office considered that the 
results might be negligible. Austen Chamberlain opposed the idea on the basis that he 
might utter an ungentlemanly oath if his pen failed him as he was signing the treaty. 
The Locarno Conference of October 1925 was the most important of its 
kind since Versailles in 1919. Compared to the shambolic disorganisation in Paris this 
conference was assiduously planned by the Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay over a 
period of months. Not even the tragic death of Eyre Crowe in April 1925 disrupted the 
planning of Locarno inside the Foreign Office. His successor, Tyrrell, and Lampson, 
the head of the department responsible for Germany, both enthusiastically promoted 
the conference and greeted favourably the final treaty. 
In his own mind, the Locarno Treaty was a landmark achievement for 
Britain's Ambassador in Berlin. "It has been a wonderful negotiation, both on 
account of the speed with which it has been carried through, and the results which 
123 Nicolson, King George V, London, 1952, p. 410. 
124 The Times, 2 December 1925. 
125 Ibid 
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may be anticipated from it. s126 It was the culmination of D'Abernon's long-cherished 
aim of restoring Germany to diplomatic parity with the other great European nations. 
His opinions were not popular among most of the Whitehall mandarins and Locarno 
must have been a great satisfaction to him. He had consistently rejected the widely- 
held diplomatic conception of Germany as the `mad-dog' arch-militarist of Europe, 
the warmonger and perpetual threat to both continental and world peace. To 
D'Abernon, the Locarno Treaty both ended the war against Germany and reduced the 
danger of her being sucked into the tentacles of Bolshevik Russia, as had seemed a 
serious possibility to him after the Treaty of Rapallo. 
Certainly, in that brief period of the Locarno `honeymoon, ' D'Abernon 
attracted an interesting variety of admirers. In his diary, he described a dinner given 
to him on December 11 1925 by Sir Abe Bailey, a South African financier and 
racehorse owner. Bailey and D'Abernon were old friends from South Africa from 
before the Jameson Raid of 1895. The purpose of the dinner was to celebrate the 
Ambassador's role in the Locarno negotiations and he could not disguise his 
satisfaction at the celebrity guest list: "A Belshazzar's feast, of a refined order, with a 
wonderful collection of guests. Two ex-Prime Ministers, Balfour and Asquith, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The 
Times, Keynes, Philip Kerr, and several magnates. ""' D'Abernon had no major 
reservations about the significance of the pact, nor which nation deserved the most 
credit: "English diplomacy never achieved a more striking success than the Treaty of 
Locarno. s128 England did not monopolise the receipt of his praise though, as "it 
126 D'Abernon diary entry, 25 October 1925, Ambassador of Peace, 3. 
127 Aid, p. 212. 
128 Ibia p. 24. 
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required indeed exceptional ability and skill on the part of the three Foreign Ministers 
concerned. While the highest praise has deservedly been allotted to Chamberlain, 
Briand and Stresemann, it would be unjust not to recognise the immense service 
rendered by others like Schubert and by the legal advisers of the Foreign Offices of 
the three countries. These latter luminaries were called together in advance of the 
meetings of Ministers, and to their detached discrimination and to their skill in 
drafting much of the final success was due. s129 
Yet, while extolling the "sagacity and moderation' *130 of the German 
Secretary of State, Schubert, D'Abernon made little mention in his diaries of the work 
of his colleagues in London. In the whole three-volume diary of his Ambassadorship 
there is only one brief reference to Sir Eyre Crowe. D'Abernon may have felt that 
Whitehall officials were a greater danger than Germany to peace, but more likely he 
may have believed that they were now just minor players on the diplomatic stage. 
D'Abernon was probably right to attribute a measure of luck to the pact. 
"Locarno was one of the most surprising strokes of good fortune recorded in history 
... 
(because) public opinion in both France and Germany was far behind the 
progressive spirit which animated the negotiators, and finally led to success ... the 
broad spirit of appeasement which animated Locarno was in strong contrast with the 
somewhat vindictive preoccupations which hampered wisdom at Versailles. s131 
The Locarno Treaty has thus been much criticised by historians since the 
Second World War. Yet, Austen Chamberlain believed that, through the treaty, he had 
achieved a lasting pe ce in Europe, although he remained deeply suspicious of 
129 D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, 3, p. 8. 
130 Ibid, p. 28. 
131 Ibid, p. 9. 
253 
German political unreliability. 132 Tyrrell believed that, within a few years, Germany 
would go to war again. The biographers of Sir Eyre Crowe though are more 
sympathetic: "It seems ... unrealistic to 
blame the authors of the Pact for not 
foreseeing... the political mayhem, including the rise of Hitler, by which it was 
followed. In the context of its time it was a great achievement. " 133 The `wisdom of 
hindsight' argument is not convincing. M. R. D. Foot believed that it failed for three 
reasons. The guarantees only applied to Germany's western frontiers (as the 
Bolshevik government could not fail to observe); there was! no connection between 
policy and strategy, and there was very little that was really; new in the treaty. 134 At 
least the first and last of these were identified as weaknesses in 1925. 
For Austen Chamberlain, Locarno was the zenith of his career. "Certainly 
no other single achievement of Chamberlain's political life earned him so much praise 
and admiration. " 133 He was made a Knight of the Garter. In his own estimation, in 
November 1925, his achievement was comparable to that of Castlereagh after 1815 in 
rehabilitating Europe after a great war f Even his critics ha e conceded that his 
intentions were creditable. " He wanted to promote peace " and "saw that the key to 
it, for the time being, lay in Germany. 99136 
Whose achievement was the Locarno Treaty though? Chamberlain has not 
been the only recipient of praise for its architecture. "The first and most memorable 
product of Briand's new policy ('apaisement') was the Treaty of Locarno which was 
signed by France and Germany in 1925 with Britain and Italy as guarantor 
132 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 183. 
133 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 485. 
134 Foot, British Foreign Policy, p. 98. 
135 Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, p. 230. 
136 Foot, British Foreign Policy, p. 98. 
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powers. s137 According to The `Times on 2 December, the great crowd outside the 
Foreign Office when the treaty was signed shouted Wive Briand. ' None of the other 
statesmen were given that accolade. Briand himself allocated shared credit: "At 
Locarno we spoke European. It is a new language which one would do well to 
learn. " 138 Other historians have given the greatest praise to Stresemann, as "on every 
major issue raised at the Conference the German view-point was the one that found 
acceptance. " 139 Only recently, has Crowe been given any credit. 
Chamberlain himself evaluated the purpose and achievement of the 
treaty in a conversation with the Lithuanian Minister, M. Galvanauskas, at the Foreign 
Office in November 1925. In response to praise for improving relations between 
nations not even signatories of the pact and a question about its ultimate effects on 
British policy, the Foreign Secretary replied: 
Our policy was one of appeasement... From the day I entered this office I had 
worked under the conviction that unless we could change - and that within a 
few years - the spirit of the relations existing between France and Germany, 
we should move fatally towards a new catastrophe. The Conference of 
Locarno had produced an immediate change greater than I had expected, but 
the merit of Locarno lay in the manner in which agreement had been reached 
and in the spirit in which the treaties would be executed. They were the 
voluntary acts of the nations immediately interested, sprung from their own 
initiative and not imposed by any external power. It was because they were the 
result of free consent that they appeared to me to give such hope for the future. 
I knew that many difficulties still lay in our path, but I kept before my eyes, as 
statesmen in all countries should do, not merely to-day or to-morrow, but the 
future. What we must do could forget an unhaa py past and come to manhood 
without the desire to renew the old struggle. ' 
Grayson claimed that Austen Chamberlain "originated and controlled 
much European policy in the Foreign Office. There, those with the greatest influence, 
137 Neville, France 1914-1969, p. 60. 
138 Ibis p. 61. 
139 `Locarno 1925 - The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite', p. 7. 
140 C 14493/459/18, Chamberlain to Vaughan in Riga, 10 November 1925, DBFP, 
I A, 1, pp. 122-123. 
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Crowe and Lampson, were influential because their views coincided with 
Chamberlain's interpretation of what was necessary. s141 This was certainly not true in 
the early months of 1925 when the new Foreign Secretary was vacillating and sought 
the help of his experts. On 4 January 1925, Chamberlain was "frankly at a loss. 99142 
His policy was to a great extent based on Foreign Office views - notably Crowe, 
Nicolson, and Headlam-Morley, although D'Abernon less so. 
Erik Goldstein had no doubts about the major role played by Crowe in the 
evolution of the Locarno Pact. 
What is particularly intriguing about the whole episode is how most of the 
recommendations went through Crowe. . It 
is worth pondering how much 
Crowe, whose health was rapidly deteriorating was driving events. Having 
helped engineer Chamberlain's, and by implication the Foreign Office's 
victory over internal interference in policy, Crowe had achieved one of his 
great goals. A few days later he went on indefinite sick leave, and 
Chamberlain went on to negotiate the Locarno Pact. '43 
Crowe and Corp agreed with Goldstein about Crowe's influence. The 
early stages of the process were very difficult, but 
the back of the problem had really been broken once initial agreement had 
been reached in the Cabinet on the Quadrilateral Pact, in whose formulation 
and acceptance Crowe had clearly played such a vital part. It was a fitting 
conclusion to his untiring efforts since the end of the First World War, both to 
maintain and strengthen the Anglo-French Entente, however difficult this 
might be, and in this very way, the only practical way, as he rightly saw that 
there was, to bring Germany back into the comity of Nations. Just as before 
the war he had supported a strong policy towards Germany, not, as sometimes 
been alleged, in order to provoke war, but in order to avoid it, as now, after the 
war, he worked for a closer understanding with France not to crush Germany, 
but to reinstate her. 144 
This argument can be strengthened by reading the `Crowe-Nicolson 
Memorandum on British policy in Europe of 20 February 1925. Chamberlain minuted 
141 Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe, p. 33. 
142 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 55. 
143 Goldstein, 'The evolution of British strategy', p. 134. 
144 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 484. 
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that it represented his views and those of the Foreign Office. But it was, quite simply, 
the 1907 Crowe Memorandum, re-written for the altered situation in 1925. It 
contained many of the older document's themes, for example, the link between 
Britain's imperial interests and European security. Yet, in its desire for a peaceful 
Germany to become a full member of the western European fraternity, the flexibility 
of the 1907 Memorandum was again demonstrated. 
In his persuasion of Baldwin in March 1925, Crowe, the man whom 
Lloyd George accused of being ill-equipped to cope with matters on a high political 
level, achieved something of a political masterstroke. As Crowe's daughter 
discovered, the archives revealed that during Chamberlain's absence in Geneva, "it 
was his permanent under-secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, who, bearded these same cabinet 
colleagues, and, persuaded the prime minister, Baldwin, to agree to proposals for such 
a pact. " 145 How extraordinary it was that a politician of Chamberlain's vast 
experience should entrust his political career to the persuasive powers of a public 
servant, unless one is aware of the abilities and character of that individual. 
However, ust criticism of Locarno must be given some response. " J The 
real losers at Locarno were Poland and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia. The terms 
of the treaties provided no safeguards for the eastern frontiers. "1"6 Although 
hypothetical, the question of an `eastern Locarno, ' and what part Crowe might have 
played, has to be raised. Goldstein's view is that 
Chamberlain ... during his remaining tenure of office never evinced any real interest in moving to the implicit second phase of negotiating an eastern 
Locarno. Indeed, the remaining period of his foreign secretaryship is but a 
pallid reflection of those first energetic months. Inevitably this raises the 
question of how far Crowe was, as he so often had been, the real engine. It is 
of course impossible to say what would have happened had Crowe lived, but it 
145 S. Crowe, `Crowe and Locarno Pact', p. 49. 
146 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 403. 
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is possible to imagine that he would have acted to deal with the many loose 
threads left by Locarno. '47 
Historians of the Foreign Office have described it as being in a state of 
`eclipse' in the immediate post-war years. 148 It is an interpretation that is similar to the 
analyses of those who worked in the Foreign Office during that period in connection 
with Anglo-Franco-German affairs. 149 In a hagiographic biography of her father, Sibyl 
Crowe, in partnership with Edward Corp, gave a different opinion, as it is Lloyd 
George's administration of foreign affairs from the `Garden Suburb' that had been the 
subject of critical scrutiny, not Crowe's leadership of the Foreign Office while 
Permanent Under-Secretary. They accept that its influence was diminished in the 
1930's, but not in the twenties, "least of all between 1920 and 1925. " They 
questioned " the alleged domination by Lloyd George of British foreign policy 
between 1920 and 1922... and the growing influence of the Treasury over foreign 
affairs during the whole period between 1920 and 1925. " 150 
Eyre Crowe's outstanding achievements are almost beyond question. 
The tributes of his contemporaries are remarkable for a civil servant, although his 
biographers believed that 
... the 
influence of Lloyd George over foreign policy was not as great as some, 
including he himself, have maintained; and though it is true that the Treasury 
played an increasingly significant part in the development of British foreign 
policy between 1920 and 1925, it would be wrong to assume that this 
automatically led to a drop in the power and prestige of the Foreign Office, for 
in fact, under Crowe's skilful guidance, it considerably enhanced it. As 
documentary, evidence shows, he not only made full use of the expert 
information ýnd advice which the Treasury offered him, he constantly asked 
for it himself, whilst, at the same time, keeping the direction and control of 
147 Goldstein, `The evolution of British strategy', p. 135. 
148 For example, Sharp, `Foreign Office in Eclipse'; Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919- 
1926. 
149 For example, Nicolson, Peacemaking - 1919; Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, 
Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters; Vansittart, Mist Procession. 
150 Crowe and Corp, Ablest Public Servant, p. 402. 
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policy firmly in F. O. hands. When he died in the Spring of 1925 the prestige 
of the F. O., like his own, consequently stood high both at home and abroad. ", 
The influence and prestige of the Foreign Office after the end of the war is 
a highly debatable subject. Crowe and Corp did not discuss Sharp's evidence of the 
absence of Crowe and his colleagues from many of the post-war reparation 
conferences, for example. 152 Nor did they publish details of exactly what Crowe did at 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 or the London Conference of 1924 and this is one 
of the important gaps that this research has filled. Their priority seems to have been to 
show that Crowe was a truly great man whose role has been undervalued by history, 
that he was frequently mistreated or misunderstood, and that he was right on foreign 
policy matters when others were wrong, or simply lied. There is strong evidence for 
each of these points, but the purpose of this thesis is far more limited and it is not a 
hagiography. It aims only to show that the principles of Crowe's Memorandum of 
1907 were the guide to British policy towards Germany in the seven years following 
. the end of 
the First World War. This was never better demonstrated than in the year 
prior to the signing of the Locarno Treity of 1925. 
's1 Ibid. 
152 See Chapter 1, p. 16. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that from the end of the First World War in November 1918 to 
the signing of the Locarno Treaty in December 1925, the predominant attitudes 
towards Germany within the Foreign Office were those of Sir Eyre Crowe, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1920 until his death in April 
1925. These attitudes had been expressed with extraordinary clarity and vision in a 
classic memorandum submitted by Crowe to the Foreign Office on 1 January 1907. It 
can also be argued that the attitudes towards Germany of Crowe were shared by many 
of the leading government ministers between 1918 and 1925, most notably, Lloyd 
George, Curzon and Austen Chamberlain. Crowe even managed to influence the 
policy towards Germany of Ramsay MacDonald and the first Labour government. 
As explained in Chapter 1, Lloyd George did not like Foreign Office 
`experts' and wished to make diplomatic decisions without them, especially on 
German matters and evidence from Crowe presented in Chapter 2 showed that in 
Paris in 1919, before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, he and his colleagues 
were, to a large extent, humiliated by their Prime Minister. Moreover, for the next 
forty months, at the post-war reparations conferences, as Sharp showed, FO experts 
were marginalised. Yet, analysis of the policy of the British government towards 
Germany between November1918 and October 1922 has also revealed that the 
ideological influenc of the Crowe memorandum remained considerable. During this 
period there was no appeasement of Germany. The German government was treated 
firmly, but fairly, from a position of strength. British interests were paramount 
primarily because Anglo-German trade needed to be restored to its pre-war level as 
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soon as possible. This required the German government and people to reject 
militarism and embrace peaceful policies. Lloyd George had been a government 
minister since 1905; he knew the principles of the Crowe Memorandum of 1907; and 
he supported them in his dealings with Germany while Prime Minister. 
The influence of Crowe on Curzon, MacDonald and Chamberlain was 
more direct and personal. They relied upon Crowe, not only for his industry and 
knowledge, but also because of his ability to formulate policy without fear or desire 
for obfuscation. In Chapter 3 it was shown that European affairs were not Curzon's 
preference and that he experienced great difficulties in dealing with Poincare. This 
thesis has emphasised Curzon's reluctance to take decisions on European affairs and 
his reliance on Crowe to assist him even on Turkish matters. Curzon's conduct of the 
Ruhr crisis was frequently disinterested, even incompetent. At first, he passed the 
problem to the ailing Bonar Law, and then, in 1923, as was argued in Chapter 4, it 
was Crowe who stimulated the only positive direction of British government policy 
on Germany, 
In the first six months of the first Labour government, Crowe was also 
indispensable to Ramsay MacDonald, but for very different reasons. To begin with, 
MacDonald wanted to give greater responsibility to his Permanent Under-Secretary 
because he needed to prove the competence of his party to govern. It was remarkable 
that a First World War pacifist should entrust the formulation of policy towards 
Germany to a Foreign Office official who had been labelled an `anti-German 
scaremonger' in the Edwardian era. But the fact that MacDonald respected Crowe's 
views and knowledge of German affairs reveals the commanding influence he exerted 
on politicians across the political divide. Indeed, Chapter 5 showed that the French 
and German acceptance of the Dawes Report in London in August 1924 was at least 
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as much due to Crowe as to MacDonald. This thesis has also shown that there would 
have been no Locarno Treaty, but for the work of Crowe in the final months of his 
life. Foreign Office archival evidence presented in Chapter 6 demonstrated that when 
the Conservatives returned to power in November 1924, it was Crowe who had the 
solution to Chamberlain's difficult question, namely, how to bring France and 
Germany together and solve the problem of western European security. When 
members of the Cabinet objected, Chamberlain trusted Crowe to convince them of the 
correctness of the proposed course and then to persuade the Prime Minister to support 
his Foreign Secretary. His early death was a national and an international misfortune 
and historians can only hypothesise about what policies he might have advocated in 
the next few years. It is difficult to evaluate the influence of a person on government 
policy in the months and years following their death, but, in Crowe's case, it cannot 
be easily dismissed. 
Of course, it could be argued that John Maynard Keynes had a greater 
influence than Crowe over British government policy towards Germany during the 
entire inter- war period, following the publication of The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace in December 1919. Yet this is not true of the period up to 1925. As has 
been shown in Chapters 1 and 2, Keynes's book was heavily criticised by, for 
example, Lloyd George, Crowe, Hardinge and Vansittart. In fact, the book had a 
bigger impact in the United States and Germany in the 1920s, not in Britain and 
France. Even Keynes' economic views were not adopted in Britain before the Second 
World War. Of course, Keynes had been a member of the Treasury team in Paris in 
1919. He had accepted that Germany was greatly responsible for the outbreak of the 
war and, in a report, proposed that Germany should pay a reparations sum of 13 
billion. Nor can it be said that the Dawes Plan was the result of allied guilt inspired by 
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Keynes' book. Crowe had wanted Germany to recover economically in order to 
increase British trade, as well as it being a way of preventing the resurgence of 
German militarism. Wall Street bankers saw it as a means to ensure the repayment of 
wartime debts to the U. S. A.. 
Academic historians have known the name of Sir Eyre Crowe since at least 
the publication in 1928 and 1933 of books by former colleagues such as John Gregory 
and Harold Nicolson. Public servants tend to be unknown to the general public, but, in 
the interests of historical accuracy and human justice, when the contributions of such 
people were so influential, their work must be given due credit. For this to have 
happened, it was vital that the recollections of former- major actors, for example, 
ministers and ambassadors, were as true a record of past events as was possible. If 
not, as a consequence, this can result in biographers of statesmen omitting the role of 
their most important public servants, or, at best, relegating the work of public servants 
to almost nothing. Readers of history are then presented with the false impression that 
politicians originated, developed and executed policy. 
In writing their memoirs, or writing letters to members of their families, 
Lloyd George and Lord D'Abernon, for example, were guilty of gross historical 
deceit. In attempting to justify and elevate their roles in great historical events, these 
men distorted historical truth by largely ignoring, in the formulation of policy 
regarding the German government, the role of Sir Eyre Crowe and some of his 
Foreign Office colleagues. Austen Chamberlain paid a glowing tribute to Crowe when 
he died, but he did not sufficiently shed light on how much he had depended upon 
him in the few months that they had worked together. Despite the publication in 1934 
of the memorandum of 1907 and the autobiographies of senior officials, for example, 
Vansittart, Hardinge, Strang and Kirkpatrick, little was known about Crowe until the 
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late 1960s. Since the opening up of the archives in 1967, historians such as Zara 
Steiner, Roberta Warman, Sibyl Crowe, Alan Sharp, Erik Goldstein, Edward Corp 
and Ephraim Maisel have attempted to increase awareness of the work of Crowe at 
the Foreign Office in the first quarter of the twentieth century. They and others have 
stimulated academic research (this thesis, for example) and have provoked much 
academic debate on subjects such as the influence of the Foreign Office before, during 
and after the First World War. 
When the First World War ended in November 1918, the Foreign Office 
needed to recover much of the influence that it had lost during and even before 1914. 
In wartime, power had been concentrated in the hands of a smaller group of people 
than had been the case in peacetime. It was Grey, the Foreign Secretary, not Asquith, 
the Prime Minister, who announced in the House of Commons on 4 August 1914 that 
Britain was at war with Germany. If it was true that Eyre Crowe's advice was ignored 
in the critical weeks in the summer of 1914, the influence of his famous memorandum 
of 1 January 1907 had been considerable in the previous seven years. This 
memorandum had articulated the concerns of many Foreign Office experts about the 
Kaiser's empire. Crowe was Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office 
and was the ministry's leading expert on the country of his birth, upbringing and 
education. He identified Germany's militaristic and imperialistic tendencies to be a 
threat to Britain's interests. British government policy towards Germany before 1907 
had been characterized by the granting of repeated concessions and, like a 
blackmailer, Germany had responded by demanding more and more. Crowe proposed 
an end to this policy and advocated a firm, but fair line towards Germany instead, as 
well as a tightening of the `entente' with France. 
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In July 1914, Crowe urged Grey to clarify Britain's intentions to stand by 
its obligations to Belgium, but Grey did not do so. In the opinion of his future Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, as well as Crowe's biographers, the Foreign Secretary proved 
incapable of decisive action. During the war, Crowe's exceptional industry and 
expertise were largely utilised organising the blockade of enemy ports, a vital factor 
in the final allied victory. Crowe's family connections (his mother was German and 
his uncle a senior German admiral) had resulted in him being the victim of prejudice 
within the Foreign Office earlier in his career, but, in the paranoid atmosphere of 1917 
and 1918, Crowe became one of the main targets of a group of `Hun-baiters' that 
included Horatio Bottomley and some leading Suffragettes. A mob of 3,000 people 
marched on his house and Crowe had a gun loaded to defend his home and family, but 
police prevented the threatened attack. He later confessed that he seriously considered 
resignation and not even speeches in Parliament praising his invaluable work for his 
country, nor the sweetener of a knighthood, could compensate for the injustice that he 
suffered. When the war ended, Crowe believed that he faced an uncertain future. 
What happened was that his career became entwined with that of another remarkable 
individual, the Prime Minister. 
In his memoirs, Lloyd George, published in the 1930s, criticised Grey's 
fatal indecision in 1914, but, on becoming Prime Minister in December 1916, blamed 
the Foreign Office `experts' for the outbreak of war. For the next six years, he 
determined foreign policy towards Germany with a small coterie of advisers known as 
the `Garden Suburb. ' The `experts' were marginalised and nowhere more so than at 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. In meetings preparatory to the signing of the 
German treaty in June 1919, policies were formulated and decisions taken by Lloyd 
George and his `friends. ' The Foreign Secretary, Balfour, played little part, as did the 
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Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Lord Hardinge. The advice of Sir 
Eyre Crowe, Britain's leading expert on German affairs, was not sought. Crowe's 
private papers have revealed that he and his colleagues were largely idle in Paris 
during the early months of 1919, but then were expected to work with indecent haste 
translating (with one dictionary) inter-governmental notes of enormous importance to 
the future peace of the world. 
Yet, Crowe praised the Versailles Treaty, highlighting particularly the 
clause that permitted Germany to ask for revision within four months. He also praised 
Lloyd George's repeated concern with Germany's capacity to pay reparations. 
However, after the extraordinary period of the post-war general election, Lloyd 
George's attitudes towards Germany had much in common with that of Crowe. 
Biographers of Lloyd George and other historians have described the Prime 
Minister's attitudes towards Germany and his foreign policy aims in terms that were 
very similar to those expressed in the Crowe Memorandum of 1907. In Paris, the 
Prime Minister, like Crowe, had spoken in favour of a moderate peace settlement with 
Germany and supported the two-year delay in deciding the final total reparations sum. 
Lloyd George though signed a treaty that almost all Germans believed was a dictated, 
vindictive, victors peace, that many French people believed was too lenient on 
Germany and that many in Britain were determined that Germany fulfil, whatever 
they believed about the treaty. Between 1920 and 1922, the view generally held by 
both Crowe and Lloyd George was that Germany must fulfil the treaty. 
Although Ll d George and Lord Hardinge did not want Crowe to become the 
Permanent Under-Secretary in 1920, Crowe's wartime work as well as the all-round 
superiority of his candidature had convinced a number of influential figures, including 
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, to demand his promotion. Yet Crowe and the 
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Foreign Office were marginalised during the three years of `Conference Diplomacy, ' 
a period when Anglo-French relations exceeded Anglo-German relations in 
importance. The reparations question dominated European affairs. France wanted 
Germany to fulfil its obligations to the letter and was in favour of military 
intervention in German economic affairs and Britain attempted to restrain French 
aggression. Crowe, who had always been unconvinced about the effectiveness of the 
League of Nations and was an implacable opponent of disarmament, proposed a 
traditional solution to ease French worries about Germany. 1 
Believing that security, not reparations, was the primary French concern, 
i 
Crowe proposed a radical solution in December 1921 - an Anglo-French military 
alliance, to be operational in the event of aggression by Germany against either 
nation. Curzon and the rest of the Lloyd George Cabinet rejected the idea, not because 
of a softening of attitudes to Germany, but because of a growing antipathy towards 
France inside government and a desire to avoid continental entanglements so soon 
after the end of the war. As the United States had chosen `isolation' in 1920, the 
rejection of Crowe's security pact was one of the great e ors of British foreign policy 
in the inter-war period. Like many leading Foreign Office mandarins in 1921, 
including Crowe's predecessor, Hardinge (then British Ambassador to France) and his 
deputy and successor, Tyrell, Crowe believed that Germany was planning a war of 
revenge. 
Instead, in 1922, Lloyd George placed his faith in European 
reconstruction, to be discussed at an international conference in Genoa. Poincare, who 
had replaced Briand as French Prime Minister, had insisted that reparations were not 
to be on the agenda. Crowe and his senior colleagues opposed the conference, but it 
collapsed anyway when news emerged that Germany and Bolshevik Russia had 
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signed the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922. Poincare's policy towards the fulfilment 
of the reparation clauses of the Versailles Treaty by Germany now became more 
uncompromising. For the next six months, Crowe remained on the margins of 
government policy towards Germany whilst Anglo-French (and, owing to the fiasco 
of the `Balfour Note, ' Anglo-American) relations deteriorated. Lloyd George's 
personal style of diplomacy was exposed by the bitter atmosphere between himself 
, and 
Curzon on the British side, and Poincare on the French side. Yet, during this time, 
as for the previous three years, there were no concessions given to Germany by the 
British government. This was a principle Crowe had insisted upon in the 1907 
memorandum. He had also said that if Germany was non-militaristic, then it ought to 
be welcomed by Britain. Lloyd George did not differ from this line in principle or 
action at any post-war reparations conference or at Genoa. Hence, the Foreign Office 
was in `eclipse', but the influence of Crowe's memorandum in relation to dealing with 
Germany was not. 
In the final months of 1922, urged on by President Millerand, Poincare 
threatened, in response to a default by Germany on timber payments, a military 
occupation of the Ruhr industrial region. In October 1922, Lloyd George was 
removed from office following a Conservative party revolt and Bonar Law became 
Prime Minister. Curzon remained Foreign Secretary, but immediately abrogated 
responsibility for the crisis in Western Europe and asked Bonar Law to negotiate with 
the French. Curzon's priority was the Turkish peace treaty and demanded that Crowe 
was in Lausanne and was at his `beck and call. ' The evidence that Curzon, though an 
extremely knowledgeable minister, needed others to assist his decision-making, is 
considerable. Therefore, Crowe was not a British representative at the London and 
Paris conferences prior to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in January 1923 
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because Curzon wanted him to act as his personal adviser. Indeed, such was Curzon's 
reliance on the advice of Crowe on German affairs, it can be argued that Crowe was 
more in command of Foreign Office policy towards Germany in 1923 than the 
Foreign Secretary. 
Following the occupation of the Ruhr, the policy of the British 
government was described as "benevolent neutrality. " Crowe and his senior Foreign 
Office colleagues, especially Lampson, the Head of the Central Department, were 
privately critical of the Franco-Belgian action, believing it to be illegal, but had to 
avoid giving any impression of support to Germany. This precarious task was 
accomplished, despite repeated attempts by Sthamer, the German Ambassador in 
London to split the `entente. ' Nor did the Foreign Office show any sympathy for the 
campaign of passive resistance in the Ruhr. However, as the occupation continued, 
the British grew impatient with the words, actions and ambitions of Poincare and the 
French. From April 1923, the policies of the British became more pro-active, 
beginning with Curzon's speech to the House of Lords on 20 April and climaxing 
with the `Curzon Note' of 11 August. Grace Curzon later wrote that Crowe was the 
author of the latter and it is probable that he was also the inspiration behind the 
former. 
In the summer and autumn of 1923, the German economy collapsed as 
hyperinflation struck. The suffering of the German people elicited little sympathy in 
London. Crowe and Lampson hoped that events in Germany would demonstrate the 
folly of Poincare's strategies, particularly his attempt to create an autonomous 
republic in the Rhineland. The despatches of Clive from Munich about Hitler and the 
Nazis showed that the Foreign Office watched the extreme nationalist, militarist, 
German right very carefully and certainly not with any affinity. In Paris in 1919, 
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Crowe's opposition to a future ban on a union between Germany and Austria had 
been sensible given the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, but the allied leaders, 
especially Clemenceau, did not agree. Neither confrontations nor concessions were 
the best way of dealing with Germany. It was by having the right policy towards it. 
This was what Crowe and the Foreign Office believed. 
Therefore, in 1924, on matters related to Germany, Crowe and his 
colleagues were on the same wavelength as Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary in the first Labour government. MacDonald had been a pacifist 
during the war as well as a critic of the `Old Diplomacy' and the Labour Party had 
been opposed to the Treaty of Versailles. It is a testament to the talents and characters 
of both men that they soon established a good working relationship. Before the end of 
1923, they had welcomed the return of American involvement in European affairs 
when the Dawes committees were formed. Despite some criticisms of the report, 
Crowe and the Foreign Office fully supported the implementation of the Dawes Plan. 
The greatest obstacle was the approval of the French. This was made easier by the 
electoral defeat of Poincare, but the plan had to be sold to the new Prime Minister, 
Herriot. At Chequers and then in Paris, Herriot was dominated and then saved by the 
combined force of Crowe and MacDonald. But, strangely, at the London Conference 
in July and August, Crowe was marginalised as he had been at Versailles in 1919, 
reduced to the role of an interpreter. Yet, Crowe was present at the negotiations which 
he had not been during the period of the Lloyd George premiership and Conference 
Diplomacy. Furthermore, the success of the London Conference, the French 
acceptance of the Dawes Plan and the setting of a date for the Franco-Belgian 
evacuation of the Ruhr were a triumph for Crowe as well as MacDonald. Crowe and 
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his colleagues had done the planning and preparation for months, even if the final 
result was due to the negotiating skills of MacDonald. 
The London Conference did not solve the problem of German reparations 
because the Dawes Plan was only ever intended to be a temporary settlement. 
However, it did improve `the weather, ' in Europe, as MacDonald had intended. For 
Crowe, to pursue policies that encouraged Germany to recover economically and to 
become a peaceful nation was completely consistent with the principles that he had 
set down in 1907. It was also in Britain's interest to do so. What was not in Britain's 
interest was for it to become entangled in foreign matters that did not directly affect 
Britain and therefore he opposed the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (much to 
Cecil's annoyance) and the Geneva Protocol. MacDonald seemed to be a supporter of 
the Protocol, but it was over Bolshevik Russia that he and Crowe disagreed the most, 
although it can be stated categorically that neither Crowe nor the Foreign Office used 
the `Zinoviev Letter' to bring the Labour government down in November 1924. 
When Baldwin formed his second ministry, Crowe was very pleased at 
the appointment of Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary (and probably relieved 
at the demotion of Lord Curzon). Chamberlain was highly sceptical about the Geneva 
Protocol, but did want to reduce tension in Europe. This had to accept France's fears 
of a resurgent Germany. He did not have a solution of his own and so sought and 
utilised the expertise of the Foreign Office by way of an internal ministerial 
conference. Crowe encouraged Harold Nicolson to write a memorandum on European 
security, while Head am-Morley provided an historical overview in response to a 
vitriolic analysis of recent German history produced by the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary, McNeill (later Lord Cushendun). On the basis of these discussions, Crowe 
and Chamberlain formed a policy to be placed before the Cabinet that advocated a 
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western security pact including France and Germany. It met with fierce opposition 
from senior ministers such as Curzon, Churchill, Balfour and Birkenhead. It was 
Crowe who told a despairing Chamberlain that he had to be prepared to threaten 
resignation in order for his plan to be accepted. Then, with Chamberlain in Geneva, it 
was Crowe who faced the Cabinet and then persuaded Baldwin that he must back his 
Foreign Secretary. It was the final great success of his career. Within two months (28 
April 1925) he was dead. ' 
The Locarno Treaty was finally signed in Decerpber 1925. This would not 
have occurred without a conjunction of like-minded statesmen simultaneously in 
office from Britain, France and Germany - Austen Chamberlain, Briand and 
Stresemann. However, in the genesis and evolution of the pact, Crowe played a role 
of great importance and, had he lived, there might have been a second treaty focusing 
on eastern European security. 
Firstly, as Head of the Central Department, and then as Permanent Under- 
-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Crowe's views on Germa y had incomparable 
influence. Nobody in the ministry (noli even Tyrrell, who ad also been educated 
there) had his knowledge of Germany and awareness of its military and imperial 
ambitions. Before he submitted the 1907 Memorandum, successive British 
governments had repeatedly made concessions to Germany. After it, British 
governments should have followed his philosophy of a firm, fair line towards 
Germany, but in the summer of 1914, the advice of Crowe and the Foreign Office was 
ignored, with catastrophic consequences. Yet this, plus his outstanding wartime work 
and the respect he gained as Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Paris in the second half of 
1919, increased his reputation within the Foreign Office. His elevation to the highest 
position there was welcomed by both junior and senior colleagues. 
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Crowe's response to the anti-Foreign Office attitude of Lloyd George was 
to quietly promote men of similar views to key positions. It has been shown that, 
although Lloyd George marginalised the Foreign Office on matters relating to 
Germany, Crowe and Curzon planned for his departure. By the time that event 
occurred, there were men who were sympathetic to Crowe's views in key posts within 
the Foreign Office. In November 1918, Hardinge, Crowe and Tyrrell, all sceptical 
towards the German government for more than the previous decade, were three of the 
leading members of the Foreign Office hierarchy. After November 1920, when Crowe 
became the Permanent Under-Secretary, he, with Curzon's support, placed many who 
shared his views in embassies around the world. In October 1922, Lloyd George 
resigned. Crowe had been Permanent Under-Secretary for two years and Robert 
Vansittart and Victor Wellesley, a future Deputy Under-Secretary, had become senior 
officials in Whitehall. In addition, Miles Lampson was head of the Central 
Department and Esme Howard, Horace Rumbold and Hardinge were in key 
ambassadorial posts. ' By January 1925, Hardinge had retired, but Harold Nicolson, 
John Gregory and Orme Sargent had been promoted to the rank of First Secretary or 
above, as well as Ralph Wigram, Head of the Central Department in the 1930s, during 
which time he passed information about Nazi Germany to Winston Churchill. 2 
There were dissenting voices. Sydney Waterlow, a senior official in the 
Central Department, expressed opinions between 1920 and 1922 that deviated from 
the Crowe line. In 1920 and 1922, he questioned the ability to fulfil the Reparation 
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles of Germany. On the latter occasion, Tyrrell had to 
bring him back into line. The main voice of dissent came from Lord D'Abernon the 
1 They were in Madrid, Constantinople and Paris respectively. Howard and Rumbold 
went on to Washington and Berlin later in the decade. 
2 UKNA, Foreign Office Lists, 1918,1922 and 1925. 
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British Ambassador in Germany. In July 1920, Curzon and Lloyd George appointed 
D'Abernon, a banker, to the post in Berlin. For the next six years, he promoted the 
view that the British government had more to fear from France than Germany and that 
the main danger in Germany was a left-wing rather than a right-wing revolution. In 
1923, especially, D'Abernon's views often clashed with those of Crowe and the 
Foreign Office. 
There is a long catalogue of memoirs, autobiographies and biographies of 
former Foreign Office personnel who were Crowe's subordinates and admired him 
greatly - Harold Nicolson, John Gregory, William Strang, Ivone Kirkpatrick, Owen 
O'Malley and Robert Vansittart, for example. As Crowe lacked, according to 
Vansittart and others, a sense of humour and could be abrupt and bad-tempered, 3 they 
knew his personality defects and qualities. It was his industry, knowledge and insight 
that astonished them. "His minutes and memoranda, particularly pertaining to 
Europe, are staggering not just because of their number, but also because of their very 
content, which combines historical and strategic analyses, and an ability to see the 
situation for what it was. "4 On no other matter was this truer than on the foreign 
country that he knew best - the one in which he grew up. As a result of the war, there 
was much hostility to Germany within the ministry in the early 1920s. Some 
mandarins had lost loved ones in the war and were unable to forgive. Crowe's attitude 
to Germany was rational, unemotional and consistent. It was consistent because it was 
founded upon his own creed, as laid down in the 1907 Memorandum. The attitudes of 
most of the Foreign Office towards Germany were also based upon this and other of 
Crowe's memoranda. Even after his death, Austen Chamberlain suggested that the 
3 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 211. 
4 Maisel, Foreign Office, 1919-1926, p. 49. 
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best way to deal with the Germans was to "read Crowe's minutes to them. "5 The 
esteem in which the Foreign Office experts held Crowe's views can further be 
demonstrated by the publication of the 1907 Memorandum several years after his 
death. 6 It was extraordinary that such a State document should be accorded this 
honour. It not only demonstrated the intellectual authority of the treatise, as well as 
finally vindicating his patriotism that had so shamefully been questioned during the 
war, but revealed the support for it within the Foreign Office. This applied as much in 
the early 1920s as in the early 1930s. 
In the early 1900s, a previous Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
responded to an attack by the German Ambassador, Count Hatzfeld, upon him, His 
Majesty's Government and British policy. "Lord Sanderson retorted that we had no 
policy, that our policy was to have no policy, that we lived from hand to mouth... "' 
This attitude did not apply after the end of the war. In 1907, the Crowe Memorandum 
had been an attempt to formulate a clear basis upon which a decisive line on Germany 
could be taken. The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 had demonstrated the 
inadequacy of an uncertain, ad hoc approach. After November 1918, and especially 
after Crowe became the Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Office had a 
framework within which British foreign policy towards Germany could be conducted. 
This was the 1907 Memorandum. 
As John Gregory said, Crowe dominated the Foreign Office. He was 
behind many of the reforms of the early 1900s. He did this intellectually by producing 
' Ibid. 
6 Connell quoted the complaint of Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times for 
almost all of the period from 1912 to 1941. In 1934, Dawson said that a colleague that 
he referred to as `X' had had Foreign Office officials waving copies of the Crowe 
Memorandum at him as he walked along the street. The newspaper tended to have a 
sympathetic attitude to Germany at that time. See Connell, The 'Office, p. 164. 7 Vansittart, Lessons of My Life, pp. 23-24. 
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a memorandum that articulated many of the concerns about Germany within the 
Foreign Office. During the First World War, Crowe did work of such vital importance 
at the Ministry of the Blockade that he won the admiration even of men such as 
Balfour, Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil. In Paris in 1919, while his superior, 
Hardinge, lost his authority, Crowe enhanced his own, despite the absurd way in 
which he and his Foreign Office colleagues were treated by Lloyd George in the 
period prior to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In the second half of the year, 
he became Britain's representative on the Supreme Council, with the rank of 
Ambassador Plenipotentiary, earning the great respect of Clemenceau, "who had an 
eye for value", called him "un homme ä part s8 - an exceptional man. 
In January 1920, the treaty was put into operation, but in the same month, 
Crowe became seriously ill. By the end of the year though, Crowe held the post of 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Until he went on sick leave in 
March 1925, Crowe had a powerful influence over three Foreign Secretaries (Curzon, 
MacDonald and Austen Chamberlain) and almost all of his colleagues, especially on 
the subject in which he was Britain's foremost expert - German affairs. They 
followed his principles - firm, but fair treatment of Germany, maintain close ties with 
France and assert the primacy of British interests. The most senior members of the 
Foreign Office also followed Crowe's line on Germany and played vital roles 
themselves, especially the head of the Central Department, Miles Lampson and 
Crowe's deputy, Tyrrell. 
It has ben shown that, on Germany, Lloyd George largely shared 
Crowe's views. Between October 1922 and February 1923, when Crowe returned 
from Lausanne with Curzon, there was a policy vacuum at the head of British 
8 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 211. 
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government and the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 was not 
prevented. Later in that year, the policy initiatives often credited to Curzon, especially 
the `Curzon Note' of 11 August 1923, were the work of Crowe. On German matters, 
the policy of the Labour government reflected his views as well as those of 
MacDonald. This meant the acceptance of the Dawes Report on reparations by all of 
the major powers concerned. This was achieved at the London Conference of 1924, 
the prelude to which Crowe made a very significant contribution, if not at the 
conference itself. When Austen Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary in October 
1924, it was Crowe again, this time with Harold Nicolson and the historian Headlam- 
Morley, whose memoranda were of such assistance to their minister. Aside from his 
critical meeting with Baldwin, at Chamberlain's behest, in March 1925, Crowe 
therefore played a major part in the evolution of the Locarno Pact. He now had what 
he had always wanted since 1907, a German government that wanted peace and 
cooperation, not conflict, with Britain and France, but he had also argued that should 
a militaristic government ever take power in Germany th n only a strong stand would 
suffice. It is, therefore, a great pity that Crowe was not ali e when the great 
international crisis of the 1930s erupted. 
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